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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that the land question in Malawi can be resolved through 
the emergence of a responsibilized State under people–generated responsibilization. 
People–generated responsibilization is a holistic, bottom–up approach to tackling 
asymmetrical access to, and ownership of, land in the country. This, it is suggested, 
must entail proactive, people–based action for a triangulated approach to land reform 
involving law, macroeconomic frameworks like poverty reduction strategies, and the 
adherence to the terms of governing under the Constitution. 
The broad context of the research is that since the mid–1990s, Malawi has 
joined the ‘new wave’ of land reform. The new wave takes place amidst the re–
conceptualization of ‘development’ in development discourse through a supposedly 
decentred focus on economic growth. The new donor consensus is that land reform 
must be more human–centred and foster pro–poor economic growth. It is in this 
environment that Malawi adopted the National Land Policy in 2002. The Policy is 
meant to guide the country’s land reform and contribute to sustained economic 
growth. 
The new wave is problematic since it perpetuates land reform approaches of 
the law and development movement whereby land reform becomes land law reform. 
The ‘customary’ space is subjected to a process of formalization and privatization of 
the right to property in land ostensibly to boost economic growth. This approach is 
narrow and undermines the resolution of a land question. Using the Foucauldian 
‘idea’ of governmentality, the thesis examines situations and processes that have 
entrenched the land question in Malawi. There is a multiverse of the parochial 
interests of the State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, ‘commercial’ farmers, and the 
land deprived. The narrow focus on land law reform demonstrates the dominance of 
market as value and entrenches the land question in Malawi. 
 
  1 
Introduction 
I THE CONTEXT 
Land reform continues to dominate debate in development discourse. At the 
turn of the 1990s, there has emerged what has been referred to as a ‘new wave’ of 
land reform which has been cross–spatial and pervasive in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. This new wave of land reform supposedly adopts a ‘human–centred’ 
approach with a decentred focus on economic growth as a measurement of (national) 
development.
1
 The new wave is really part of a continuum. In sub–Saharan Africa, for 
instance, land reform has been omnipresent in various shades since the onset of 
informal imperialism and the entrenchment of European domination on the continent 
under the new imperialism period.
2
 The impetus for land reform in postcolonial 
Africa has been multifarious. This has included the desire to address the historically 
situated problem of access to available arable land for the land deprived; the 
eradication of impoverishment; the guarantee of food security; and the assurance of 
economically efficient land use for the growth of the colonial, and later, postcolonial 
economies.  
Land reform proceeds on an aspiration ‘to improve by altering’; ‘to correct an 
error’ or ‘to remove a defect’; and indeed ‘to make better’.3 This need to improve 
through altering, correcting errors, removing defects, or making better implies the 
existence of an underlying ‘problem’ with a status quo relating to the land relations in 
a country. This problem with land relations does not relate to land for its own sake. It 
refers to the relation of the human being as a member of society – a social being – and 
land as a resource for a livelihood. The problem is what has been referred to as the 
land question. Land reform is (ideally) a strategy to address a land question.   
In sub–Saharan Africa, while there is a plethora of literature on land reform, 
the opposite is the case regarding literature on the African land question or land 
                                                 
1
 See for example C Toulmin & J Quan ‘Evolving Land Rights, Tenure and Policy in Sub–Saharan 
Africa’ in C Toulmin & J Quan (eds.) Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa (London: 
DFID, 2000); and World Bank Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2003). There is a detailed discussion of the new wave of land reform under section II of 
this Chapter. Cf. S Adelman & A Paliwala ‘Law and Development in Crisis’ in S Adelman & A 
Paliwala (eds.) Law and Crisis in the Third World (London: Hans Zell, 1993) 1–26.  
2
 ‘Informal imperialism’ refers to the arrival of white missionaries and ‘entrepreneurs’ in Africa prior 
to the 1880s. ‘The new imperialism period’ refers to the period following the Berlin Conference on the 
partition of Africa in 1884 and the start of the First World War: See for example K Shillington History 
of Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). 
3
 See CT Onions The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) on the 
definition of ‘reform’. 
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questions of specific countries. However, the determination of the nature of the 
African land question is important because it has implications for the ‘purpose’ and 
‘direction’ of land reform on the continent generally and indeed in particular 
countries.
4
 A clearly defined land question must lead to clearly established purpose 
and direction of land reform. However, if there is a key conception where confusion 
and dissensus looms large then it is the nature of the African land question. This 
confusion and dissensus has undermined the purpose and direction of land reform on 
the continent. There are two levels through which one can engage with the 
determination of the African land question. The first level is spatial and the second is 
conceptual.  
At the spatial level, it is not clear from the scholarship whether there is a 
continent–wide African land question or it is more precise to discuss a host of African 
land questions where each question is peculiar to a specific country.
5
 At the 
conceptual level, the debate has centred on the nature of land tenure in the pre–
colonial and the postcolonial African society. This debate has focused on the presence 
or absence of individual tenure as opposed to communal tenure in land.
6
 It has also 
raised fundamental issues regarding the conception of ‘right’, ‘property’ and ‘tenure’.7 
So far, the approaches to the African land question reveal its complication such that 
its analysis, if at all, must be wary of essentialism. This complication is particularly 
exacerbated by the multiplicity of interests of various constituencies competing for 
the control of access to available arable land. Sara Berry states: 
The significance of land conflicts for contemporary processes of governance and development 
in Africa lies not only in the way they have been shaped by past events, but also in their 
salience as arenas for the production of history. 
 
Because they often involved multifaceted debates over power, precedence and entitlement, 
struggles over land have also varied in intensity and outcome, depending on the particular 
social, economic, and political contexts in which they occurred. By drawing attention to the 
                                                 
4
 On the debate on the purpose and direction of land reform: See A Manji The Politics of Land Reform 
in Africa: From Communal Tenure to Free Markets (London: Zed Books, 2006). 
5
 See for example S Moyo (2004) ‘African Land Questions, the State and Agrarian Transition: 
Contradictions of Neoliberal Land Reforms’ [on file with the author]; A Mafeje ‘The Agrarian 
Question, Access to Land, and Peasant Responses in Sub–Saharan Africa’ Civil Society and Social 
Movements Programme Paper Number 6 (Geneva, UNRISD, 2003); S Berry ‘Debating the Land 
Question in Africa’ (2002) 44(4) Comparative Studies in Society and History 638; and H Bernstein, 
‘Rural Land and Land Conflicts in Sub–Saharan Africa’ in S Moyo & P Yeros (eds.) Reclaiming the 
Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America (London; New York: 
Zed Books, 2005) 67–101.  
6
 See for example PE Peters ‘Inequality and Social Conflict Over the Land in Africa’ (2004) 4(3) 
Journal of Agrarian Change 269. 
7
 See for example K Akuffo ‘The Conception of Land Ownership in African Customary Law and Its 
Implications for Development’ (2009) 17 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 57.  
  3 
ubiquity of land conflicts in Africa in recent years, and to commonalities in the causes of land 
scarcity and the debates it engenders, I am not attempting to reduce the land question to a 
single story, but rather to emphasize the importance of situating land struggles in specific 
historical contexts, taking account of the way multiple interests and categories of people come 
into play, and impinge on one another, as people seek to acquire, defend, and exercise claims 
on land.
8
 
 
Beyond this avowed complication of the African land question, history and 
context must be taken into account in its examination.
9
 History and context are 
important precisely because of the complication of the land question itself and the 
nuances that have shaped specific land struggles in different African countries.
10
 
However, there are commonalities that may be attributed to the African land question 
for analytical purposes. These commonalities are the nature of colonial capitalism,
11
 
the law and policy framework of the emergent postcolonial State,
12
 and economic 
globalization.
13
 These commonalities are a means of concretizing the history and 
context of the African land question and may assist in unravelling the nuance and 
complication around the question.
14
  
There is also a socio–economic explanation to the African land question. The 
African postcolony is replete with the absence of a significant non–agricultural 
economic base. In this respect, the land question is intertwined with the agrarian 
question; the latter being concerned with land use for optimal agricultural productivity 
                                                 
8
 See S Berry, note 5, 640. 
9
 See S Berry, note 5. 
10
 See for example S Berry, note 5, 639. 
11
 For the ‘macro-regions’ shaped by colonialism in sub–Saharan Africa: See S Amin Unequal 
Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism (Hassocks: Harvester, 
1976) cited in H Bernstein, note 5, 68–70. For accounts of the colonial encounter in Malawi and its 
effect on land relations, see for example B Pachai Land and Politics in Malawi, 1875–1975 (Kingston, 
Ontario: Limestone Press, 1978); C Baker Seeds of Trouble: Government Policy and Land Rights in 
Nyasaland, 1946–1964 (London, New York: British Academic Press, 1993); MRE Machika Law and 
Economic Development: A Study of Land Law and Agriculture in Malawi, Kenya and Zambia (PhD 
Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1983);C Ng’ong’ola ‘Design and Implementation of Customary 
Land Reforms in Central Malawi’ (1982) 26(2) Journal of African Law 115; C Ng’ong’ola, Statutory 
Control of Land and the Administration of Agrarian Policies in Malawi (PhD Thesis, University of 
London, 1983); C Ng’ong’ola ‘The State, Settlers, and Indigenes in the Evolution of Land Law and 
Policy in Colonial Malawi’ (1990) 23(2) The International Journal of African Historical Studies 27; 
and FE Kanyongolo ‘Land Occupations in Malawi: Challenging the Neoliberal Legal Order’ in S 
Moyo & P Yeros (eds.), note 5, 118–141. 
12
 See for example H Bernstein, note 5; FE Kanyongolo, above; MRE Machika, above; G Mhone ‘The 
Political Economy of Malawi: An Overview’ in G Mhone (ed.) Malawi at Crossroads: The 
Postcolonial Political Economy (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1992) 1–33; C Ng’ong’ola ‘The Post–colonial 
Era in relation to Land Expropriation Laws in Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe’ (1992) 41(1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 117; and S Moyo & P Yeros ‘The Resurgence of Rural 
Movements under Neoliberalism’ in S Moyo & P Yeros (eds.), note 5, 8–64.  
13 See for example S Moyo ‘Land in the Political Economy of African Development: Alternative 
Strategies for Reform’ (2007) XXXII (4) Africa Development 1. 
14
 See S Moyo, note 5, 29–30, and 32.  
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in a political economy.
15
 The quest for access to available arable land for the land 
deprived remains a never–ending struggle.16  Indeed, in the context of Zimbabwe, 
Lawrence Tshuma states: 
[T]he land question goes beyond the mere concentration of land in a few hands which is the 
economic basis for the domination and exploitation of those without land. In addition, the land 
question has a political aspect which usually assumes the form of state support for exploitative 
landlord/tenant relations. There is thus an articulation of class domination and exploitation 
through the ownership of land with state domination.
17
 
 
The power dimension to a land question that Tshuma has highlighted implicates the 
postcolonial State in perpetuating a scheme of asymmetrical land relations. Sam 
Moyo has gone a step further to suggest that the African land question is now 
‘unique’ and ‘embeds’ both global capital and the postcolonial State – and the 
interests that are thus represented – in the desire to control access to land for purposes 
of mineral resources exploitation, agricultural production, biotechnology, tourism and 
forestry. This new dimension in the control of land has continued to fortify issues 
such as rural–to–urban migration; rural, urban and peri–urban land deprivation; 
gender disparity in access to available arable land which favours men over women; 
and the support of the estate sector over the smallholder sector.
18
 
When the analysis of a land question focuses on a specific country, there are 
important nuances that arise from the peculiarity of its history and context. In the case 
of Malawi, there is a detailed discussion of the evolution of the land question in 
Chapter 4. In general terms, land alienation underpins the land question in Malawi 
and this has perpetuated the lack of access to available arable land on the part of the 
land deprived. The ‘unique’ elements that scholars such as Moyo point out have since 
emerged in relation to the African land question also surface in Malawi. Indeed, it is 
possible to embrace issues relating to migration, urbanization and gender disparity in 
considering the land question in Malawi. However, in this thesis, the following four 
dimensions embody the nature of the land question in the country:  
(a) The nature of colonial capitalism;  
(b) The neopatrimonial nature of the postcolonial State;  
(c) The normative issue of the conception of the ‘customary’ space; and  
                                                 
15
 See for example L Tshuma Law, State and the Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe (PhD Thesis, 
University of Warwick, 1995); and S Moyo, note 5. 
16
 See S Moyo, note 5; and FE Kanyongolo, note 11, 126. 
17
 See L Tshuma, note 15, 21. 
18
 See S Moyo, note 5; and S Moyo, note 13. 
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(d) The multifaceted interests of the postcolonial State; the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; 
the Achikumbe; and the land deprived. 
The first and second dimensions are discussed in Chapter 4. There is a discussion of 
the normative basis of the third dimension in Chapter 1; and a more empirical account 
in Chapter 4. In relation to the fourth dimension, the Achikumbe and the land deprived 
must be clarified.  
In relation to the nature of colonial capitalism and the land question in 
Malawi, the regional context to land alienation in the country is that Malawi as a 
British protectorate was a source of cheap labour that supported mineral resource 
exploitation in South Africa, Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, Zambia.
19
 The national 
context is that under a process of semi–proletarianization, there was an assured supply 
of cheap wage labour for an emergent estate sector, particularly in the Shire 
Highlands in southern Malawi, and over time, the rest of the country. There has also 
been a process of entepreneurization under the Achikumbe policy scheme.
20
  
The nature of the neopatrimonial State
21
 is discernible from the ‘philosophy’ 
of the various Administrations in the country; namely, that of President Hastings 
Kamuzu Banda (the ‘Banda Administration’) between 1964 and 1994; President 
Bakili Muluzi (the ‘Muluzi Administration’) between 1994 and 2004; and President 
Bingu wa Mutharika (the ‘Mutharika Administration’) from 2004 to date.22 There are 
at least two strands to the nature of the neopatrimonial State and its implications for 
the lack of access to available arable land for the land deprived. The first strand 
relates to the law and policy framework that was introduced under the Banda 
Administration. First, the Banda Administration perpetuated colonial practice where 
labour migration to other countries in the region, particularly South Africa, continued. 
Second, the Administration favoured the estate sector over the smallholder sector as 
                                                 
19
 The British declared their colonial authority over Nyasaland (as Malawi was then called) through a 
notification issued by the Foreign Office on 14
 
May, 1891 and published in the London Gazette on 15 
May, 1891. The colonization lasted until 6 July, 1964 when Malawi was granted independence: See 
MRE Machika, note 11, 46. The territory was initially named British Central Africa protectorate and 
was re–named Nyasaland under the Nyasaland Order–in–Council of 6 July, 1907. See also HL Duff 
Nyasaland under the Foreign Office (London: George Bell & Sons, 1903) 1–15.  
20
 See FE Kanyongolo, note 11 and S Thomas ‘Economic Development in Malawi since Independence’ 
(1975) 2(1) Journal of Southern African Studies 30. 
21
 Neopatrimonialism generally refers to a status quo where political legitimacy is based on patronage 
as opposed to principle: See the detailed discussion on the nature of the neopatrimonial State in Malawi 
in Chapter 4. 
22
 There is a detailed discussion of the three Administrations in Chapter 4. 
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the key to national economic growth. Hence, while the colonial State largely restricted 
land alienation to the Shire Highlands in southern Malawi, the Banda Administration 
rolled out a national plan for the emergence of the Achikumbe throughout the country. 
Third, the Banda Administration also practised patronage which had implications for 
the land question, albeit, the patronage was policy–driven. The Mutharika 
Administration is generally similar to the Banda Administration to the extent that the 
latter two strategies of the Banda Administration largely underpin the Mutharika 
Administration’s development agenda. Lastly, the second strand of the nature of the 
neopatrimonial State is that under the Muluzi Administration the resolution of the 
land question was undermined since the Administration was dogged by what has been 
termed the ‘democratization of corruption’.23 
Regarding the conception of the ‘customary’ space, there is a liberal tilt to its 
conception which has been influenced by the dominance of market as value. The 
conception of the ‘customary’ space has implications for the interpretation of ‘right’, 
‘property’ and ‘tenure’. The interpretation of these ‘norms’ has, in my view, 
influenced the often automatic transition from land reform to land law reform in 
countries such as Malawi. 
Under the fourth dimension, the Achikumbe refers to a coterie of ‘progressive’, 
landowning, ‘smallholder’ farmers and big estate farmers. The big estate farmers are 
the historically, land owning class in the country while the progressive, landowning, 
smallholder farmers comprise erstwhile subsistence farmers, ‘senior politicians, civil 
servants, retirees, and formerly non–agrarian business people’. This category of 
smallholders has been described as ‘progressive’ because they were receptive to, and 
benefited from, targeted agricultural extension methods, agricultural credit markets 
and farm input subsidy programmes.
24
 The Achikumbe have been crucial for the 
sustenance of Malawi’s bimodal agricultural policy based as it is on an estate 
expansion strategy for increased agricultural production as opposed to universal 
                                                 
23
 See D Booth et al. ‘Drivers of Change and Development in Malawi’ Overseas Development 
Institute, Working Paper Number 261 (Brighton, 2006). 
24
 See S Thomas, note 20, 38–39. See also G Mhone, note 12; FE Kanyongolo, note 11, 123; and M 
Chipeta ‘Political Process, Civil Society and The State’ in G Mhone (ed.), note 12, 34–49, 35–36, 41. 
These politicians, civil servants, retirees and business people were often loyal to the ruling political 
party structure of the postcolonial State: See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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support for subsistence smallholders.
25
 There is a detailed discussion of this policy in 
Chapter 4.  
The discussion in Chapter 5 shows that it is not very clear from the statistics 
how much of the land area that is suitable for cultivation in the country is available 
under public landholding or is already in private landholding. This lack of clarity, as it 
will be shown, has implications for the resolution of the land question. However, it is 
estimated that as much as 10.48 million people – almost 80 per cent of the population 
of Malawi – have landholdings of less than 0.5 hectares.26 Indeed, at the turn of the 
2000s, the national average per capita of cultivated land area was set at 0.22 hectares; 
with the ‘ultra poor’ holding 0.16 hectare per capita and the ‘non–poor’ holding 0.28 
hectares.
27
 On this basis, for analytical purposes, the land deprived, under this thesis, 
refers to households with no access to arable land or has access to less than 0.5 
hectares of arable land per household. In this thesis, the postcolonial State, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions, the Achikumbe and the land deprived constitute the key 
constituencies for the resolution of the land question in Malawi.  
The importance of the control of available arable land as a factor of production 
is, if anything, highlighted by the competing interests of these key constituencies. An 
examination of the processes for the adoption and implementation of the country’s 
National Land Policy of 2002
28
 reveals the tension amongst them. In Chapter 6, there 
is a discussion of the complicated interplay of the key constituencies. In relation to the 
multiplicity of interests in land reform, Sara Berry states: 
Competition over land has followed myriad social fault lines, pitting national and local elites 
against ordinary citizens, neighbour against neighbour, kinsman against kinsman, and 
husbands against wives.
29
 
 
                                                 
25
 The Achikumbe are in part rooted in the colonial ‘master farmer’ policy whereby landowning, 
smallholder farmers were incorporated into the estate sector as part of the State’s strategy for increased 
agricultural productivity: See S Thomas, above. The colonial ‘master farmer’ policy has been 
perpetuated under the postcolonial State: See S Thomas, in this note; G Mhone, note 12; FE 
Kanyongolo, note 11; M Chipeta, above; J Harrigan ‘Malawi’ in P Mosley et al. (eds.) Aid and Power: 
The World Bank and Policy–Based Lending, Volume 2, Case Studies (London: Routledge, 1991) 201–
269, 214; and T Mkandawire ‘Agriculture, Employment and Poverty in Malawi’ ILO/SAMAT Policy 
Paper Number 9, 1999. 
26
 Under the census carried out in 2008, the human population of Malawi stands at 13.1 million: See 
National Statistical Office Population and Housing Census: Preliminary Report (Zomba: NSO, 2008). 
27
 See E Chirwa ‘Access to Land, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Malawi’ (August, 2004) [on file 
with the author]. 
28
 See Government of Malawi, National Land Policy (Lilongwe: Government Printer, 2002) [hereafter 
the ‘Land Policy’ or ‘Policy’].  
29
 See S Berry, note 5, 639. 
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Further, a dissection of the constituency of the land deprived would highlight 
the emerging issues on migration, urbanization and gender disparity that scholars like 
Moyo have discussed. However, the treatment of the land deprived in this thesis 
focuses on their interaction with the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe 
respectively. There is a further examination, first of the role of chiefs (as the 
purported custodians of ‘customary’ land); and second, the relationship between eni 
malo and obwera.
30
 
Following the preceding, prefatory observations on the nature of the land 
question in Malawi, the central argument in this thesis is that its resolution can be 
enhanced through the emergence of a responsibilized State under people–generated 
responsibilization. This should involve the triangulation of four pillars of people–
generated responsibilization: gnosis and the drama of citizenship, the public trust and 
the social trust under the Constitution, the beneficial interest in land, and the re–
location of law in the political economy. This means that the responsibilized State 
must desist from an automatic translation of land reform into land law reform. There 
is a detailed discussion of people–generated responsibilization in Chapter 7. Briefly, 
people–generated responsibilization is a holistic, bottom–up approach to tackling 
asymmetrical access to, and ownership of, land in the country. This, it is suggested, 
must entail proactive, people–based action for a triangulated approach to land reform 
involving law, macroeconomic frameworks like poverty reduction strategies, and the 
adherence to the terms of governing under the Constitution. Under this framework, 
people sovereignty is the root of governing and it is embodied under the public trust 
and the social trust under the Republican Constitution of 1994.
 31
  The public trust and 
social trust set out the people’s capability of gnosis – the ‘methods of knowing’.32  
There are two parts to the analysis of the land question in Malawi under the 
thesis. The first part is a critique of the normative framework of land reform 
generally. This is largely the focus of the discussions in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. The 
second part is a critique of the contextual framework of land reform in Malawi. This 
                                                 
30
 ‘Eni malo’ is a ChiNyanja descriptor which loosely translated means ‘owners of the land’; and 
‘obwera’ is also a ChiNyanja descriptor which loosely translated means ‘strangers to the land’.  
31
 Act Number 20 of 1994 [hereafter the ‘Constitution’].  The Constitution came into force 
provisionally on 18 May 1994 (section 212 of the Constitution) and became fully operational on 18 
May 1995 as Act Number 7 of 1995.  For a detailed discussion on the coming into force of the 
Constitution: See DM Chirwa ‘A Full Loaf is Better Than Half: The Constitutional Protection of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Malawi’ (2005) 49 (2) Journal of African Law 207, 210–212.  
32
 On the idea of gnosis: See VY Mudimbe The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order 
of Knowledge (London: James Currey, 1988). Gnosis is further discussed in Chapters 1 and 7. 
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is more empirical and forms the crux of the discussions in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. This 
should not suggest that the two parts of the critique are mutually exclusive; they are 
complementary. However, the first part of the critique is dominated by issues of 
conception: the meaning of ‘right’; right to property in land; the right to property in 
land as a social relation, and the attendant issue of the right to property in land as a 
legal relation; the nature of the ‘customary’ space generally, and the attendant issue 
relating to ‘customary’ land tenure; and, finally, the emergence and dominance of 
market–based land reform models. The second part, focused as it is on Malawi, 
examines the following issues in greater depth: the nature of the land question; the 
treatment of the right to property under the Constitution and its implication for land 
reform in the country; the policy initiatives in tackling the land question; the role of 
the key constituencies in the resolution of the land question; and the strategies that can 
enhance the resolution of the land question.  
II LOCATION OF THE RESEARCH 
  The on–going land reform in Malawi can be traced to the appointment of the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform in 1996, and the land 
utilization studies that took place in the country between 1995 and 1998. These 
interventions led to the development of the Land Policy. Generally, the Policy seeks 
to ameliorate critical lack of access to available arable land on the one hand and foster 
economic growth through efficient land use on the other. The postcolonial State has, 
among other things, embarked on land law reform to implement the Land Policy.
 33
  
While the current reform may be delimited to 1995 onwards, this does not 
mean that the effects of colonial land law and policy and the law and policy 
framework of the postcolonial State from the mid–1960s have abated. The fact that 
the land question in Malawi remains unresolved signifies that the effects of colonial 
and postcolonial land law and policy prior to 1995 are very much alive.  
The adoption of the Land Policy in Malawi is not an isolated case. From the 
turn of the 1990s onwards, a number of land policies mushroomed across Africa; from 
Ghana in West Africa; to Uganda and Tanzania in East Africa; and to South Africa, 
Malawi and Mozambique in Southern Africa to mention a representative sample of 
                                                 
33
 See Government of Malawi, note 28; and Malawi Law Commission Draft Report on the Review of 
Land–Related Laws (Lilongwe: Malawi Law Commission, 2006) [on file with the author]. 
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countries that have adopted ‘new’ land policies.34 These land policies emerge in the 
context of ‘new’ approaches in development discourse which locate the new wave of 
land reform in broader ‘good governance’ projects meant to inculcate the market 
economy in sub–Saharan Africa.35 
A brief background analysis of the global linkages of the on–going land 
reform in Malawi takes the ‘narrative’ back to the 1950s.36 With the newly 
independent, African developmental State at the centre of development on the 
continent from the 1950s onwards, there was an equally engaged drive in 
development discourse that agitated for the reform of so–called ‘customary’ land 
tenure. In the context of the Anglophone African postcolony, the call for the reform 
can be traced to the work by Lord Frederick Lugard in 1922 and RWJ Swynnerton in 
1955.
37
 The logic of the reform of ‘customary’ land tenure in the Anglophone African 
colony and postcolony was supposedly premised on the classical economics 
efficiency argument.
38
 Since the developmental State arose during the heyday of the 
first law and development movement, land reform quickly translated into land law 
reform where the formalization of ‘customary’ land interests was considered the 
panacea to economic growth of the newly, independent, developmental State. Hence, 
land reform projects proliferated in sub–Saharan Africa from this period onwards on 
the back of technical interventions by lawyers, economists and other development 
‘experts.’39 
                                                 
34
 See for example C Toulmin & J Quan, note 1; and R Palmer ‘Land Policy in Africa: Lessons from 
Recent Policy and Implementation Processes’ in C Toulmin & J Quan (eds.), note 1, 267–288.  
35
 See PE Peters, note 6, 275. 
36
 ‘Narrative’ has been considered a universal means of communication which defies time and space. It 
is a mediation of ‘complex’ ideas into an intelligible, ‘manageable’ form. By virtue of the 
‘manageability’, narrative has also been at the centre of (western) modernity: See R Barthes Images, 
Music, Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977); R Kearney ‘Between Tradition and Utopia: The 
Hermeneutical Problem of Myth’ in D Wood (ed.) On Paul Ricouer: Narrative and Interpretation 
(London: Routledge, 1991) 55–73; and J–F Lyotard The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge trans. G Bennington & B Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). Peter 
Fitzpatrick has argued that the ‘use’ of narrative can also be ‘emancipatory’: See P Fitzpatrick The 
Mythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge, 1992). 
37
 See Lord Lugard The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965) 
280–332 [hereafter the ‘Lugard thesis’]; and RWJ Swynnerton A Plan to Intensify the Development of 
African Agriculture in Kenya (Government Printer, 1955) [hereafter the ‘Swynnerton Plan’]. 
38
 Briefly, the argument states that ownership of an asset under a clearly defined property rights regime 
leads to greater incentive for investment that then leads to greater present value of returns. Under land 
reform, the value of net returns refers to greater agricultural yield which, in turn, leads to higher 
productivity. With greater returns, a new cycle of investment commences: See for example K Griffin et 
al. ‘In Defence of Neo–Classical Neo–Populism’ (2004) 4(3) Journal of Agrarian Change 361.  
39
 See for example PE Peters, note 6. 
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The trend tapered somewhat towards the late 1980s. This tapering prompted 
HWO Okoth–Ogendo to declare a ‘crisis’ in African agrarian reform.40 Okoth–
Ogendo has observed that the ‘African agrarian “crisis” is an extremely complex 
phenomenon.’41 He has argued that the lack of consensus on the ‘precise nature’ of 
the ‘crisis’ has negatively affected the nature of the solutions at the national level in 
terms of ‘policies, plans and programmes.’42 He has contended that the ‘crisis’ 
emerges in part because the wrong question and therefore the wrong analysis is 
deployed in African agrarian reform scholarship generally. The analysis of the power 
dimensions of land and the control of that power in respect of land tenure has often 
been de–emphasized in African land reform discourse.43 
In light of the ‘crisis’ and the reverse economic growth that has been 
ubiquitous in sub–Saharan Africa, there is renewed vigour for land reform across the 
continent. This is the context of the emergence of the new wave of land reform which 
follows in the wake of the well–documented shortcomings of land reform of the 
1950s through to the 1980s.
44
 Ambreena Manji, writing in 2006, aptly captures the 
mood of the re–emergence of the debates around land reform in Africa: 
In many parts of Africa, the last two decades have been characterized by debates as to the 
purpose and direction of land reform, the appointment of commissions of enquiry into land 
matters, the formulation of national land policies and ultimately by the enactment of new land 
laws. In short, this has been the age not just of land reform but of land law reform.
45
 
 
The ‘new’ debates emerge in the context of an apparent ‘new donor consensus’ in 
relation to land reform. The reform, it is suggested, must be ‘more human centred’ in 
its approach to rights in land; must foster pro–poor economic growth; be less driven 
by ‘economic prescription’; and must recognise the diversity in the notions of 
                                                 
40
 See HWO Okoth–Ogendo ‘Some Issues of Theory in the Study of Tenure Relations in African 
Agriculture’ (1989) 59(1) Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 6.  
41
 See HWO Okoth–Ogendo, above. 
42
 See HWO Okoth–Ogendo, note 40, 6. 
43
 See generally HWO Okoth–Ogendo, note 40. 
44
 See for example S Borras, Jr. ‘Can Redistributive Reform be Achieved via Market–Based Voluntary 
Land Transfer Schemes? Evidence and Lessons from the Philippines’ (2005) 41 Journal of 
Development Studies 90; K Deininger & H Binswanger ‘Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy: 
Principles, Experiences and Future Challenges’ (1999) 14(2) The World Bank Research Observer 247; 
P McAuslan Bringing the Law Back In: Essays in Land, Law and Development (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003); S Moyo Land Reform under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe: Land Use Changes in 
Mashonaland Provinces (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000); and JP Platteau ‘Does Africa Need 
Land Reform?’ in C Toulmin & J Quan (eds.), note 1, 51–73; and C Nyamu–Musembi ‘Breathing Life 
into Dead Theories about Property Rights: De Soto and Land Relations in Rural Africa’ (2006) 
International Development Studies Working Paper Number 272 (Brighton: International Development 
Studies). 
45
 See A Manji, note 4, 1. 
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property rights.
46
 In this respect, the current wave of land reform has emerged in the 
context of shifts in development discourse where ‘development’ has been re–
conceptualized through a supposedly decentred focus on economic growth.
47
 The 
advocates of the new approach to development emphasize the importance of political, 
social and legal factors. These factors, when taken together, may be located in 
Amartya Sen’s thesis of development as freedom.48  
The World Bank, on its part, has included the socio–political agenda to 
development under the Comprehensive Development Framework.
49
 In relation to land 
reform, the Bank has conceded that previous land reforms were flawed in their 
exclusive focus on the individualization of the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure.50 
The Bank now advocates the view that a ‘human centred’ approach to land reform 
will enhance legality and legitimacy and ultimately guarantee good governance. The 
new wave has its critics who point out the often contradictory objectives that emanate 
from the World Bank; the Bank’s researchers have tended to be more ‘revisionist’ and 
‘egalitarian’ while the institution’s official position has robustly gravitated towards a 
more market–based land reform modelling.51 
Some recent scholarship on land reform in Africa such as that by Camille 
Toulmin and Julian Quan,
52
 Patrick McAuslan
53
 and Ambreena Manji,
54
 to mention a 
few, has repeatedly criticized the longstanding malaise where land reform often 
translated into land law reform. Despite the critiques, the trends in sub–Saharan 
                                                 
46
 See C Toulmin & J Quan ‘Evolving Land Rights, Tenure and Policy in Sub–Saharan Africa’ in C 
Toulmin & J Quan (eds.), note 1, 1–29, 3; and World Bank, note 1.  
47
 See D Trubek & A Santos ‘Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory and 
the Emergence of a New Critical Practice’ in D Trubek & A Santos (eds.) The New Law and Economic 
Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 1–18. 
48
 See D Trubek & A Santos, above, 7; and A Sen Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). This is located in Sen’s capabilities approach to welfare where the focus is on 
a person’s actual ability to incentivize an asset. Under the new wave, the rhetoric on the decentring 
emphasizes that a right to property on its own may not lead to greater agricultural production, that is, a 
greater net return of value. 
49
 The Bank’s former President, James Wolfensohn (1995–2005), argued for an ‘integrated approach’ 
to development: See his speech entitled ‘The Other Crisis’ at 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/am98/jdw-sp/am98-en.pdf [visited on 4 June, 2007]. The speech 
became the foundation for the Comprehensive Development Framework: See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STR 
ATEGIES/CDF/0,,contentMDK:20072662~menuPK:60746~pagePK:139301~piPK:261885~theSitePK
:140576,00.html [visited on 4 June, 2007]. 
50
 The World Bank argues that its Land Reform Policy Paper of 1975 ‘devoted little attention to the 
importance of land rights for empowering the poor and improving local governance’: See World Bank, 
note 1, xiv. 
51
 See for example the discussion by PE Peters, note 6. 
52
 See C Toulmin & J Quan, note 1. 
53
 See P McAuslan, note 44. 
54
 See A Manji, note 4. 
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Africa reveal that this automatic translation is almost ingrained in land reform 
discourse. The development agencies, particularly the World Bank, advance an 
‘official position’ that lauds the supposed flexibility, adaptability and negotiability of 
so–called ‘customary’ land–holding.55 Pauline Peters has argued that there is need for 
an engaged research on the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the context of this flexible, 
adaptable and negotiable land reform.
56
  
In the case of Malawi, scholarship that has looked at the Land Policy has 
proceeded from a development theory perspective;
57
 an economics analysis that 
focuses on the prospects for agricultural productivity under the country’s policy 
framework;
58
 a gender analysis that concentrates on women’s land rights;59  and 
analyses that looked at the debates on the reform of the ‘customary’ space and the role 
of chiefs.
60
 In the legal academy, work on the Land Policy has been the 2005 and 
2008 articles by Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo.
61
 Kanyongolo’s critique is a Marxist–
based, critical legal theory analysis. 
 All the scholarship on the Land Policy acknowledges the importance of access 
to available arable land for the land deprived in Malawi’s development plan. The 
literature, particularly Peters and Kambewa, also dwells on the problems for land 
reform that arise out of the conception of the ‘customary’ space in ways that 
invariably require its ‘formalization’ under statute. Finally, the literature emphasizes 
the over–bearance and influence of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the country’s other development partners on the nature and direction of land 
reform.  
However, while the existing scholarship on the Land Policy is laudable, what 
has been missing in these analyses is the identification of ‘situations’ and ‘processes’ 
                                                 
55
 See PE Peters, note 6, 269, 270.  
56
 See PE Peters, above. 
57
 See B Chinsinga ‘Exploring the Politics of Land Reforms in Malawi: A Case Study of the 
Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP)’ IPPG Discussion Paper Number 
20 (University of Manchester, 2008).  
58
 See E Chirwa ‘Access to Land Farm Investments and Food Production in Malawi’ IPPG Discussion 
Paper Number 18 (University of Manchester, 2008). 
59
 See S Holden et al. ‘Land Policy Reform: The Role of Markets and Women’s Land Rights in 
Malawi’ (Oslo: NORAGRIC Report Number 36, 2006). 
60
 See P Kishindo ‘Customary Land Tenure and the New Land Policy in Malawi’ (2004) 22(2) Journal 
of Contemporary African Studies 213; and PE Peters & D Kambewa ‘Whose Security? Deepening 
Social Conflict over ‘Customary’ Land in the Shadow of Land Tenure Reform in Malawi (2007) 45 
Journal of Modern African Studies 447. 
61
 See FE Kanyongolo, note 11; and FE Kanyongolo ‘Law, Land and Sustainable Development in 
Malawi’ in KS Amanor & S Moyo (eds.) Land and Sustainable Development in Africa (London: Zed 
Books, 2008) 83–99.  
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that enhance or undermine the negotiation for a particular social group under the on–
going land reform.
62
 Peters in her 2004 article on land reform in Africa generally 
discusses the point.
63
 Subsequently, Peters and Kambewa do not analyze the 
normative issues of ‘situations’ and ‘processes’ to the land question in Malawi in a 
similar manner as she does when discussing the African land question.
64
  
In light of the lack of concerted engagement with ‘situations’ and ‘processes’, 
this thesis sets out to analyze the underlying processes that enhance or undermine 
‘benefit’ to the key constituencies in land reform in Malawi; particularly in the 
context of the resolution of the land question. It is in this respect that the ‘theory’ for 
the thesis is based on the Foucauldian ‘idea’ of governmentality and a framework for 
analysis premised on responsibilization. There is a detailed discussion of 
governmentality and responsibilization in Chapter 1.  
Governmentality is a Foucauldian neologism that refers to ‘governmental 
rationality’ or ‘rationality of government’.65 There is a wider and narrower sense of 
governmentality. The former relates to the ubiquitous manner a people manage 
themselves. This is akin to the general understanding of sovereignty. The latter sense 
relates to the complex deployment of power; it does not rely on sovereignty; it is 
concerned with who can govern, what governing is, and what or who is governed.
66
 
Responsibilization, on the other hand, generally relates to a process where a 
normative tool of governance is translated into practice or ‘reality.67 Ronen Shamir 
has argued that there is a framework of ‘expectation’ and ‘assumption’ under 
responsibilization whereby an economic and social domain merges under a value 
‘system’ as the root motivation for action.68 The nature of responsibilization that is 
                                                 
62
 Cf. PE Peters, note 6. 
63
 See PE Peters, note 6. 
64
 See PE Peters & D Kambewa, note 60 and PE Peters, note 6. 
65
 See C Gordon ‘Governmental rationality: an introduction’ in G Burchell et al. (eds.) The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 1–51, 3. Often 
Foucault is solely accredited with the development of ‘governmentality’ as an ‘idea’. Colin Gordon 
clarifies, however, that governmentality as a research project involved several researchers: See C 
Gordon, in this note, 1. 
66
 See generally C Gordon, above. See also the discussion of governmentality in Chapter 1. 
67
 See generally R Shamir ‘The Age of Responsibilization: On Market–Embedded Morality’ (2008) 37 
(1) Economy & Society 1. In relation to ‘reality’, Michel Foucault himself has said that in the pursuit to 
understanding ‘reality’, what is important is not so much the cause of the ‘reality’ but the underlying 
processes that made the ‘reality’ possible: See M Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972–1977 ed. C Gordon and trans. C Gordon et al. (New York: The Harvester Press, 
1980) 134–146. Foucault has argued that focusing on the cause is essentialist and polarizing. An 
examination of the underlying processes – what he has called the ‘technologies of normalization’ – 
offers a viable opportunity to understanding the ‘reality’: M Foucault, in this note, 137. 
68
  See R Shamir, above. 
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pervasive in the literature is what may be called hegemonic responsibilization. This is 
top–down and focuses on the individual. It is based on the dominance of market as 
value. People–generated responsibilization being proposed under the thesis is the 
alternative to hegemonic responsibilization. 
The ‘reality’ of land relations in the country emerges under the following 
broad socio–economic picture: Malawi occupies an area of 118,324 square kilometres 
of land and water. Land accounts for 94,080 square kilometres. Of this total land 
mass, 53,070 square kilometres or some 5. 3 million hectares is supposedly suitable 
for cultivation.
69
 This represents about 22 per cent of the total land size of the country. 
As already noted, in the Population and Housing Census of 2008,
70
 the country’s 
human population is estimated at 13.1 million; the regional proportion being 5.9 
million in southern Malawi (46 per cent of the national total), 5.5 million in central 
Malawi (42 per cent), and 1.7 million in northern Malawi (12 per cent). Between 1998 
and 2008, the country’s population grew by as much as 32 per cent, representing an 
annual intercensal growth of 2.8 per cent. With the exception of Rwanda and Burundi, 
the country has a very high population density in sub–Saharan Africa which currently 
stands at 139 people per square kilometre; the regional variations in the country being 
185 people per square kilometre in southern Malawi, 154 people per square kilometre 
in central Malawi, and 63 people per square kilometre in northern Malawi. For a 
regional picture, while Malawi’s national population density was 105 people per 
square kilometre in 1998, Zambia’s national population density in 2000 was only 13 
people per square kilometre.
71
 Since Malawi is a heavily agro–based economy, the 
incidence of high population growth and high population density puts a lot of pressure 
on arable land. 
Current estimates
72
 indicate that up to 85 per cent of the Malawian population 
is employed in the agricultural sector; mostly as subsistence, tenant workers. 
Agriculture contributes over 90 per cent to the country’s export earnings; which 
                                                 
69
 See Government of Malawi Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy 
Reform, Volume 1 (Zomba: Government Printer, 1999) 13. 
70
 See National Statistical Office, note 26. 
71
 See D Potts ‘Rural Mobility as a Response to Land Shortages: The Case of Malawi’ (2006) 12 
Population, Space and Place 291. 
72
 See B Chinsinga ‘Resurrecting the Vestiges of a Developmental State in Malawi? Reflections and 
Lessons from the 2005/2006 Fertilizer Subsidy Programme,’ a paper presented at the 2007 Guy Mhone 
Memorial Conference on Development: Public Sector Reforms in Africa: Retrospect and Prospect, 22–
24 August, 2007, Zomba, Malawi [on file with the author]. 
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translates to about 39 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).73 The 
main agricultural exports are tobacco, tea and sugar. The importance of agriculture in 
the country’s economy is actually increasing and not diminishing. This follows from 
the devastating effects structural adjustment programmes, with their insistence on free 
trade, have had on the manufacturing sector throughout the 1980s. For instance, in 
2007, the manufacturing sector contributed only 11 per cent to the country’s GDP. 
This has been a result of either total collapse of some industries or reallocation of 
these industries to neighbouring countries within southern Africa.
74
 
Scholars have argued that the extent to which agricultural development can 
have greater impact on the reduction of impoverishment
75
 depends on the availability 
of arable land.
76
 However, in the case of Malawi, impoverishment will remain a 
challenge as long as the land question is unresolved. In 1968, the national average for 
landholding was estimated at 1.53 hectares. In 1998, the ‘ultra poor’77 held less than 
0.5 hectares per household and produced 48.5 kilogrammes of maize per year. The 
non–poor held 1.1 hectares per household, producing 115.8 kilogrammes of maize per 
year.
78
 As already noted, by the 2000s, the national average per capita of cultivated 
land area was set at 0.22 hectares; with the ‘ultra poor’ holding 0.16 hectare per capita 
and the non–poor holding 0.28 hectares.79 Land distribution is different across the 
three administrative regions of the country. In southern Malawi, the average land 
holding per capita is estimated at 0.178 hectares. In central and northern Malawi it is 
0.257 hectares and 0.256 hectares respectively.  
Beyond landholding, impoverishment is also severe in the country. In 2007, 
Malawi’s National Statistical Office produced a report of a Welfare Monitoring 
Survey conducted in 2006.
80
 The Survey shows that the overall proportion of the 
                                                 
73
 For a robust critique of GDP as a measurement of ‘social welfare’: See JCJM van den Bergh 
‘Abolishing GDP’ (2007) Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2007–019/3 available at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/07019.pdf [visited on 22 October, 2009]. 
74
 See B Chinsinga, note 72. 
75
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incidence of impoverishment at the national level stood at 40 per cent; down from 50 
per cent in 2005. The proportion of the ‘ultra poor’ was 15 per cent; down from 21 per 
cent in 2005. At the level of the country’s administrative regions, rural southern 
Malawi was the most impoverished at 51 per cent, followed by rural northern Malawi 
at 46 per cent, and rural central Malawi at 36 per cent. The proportion of the ‘ultra 
poor’ was 22 per cent in rural southern Malawi, 18 per cent in rural northern Malawi, 
and 11 per cent in rural central Malawi. In terms of the urban/rural divide at the 
national level: there was a proportion of 11 per cent ‘urban poor’, down from 24 per 
cent in 2005; 44 per cent of ‘rural poor’, down from 53 per cent in 2005; 2 per cent of 
urban ‘ultra poor’, down from 8 per cent in 2005; and 17 per cent of rural ‘ultra poor’, 
down from 23 per cent.  
It is in light of the foregoing dour socio–economic profile of the country that 
under the thesis the broad context is the examination of whether the conception of 
land reform under the Land Policy enhances or undermines the resolution of the land 
question. The contextual parameters of the thesis entails looking at the linkage 
between (global) development discourse and land reform in Malawi; and the 
discursive continuities between colonial and postcolonial land law and policy. The 
following issues are the crux of the investigation: Conception of the right to property 
in land and its implication for land reform in Malawi; the precise nature of the land 
question in Malawi; and the competing interests of the key constituencies and their 
implication for the resolution of the land question in Malawi. 
III A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
The thesis has complied with The University of Warwick’s Guidelines on 
Ethical Practice. In view of the scope of the thesis, I adopted a contextual approach 
that involves a law and policy analysis of land reform in Malawi. The research is 
largely based on qualitative methodology and used a multi–method approach for data 
collection, management and analysis.
81
 The primary and secondary sources used in 
                                                                                                                                            
minimum expressed in local currency (the ‘Malawi Kwacha’) determined by the Cost–of–Basic–Needs 
methodology. The methodology incorporates individual food requirement and critical non–food 
consumption. The methodology departs from a Purchasing Power Parity approach to measuring 
welfare. Hence, while structural impoverishment remains relatively unchanged, the figures suggest an 
improvement in the livelihood of the population. 
81
 The work has involved both qualitative and quantitative data for a contextual background on Malawi. 
For example, information on population density in Malawi, statistics on land ownership, etc., is 
predominantly quantitative. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln have suggested that the qualitative 
and quantitative research dichotomy refers to research styles that are actually doing the same things 
differently: See N Denzin & Y Lincoln ‘Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research’ in N 
  18 
this research include statutes on land in Malawi; policy instruments commissioned by 
the Government of Malawi, and international institutions such as the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Department for International Development of 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; case 
law; law reform reports and social science literature on land reform. The methods 
included: desk research (through library, internet and archival searches); focus group 
discussions; key informant interviews; and observation.  
The data analysis largely involves an interpretive paradigm that incorporates 
elements of critical discourse analysis.
82
 The interpretive paradigm is rooted in post–
positivist, qualitative methodology. The paradigm proceeds on the basis that ‘reality’ 
is in constant construction through social interaction.
83
 In contrast, the positivist 
school assert that ‘reality’ evolves outside the influence of social actors. The post–
positivist school falls into the realm of ‘constructivism’; the positivist school belongs 
to ‘objectivism’.84 Hence, an interpretive paradigm allows for the exploration of 
‘meaning’.85 In this context, the methodology complements the underlying critique of 
the thesis which is that in the analysis of the land question in Malawi the focus must 
be on the ‘situations’ and ‘processes’ underpinning the ‘reality’ of land reform in the 
country. Further, the interpretative paradigm resonates with the ‘theory’ of the thesis 
based as it is on the Foucauldian ‘idea’ of governmentality and the ‘idea’ of 
responsibilization.  
There are two key assumptions to the thesis: First, a liberal legal order masks 
the inequality in a society with its emphasis on an abstractionist conception of a 
‘right’ and ‘property’, and a de–historicized and de–contextualized approach to 
analysis. Second, an analysis based on land owner–land deprived dichotomy when 
looking at the land question masks other esoteric interests underway in the various 
                                                                                                                                            
Denzin and Y Lincoln (eds.) The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues (London; 
New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1999) 1–33, 8–11.See also T Murray Blending 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods in Theses and Dissertations (London; New Delhi; 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2003); and N Denzin & Y Lincoln (eds.) The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research (London; New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 2005). 
82
 On discourse and discourse analysis: See for example N Fairclough Discourse and Social Change 
(Cambridge: Country Press, 1992); M Foucault ‘Incitement to Discourse’ in A Jaworski & N Coupland 
(eds.) The Discourse Reader (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) 514–522; and D Haworth 
Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000). 
83
 See J Grix The Foundations of Research (Basingstoke, UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
84
  See J Grix, above. 
85
 See for example M Stroh ‘Qualitative Interviewing’ in D Burton (ed.) Research Training for Social 
Scientists: A Handbook for Postgraduate Researchers (London: Sage Publications, 2000) 196–214.   
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agitations for the resolution of the land question. In view of these assumptions, the 
analysis of the land question revolves around the interplay among the key 
constituencies. This means that the research on the land question in Malawi steers 
towards the analysis of how and why the ‘reality’ of land relations has come to be and 
its consequences.
86
 
A final point on methodology relates to extrapolation. The issue here concerns 
the extent to which one can generalize findings from qualitative research that has 
taken place within a limited time and space. The concern is pertinent where the 
findings from a sample are meant to apply to a wider population.
87
 Under the 
research, to the extent that the focus has been on ‘situations’ and ‘processes’, the 
extrapolation of the emerging trends is based on ‘theory’ as opposed to empirical 
findings.
88
 
A Method 
 The research for the thesis was done between 1 January, 2007 and 31 January, 
2010 at two sites: one in Coventry, England and the other in Malawi. During the 
period of the research I was primarily resident in Coventry, England. Here, the 
research was based at The University of Warwick and focused mostly on library, 
internet and archival searches from different libraries in the United Kingdom. 
Between March and June, 2008 and 28 October to 9 November, 2008, I conducted the 
research in Malawi through library, internet and archival searches, focus group 
discussions, key informant interviews, and observation. I discuss the issues on method 
below: 
1 Data Collection 
The library, internet and archival searches both at Warwick and in Malawi 
involved an intensive analysis of primary and secondary sources on land reform 
discourse generally and Malawi in particular. This exercise largely focused on 
documentary data. The aim of this exercise was two–fold: to develop a deeper 
understanding of land reform scholarship; and to locate land reform in Malawi in a 
global context. The tentative conclusions of the research were presented at workshops 
in England in June, 2007 and June, 2009, and in Malawi in November, 2008. 
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 Cf. HWO Okoth–Ogendo, note 40, 12–13.   
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 See D Silverman Doing Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publications, 2005). 
88
 See D Silverman, above. 
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Beyond desk research, I conducted eight interviews and three focus group 
discussion sessions during the research trip to Malawi. The interviews were with 
public officers in Malawi’s public service and the owners of the Makandi Estate. 
While the interviews were largely set through prior arrangement based on a 
theoretical sampling, two of them were scheduled through dung beetling. The 
interviews were semi–structured and used open–ended discussion guides that focused 
on the issues under investigation under the thesis. In this way, there was room for new 
issues to emerge from the interviewees. 
 I had focused group discussions with the community in the periphery of 
Makandi Estate and the resettled community in the Estate.
89
 I recruited a research 
assistant for the focus group discussions to assist me with note–taking. The focus 
group discussions were also conducted using open–ended discussion guides. 
The challenges that arose during data collection were logistical and 
surmountable. Where data was unavailable in The University of Warwick library, it 
was available through another University library within the United Kingdom. In 
Malawi, three scheduled interviews did not proceed.
90
 These failed interviews were, 
in my view, adequately compensated for with those that went ahead.  
 The lingering concern from the focused group discussions is whether the 
information that was generated from the discussions was not rehearsed and tailor–
made to satisfy my enquiry. This is a lingering concern because on account of 
logistical impossibility I did not have a feedback ‘workshop’ with the concerned 
communities in the Makandi area. A process of reflection has compensated for this 
research limitation.  
2 Data Management and Analysis 
Note–taking was the major tool for data collection during the interviews and 
focus group discussions. The note–taking during the focus group discussions with the 
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 Specifically, I had focused group discussions with the community of Mwitere Village, Traditional 
Authority Chimaliro, Thyolo district in southern Malawi; and the resettled community in section C of 
the erstwhile Makandi Estate. The three discussions were as follows: one session with fifteen men from 
the village; another with fifteen women from the village; and a third with a mixed group of fifteen men 
and women from section C of the Estate. 
90
 I cancelled the scheduled interviews with public officers in the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs, Lilongwe, Malawi because none of the officers was willing to give me an audience. Two of the 
possible interviewees in the Ministry of Lands died before I could schedule a meeting with them. A 
third potential interviewee demanded a questionnaire. I developed and provided her with the 
questionnaire. She never returned the questionnaire to me despite my determined efforts to get the 
completed questionnaire from her. The World Bank, Malawi Office never responded to my requests for 
an audience.  
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communities in the periphery of Makandi Estate and the resettled community in the 
Estate entailed translation from ChiNyanja to English. The translation posed its own 
challenges. For example, a lingering problematic phrase from the discussions was 
‘Kukhala ndi malo’;91 which in one vein can mean ‘land ownership’ or; in another 
context, ‘land tenure’; or, indeed, simply ‘land possession’. During the data analysis, I 
have had to rely on the contextual usage of the phrase to determine whether a 
participant was referring to ownership, tenure or possession. 
 The data analysis involved the limited use of NVIVO qualitative data analysis 
software. The core issues for investigation under the research; namely, conception of 
‘right’, ‘property’ and ‘tenure’ and its implication for land reform in Malawi; the 
precise nature of the nature of the land question in Malawi; and the competing 
interests of the key constituencies in land reform and their implication for land 
reform; were the main guiding ‘trees’ for the analysis. 
3 Sampling and Selection 
 The sampling and selection of participants in this research was based on 
theoretical sampling and selection. Theoretical sampling and selection relates to the 
selection of participants and indeed the sites of study on the basis of their relevance to 
the research issues and the ‘theory’ of a research. For instance, the choice of the oral 
data sources in Malawi; namely, officers in the Malawi public service; the officers at 
the World Bank, Malawi Office; the owners/managers of Makandi Estate; and the 
households in the periphery of Makandi Estate had been purposive and had been 
primarily guided by the documents’ review undertaken in the research. These oral 
data sources are also representative of the key constituencies in land reform in the 
country: the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Achikumbe, and 
the land deprived.  
B Access and Ethics Issues 
The right to privacy is at the core of access and ethics considerations. Hence, 
codes of ethics in research outline the rules on informed consent, deception, privacy 
and confidentiality, and accuracy. Informed consent relates to the right of participants 
to be informed of the nature of the research. The participants must agree voluntarily to 
participate in a research; and they must agree on the basis of full and frank disclosure 
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 This is a ChiNyanja phrase which literally translates into ‘to have land’. 
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on the part of the researcher. The rules against deception also demand strict accuracy 
in the presentation of research findings.
92
 
In practice, real challenges emerge for a researcher and those challenges apply 
in my case: the dilemmas that emerge from full disclosure (which may result in denial 
of access); the potential betrayal of the research participants; and the possibility of 
suppressing important research findings.
93
 I adopted what I call a principled, 
pragmatic approach in the conduct of the field research. A principled, pragmatic 
approach is useful here whereby a code of (access and) ethics must serve as a 
guideline and not necessarily stifle full participation for the purposes of the research.  
I will share my experiences in Malawi: In relation to the community in the 
Makandi area, the village headpersons were pivotal in mobilizing the participants to 
the focus group discussions. This raises the question whether strictly speaking the 
participants gave their full consent to participate in the discussions considering the 
power dynamics between a village headperson and a member of village which lean 
heavily in favour of the village headperson. 
In terms of access to the ‘field’, I adopted a Kalilombe94 technique; whereby, 
depending on the setting, I would introduce myself simply as a postgraduate research 
student from a University in the United Kingdom or indeed I would introduce myself 
as a senior public officer in Malawi’s public service and currently pursuing doctoral 
studies in the United Kingdom.
95
 The setting would determine which mode of 
introduction will bring me greater access. However, whichever setting I found myself 
in, I always made it clear prior to any substantive engagement with the participants 
that our interaction was towards data collection for the doctoral studies I was 
pursuing; that I did not have all the answers; and that I was meeting the participants to 
‘learn’ from them. 
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 See S Ali & M Kelly ‘Ethics and Social Research’ in C Seale (ed.) Researching Society and Culture 
(London; New Delhi; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2004) 116–127. 
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technique represents a tactical nous for purposes of entry into the ‘field’.  
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 I am a public officer in the law reform section of the Malawi Law Commission. In the institution’s 
hierarchy, I am the fifth most senior officer. 
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One ethical issue stands out and it relates to the work ethic in sub–Saharan 
Africa. This concerns to what has been described as the ‘allowance culture’.96 At the 
end of the focus group discussions with the community in the periphery of Makandi 
Estate and the resettled community in the Estate, I and the participants would share 
refreshments which I brought with me. Often the discussions would begin around 
mid–morning and finish just after lunch (precisely around 12.30 p.m. or 1 p.m.) It is 
possible to interpret this offer of refreshments as part of the ‘allowance culture’ which 
permeates the conduct of business in the public service in Africa and has been 
soundly criticised as ‘unethical’.97 In my case, these were – to use Ngeyi 
Kanyongolo’s description – ‘gestures of care’ and did not in any way have an ulterior 
motive of influencing the nature of the discussions.
 98
 In fact, the participants would 
not know that we would have refreshments until the discussion was formally closed.  
IV MAP OF THE THESIS 
 Besides the Introduction and the Conclusion, the thesis has seven core 
Chapters. In Chapter 1, I outline the ‘theory’ of the thesis which is based on the ‘idea’ 
of governmentality and a framework for analysis based on the ‘idea’ of 
responsibilization. Chapter 2 looks at conception issues; namely, the nature of ‘right’, 
right to property in land, right to property in land as a social relation, right to property 
in land as a legal relation, the nature of the ‘customary’ space, and the beneficial 
interest in land. The main thrust under the Chapter is that clarity in these foundational 
issues provides a strong platform for understanding the precise nature of the land 
question in Malawi and in turn leads to informed strategies for its resolution. 
 In Chapter 3, I discuss the dominance of market–based land reform modelling 
and its implications for the resolution of the land question in Malawi. Chapter 4 
centres on a historicized and contextualized narrative of the land question in Malawi. 
This is in order to demonstrate that colonial and postcolonial law and policy has 
consistently led to the responsibilization of the land deprived as a constituency of 
labour and as small–scale, auxiliary producers that contribute towards national food 
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98
 For a similar concern: See NR Kanyongolo Social Security and Women in Malawi: A Legal 
Discourse on Solidarity of Care (PhD Thesis: University of Warwick, 2007) 125. 
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security but simultaneously remain vulnerable to ‘capture’ by the large estate 
agriculture sector. 
Chapter 5 looks at the responses that have emerged in the country in relation 
to the resolution of the land question. The focus is on the Land Policy and to 
processes prior to its adoption by the postcolonial State in 2002; particularly, the work 
of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform, and the three land 
utilization studies that took place between 1995 and 1998. After the adoption of the 
Land Policy, I look at the intervention of the Malawi Law Commission. Confusion 
and disjuncture pervade the various interventions. In the end, the Law Commission’s 
work shows an automatic transition from policy to law which only entrenches the 
irresolution of the land question. 
 Chapter 6 discusses the interplay of the key constituencies in Malawi’s land 
reform. The argument is that a triangulated examination of the key constituencies 
reveals a multiverse of parochial interests. These parochial interests have made the 
resolution of the land question in the country very burdensome. The dominance of the 
macroeconomic frameworks that are imposed on the country from Bretton Woods 
Institutions suggests that the Institutions ‘end’ or ‘foreclose’ the negotiation by the 
other constituencies towards a possible resolution of the land question in the country. 
This ‘ending’ is more pronounced considering the lack of synergy between the Land 
Policy and the macroeconomic frameworks in the country. 
 In Chapter 7, I propose a ‘bottom–up’ approach to the strategies that enhance 
the resolution of the land question in the country. The approach is based on people–
generated responsibilization. The main point here is that people–generated 
responsibilization must lead to a responsibilized State.  
V FINAL WORD 
 The picture that emerges from this Introduction is that land reform in Malawi 
– or more precisely the resolution of the land question – is a complex enterprise. As 
the debate on the land question continues, this work seeks to contribute to the debate 
through a critique of the on–going land reform in Malawi, particularly the translation 
from land reform to land law reform. The goal is to move the debate forward through 
a Foucauldian analysis of the land question in the country.  
While I have alluded to the power relations that underlie land reform in the 
country, there are also power relations in the research ‘field’. George Meszaros 
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cautions the researcher to the complication of power relations in the research ‘field’. 
He states: 
Power relations, it is argued, pervade the field and thereby define key aspects of the 
researcher’s relationship to it, and vice versa. Not only may these relations affect the way a 
project is constituted (for example, sold to prospective funders) or justified to participants 
themselves; but they will affect the terms of access to so–called gatekeepers; the sorts of 
questions posed to interviewees; their perceptions of the researcher; the types of answers 
given; and thereby the conclusions reached. For all these reasons […] power relations (also 
referred to as the politics of research) are of vital significance to both the development of a 
project and, potentially, its very sustainability.
99
 
 
The issues Meszaros highlights also apply to the present work. However, my position 
is that they have been considerably mitigated by the trajectory of the analysis adopted 
under this thesis. 
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 See G Meszaros ‘Researching the Landless Movement in Brazil’ in Mike McConville and Wing 
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Chapter 1 
Governmentality, Responsibilization and the Land Question: Theory and 
A Framework for Analysis 
 
 The resolution of a land question rests, to a large extent, upon clearly defined 
parameters of the constitutive conception, theory and the framework for analysis.
1
 In 
the case of political economies such as Malawi, the resolution must necessarily be 
based on the conception, theory and the framework for analysis that incorporates 
history and context for an understanding of what ought to constitute the precise nature 
of the reform. The need for clarity of the conception, theory and a framework for 
analysis, and indeed the nature of the land question in Malawi, sets out the crux of this 
and the subsequent Chapters. Chapter 2 deals with matters of conception relating to 
the nature of a right; the nature of the right to property as a social relation (including 
the right to property as a legal relation, and the right to land); the nature of the 
‘customary’ space; and the proposal of a beneficial interest in land. In this Chapter, I 
outline the theory and the framework for analysis underpinning the thesis.  
Theory must be understood in the context of a framework that allows the 
extension of the ‘frontiers of knowledge’ of a (social) reality. The theory that 
underpins the thesis is a composite that coalesces under the Foucauldian ‘idea’ of 
governmentality. In section I, I have made observations on the choice and suitability 
of the theory for the thesis: The core utility of the theory is that it provides a basis for 
the depiction of the responsibilization of a population under market–based land 
reform models. The coalescence comes about in light of the interpretation of the 
‘idea’ of governmentality by a variety of scholars such as Mitchell Dean,2 and Ben 
Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick,
3
 to mention a few. Hence, the use of governmentality is 
Foucauldian because it is not only limited to Michel Foucault’s work on the ‘idea’ of 
governmentality. I engage with other re–interpretations of governmentality available 
in the academy. 
Finally, I propose a framework for analysis based on a two–tiered re–
interpretation of responsibilization. Under the framework, I am arguing for what I 
have called the people–generated responsibilization; which primarily involves the 
                                                 
1
 A ‘concept’ constitutes an abstract, universal meaning of an ‘idea’ while ‘conception’ entails its 
social construction on the basis of multiple variables in a country: See A George ‘The Difficulty of 
Defining “Property”’ (2005) 25(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 793, 797–798.  
2
 See M Dean Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999). 
3
 See B Golder & P Fitzpatrick Foucault’s Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
 27 
responsibilization of the State. People–generated responsibilization is based on people 
sovereignty. In another description, it is rooted in constituent power. The central role 
here is to lay down an alternative approach to the resolution of the land question in 
Malawi.  
I THEORY 
 Theory here must be understood as a scientific rather than an etymological 
framework for analyzing a (social) phenomenon. The theory coalesces under the 
Foucauldian ‘idea’ of governmentality. The theory is a fusion of various scholarships 
from Foucault’s ‘idea’ of governmentality (in the various dimensions that I discuss 
below) to James Scott’s conception of ‘calculated conformity’.  
It is not uncommon in the academy for a scholar to appropriate a particular 
theory as the basis for ‘solving’ or ‘discussing’ a particular (social) phenomenon.4 In 
my case, there are three reasons for the choice and suitability of the theory: The focus, 
under the Foucauldian ‘idea’ of governmentality, on a population is useful. In market–
based land reform, there is an abstraction and a decontextualization of the constructed 
individual. The responsibilized individual must be an entrepreneurial individual; they 
must display universal behaviour in the quest to sustain the market. Secondly, the 
complexity of governance under current global geopolitics requires a theory that 
enables an analysis of the possibility of both ‘domination’ and ‘emancipation’. 
Finally, the theory allows for a demonstration of the interplay among the intra–‘local’, 
the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ that is not necessarily hierarchical. In sum, the theory 
allows for an analysis of the ‘situations’ or ‘practices’ that undermine or enhance the 
resolution of the land question in Malawi in the context of the dominance of market–
based land reform models. It allows for an analysis of the ‘rich analytic of power’ that 
is part of the ‘news ways of ruling’, under what Fitzpatrick describes as a ‘governing 
mentality’.5 
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 Brian Bix has observed that such appropriation is unfair because ‘purely analytical discussions may 
be appropriated for purposes that they are not well–suited’: See B Bix Jurisprudence: Theory and 
Context (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 28.  
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necessarily confined to France: See P Fitzpatrick, in this note. In this way, governmentality is a useful 
theoretical basis of this work which looks at the land question in Malawi.  
 28 
Hence, the choice of the theory here is not so much that it is ‘correct’ or ‘true’. 
I do not lay a claim to its universal application. In fact, critics may be scathing that a 
work that starts from Foucault is laying a claim to theory. After all, Foucault himself 
states: 
I am an experimenter and not a theorist. I call a theorist someone who constructs a general 
system either deductive or analytical, and applies it to different fields in a uniform way. This 
is not my case. I am an experimenter in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in 
order not to think the same thing as before.
 6
 
 
For my purposes, it is sufficient that the theory does not simply dwell on the ‘points 
of friction’ but also seeks to examine the various relations – at the intra–‘local’ level, 
the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ – in the analysis of the resolution of the land question in 
Malawi.
7
 The focus of the thesis is on situations and processes that have shaped the 
land question. In Foucauldian terms, these are the ‘technologies of normalization’.8 
The Foucauldian ‘Idea’ of Governmentality  
In the Introduction, it has been noted that governmentality is a Foucauldian 
neologism that refers to ‘governmental rationality’ or ‘rationality of government’.9 
However, the nature of government is crucial for analysis. In the ‘Governmentality’ 
Lecture of 1 February, 1978,
10
 Foucault traces the development of governmentality 
through the discussion of the pastoral power of the era of feudalism in Europe, the 
Machiavellian Prince, Jean–Jacques Rousseau’s social contract, Adam Smith’s 
political economy, and the post–war, neo–liberal thought in Germany, USA and 
France.
11
 A number of key points are highlighted:  
Foucauldian ‘government’ has a general, wide sense and a narrower one. The 
general, wide sense of governmentality refers to the ubiquitous manner a people 
manage themselves. This general, wide sense is imbricated in the conventional 
understanding of sovereignty.
12
 The narrower sense, however, does not refer 
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 See M Foucault ‘Interview with Michel Foucault’ in J Faubion (ed.) Power (New York: New Press, 
2000) 240. Cf. B Golder & P Fitzpatrick, note 3, 3 who note Michel Foucault’s propensity to reject 
theory. 
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 See C Gordon, Introduction, note 65. 
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 See M Foucault ‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al. (eds.), Introduction, note 65, 87–104. 
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 See M Foucault, 10, 89; M Foucault Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1977–78, trans. by G Burchell (New York: Picador; Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) , particularly 
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exclusively to the sovereign; it is an ‘art’ with a complex deployment of the 
‘macrophysics’ and ‘microphysics’ of power.13  
In relation to the general sense of ‘government’, Gordon notes that Foucault 
has interpreted it as the ‘conduct of conduct’.14 In this respect, governmentality relates 
to the mentality of government where there is collective thought about knowledge of 
government. The collective thought is taken for granted and relates to the social, 
political and economic bases leading to the development of a ‘truth’.15 The collective 
thought converges in the ‘State’ as the territorial sovereign. In a liberal legal order, the 
‘State’ uses ‘freedoms’ or ‘rights’ as the means or techniques of securing the ‘ends of 
government’.16 Hence, the ‘freedoms’ may be ‘a natural attribute, a product of 
civilization or the exercise of rational choice in a market.’17 The law in the realm of 
governmentality is merely ‘an instrument of rule’.18 In modernity, the ‘new modality 
of power’ is central and the State is only a constitutive part of the ‘art of 
government’.19  
The narrower sense of governmentality expounds on the art of government. 
The art of government is not dependent on a sovereign but at the same time it does not 
deny the efficacy of the sovereign. The Foucauldian focus here is on the ‘activity’ or 
‘practice’ as a way of knowing what ‘the activity [of government] consisted in, and 
how it might be carried on.’20 Gordon comments: 
[Governmentality] will thus mean a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice 
of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of 
making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to 
those upon whom it was practised.
21
 
 
Indeed Foucault has argued that if government involves morality, the economy and 
politics, the art of government demonstrates the three ‘norms’ – morality, economy 
and politics – as an ‘essential continuity’ which remains to be ‘explained’ and 
‘justified’.22 He states: 
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The art of government […] is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to 
introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods, wealth 
within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and 
servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper – how to introduce this meticulous 
attention of the father towards his family into management of the state. 
 
This, I believe, is the essential issue of the establishment of the art of government: 
introduction of economy into political practice.
23
 
 
Hence, Foucault concluded that ‘the very essence of government’ is to ensure that its 
objective is ‘the economy’.24 He asserts: 
 To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of 
the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour 
of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family 
over his household and his goods.
25
   
 
What is implicit in Foucault’s interpretation of the narrow sense of the government – 
the art of government – and its focus on the economy is that there is also a ‘duty’ 
requiring the ‘right disposition of things’.26 The ‘things’ relate primarily to the 
regulation of the population.
27
 He states: 
One governs things. But what does this mean? I do not think this a matter of opposing things 
to men, but rather of showing that what government has to do with is not territory but rather a 
sort of complex composed of men and things. The things with which in this sense government 
is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with 
those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of 
things, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking, etc.; lastly, men in their relation to that 
other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc.
28
 
 
 Foucault proceeds to elaborate that the art of government here is not so much 
concerned with a philosophical or theological ‘common good’ but rather a 
‘convenient end’. Foucault argues that ‘convenient end’ implies a ‘plurality of 
aims’.29 He contends: 
[G]overnment will have to ensure that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, 
that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is 
enabled to multiply, etc. There is a whole series of specific finalities, then, which become the 
objective of government as such. In order to achieve these various finalities, things must be 
disposed – and this term, dispose, is important because with sovereignty the instrument that 
allowed to achieve its aim – that is to say, obedience to the laws – was law itself; law and 
sovereignty were absolutely inseparable. On the contrary, with government it is a question of 
not imposing law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather 
than laws, and even using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way that, 
through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.
30
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Further, Foucault contends that the ‘end of sovereignty’ lies in the ‘shape of its laws’ 
while the ‘finality of government’ lies in the management of ‘things’, the ‘perfection’ 
and ‘intensification’ of its processes. The ‘instruments’ of government are not laws 
but ‘a range of multiform tactics’.31  
 Given that the art of government is concerned with governing ‘things’ for 
‘convenient ends’, Foucault’s comments on the control, ownership and use of land in 
the political economy are illuminating in the context of this thesis. He has said: 
The problematic of the économistes reintroduces agriculture as a fundamental element of 
rational governmentality. The land now appears alongside, and at least as much as and more 
than the town, as the privileged object of governmental intervention. It is a governmentality 
that takes the land into consideration, but it must no longer focus on the market, on the buying 
and selling of products, on their circulation, but first of all on production.
32
 
 
Land is critical in the light of the Foucauldian ‘police of grains and the phenomenon 
of scarcity’.33 First, ‘the phenomenon of scarcity’ refers to ‘man’s greed’; that is, the 
‘need to earn’, the ‘desire to earn even more’, the ‘egoism’ which in turn leads to ‘the 
phenomena of hoarding, monopolization and witholding merchandize’.34 Under 
Foucault’s analysis, the police of grains and the phenomenon of scarcity entail an 
‘economic’ policy based on the abundance of grain (or agricultural produce) and 
cheap wage labour; whose combination results into maximum dividend from exports. 
Hence, the control, ownership, and use of land are critical. The art of government – 
the governmentality – is concerned with the value of return to the producer.35 It is 
suggested that this producer, under this thesis, is the postcolonial State, the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and the Achikumbe. In turn, the land deprived have, over time in 
Malawi, constituted the source of cheap wage labour and the category of small–scale, 
auxiliary producers under market–based land reform modelling.36 
In the context of the emergence of the mercantilist tendencies in 18th Century 
CE Europe, Foucault contends that the art of government evolved into a ‘science’ of 
government and in the process maintained its ‘influence’ on the population. Science 
of government here refers to the ‘statistics’ of the population and the extent to which 
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these statistics derestrict the art of government. The statistics relate to birth, death, 
disease, labour or wealth.
37
 Hence, the art of government becomes the ‘exercise of 
power through [an] economy to regulate [a] population.’38 Foucault concludes: 
By this word ‘governmentality’ I mean three things: 
 
1. The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit very complex, power which 
has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as 
its essential technical instrument apparatuses of security.   
 
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards 
the pre–eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power 
which may be termed government, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of 
specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a series of 
saviors.   
 
3. The process, or rather, the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the 
Middle Ages transformed into the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, gradually becomes ‘governmentalized.39 
 
It is arguable that this notion of governmentality is linked to sovereignty and 
discipline that is embraced in a liberal, democratic State. Foucault himself concedes 
that within the framework of the art of government, sovereignty and discipline do not 
completely disappear.
40
 Governmentality, if anything, is a triangle of ‘sovereignty–
discipline–government’.41 He has said: 
[W]e need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of 
government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty–discipline–government, which has as its 
primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security.
42
 
 
The apparatuses – or the dispositifs – of security have four features: space; uncertainty 
(or what Foucault calls the ‘aleatory’); ‘normalization’; and fourth, the correlation of 
security and population.
43
 In his discussion of the apparatuses, Foucault gives three 
examples: town planning, food scarcity, and anti–epidemic vaccination campaign. He 
looks at the government of a polity through a concern with the ‘mobility’ of 
‘produce’, people and wealth that circulates in an economy within and between States. 
While discipline is understood as requiring a particular structure of hierarchy in 
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society, security relates to a particular ‘technology of power’.44 Foucault argues that 
this takes place through the ‘plotting of the normal and the abnormal’ under a process 
of normalization; or precisely, normation.
45
 In this respect, it is pertinent to consider 
the ‘disciplinary’ aspect of governmentality. I now consider the ‘idea’ of 
governmentality in light of the analytics of power – particularly biopower. 
1 Governmentality and Analytics of Power 
Foucault’s narrower sense of governmentality is more nuanced than mere 
attribution that it is a collective of the mentality of government. It is ‘counter–
Machiavellian’.46 Foucault has pointed out that government under the narrower sense 
of governmentality is not preoccupied with defending the territory, it is embroiled in 
the conspiracy of men and things; especially men in their relations to wealth, 
resources, means of subsistence,  and the specific qualities of the territory (such as 
climate and soil fertility).
47
 Dean points out that to the extent that ‘government is 
economic government’, the ‘law’ need not defend sovereignty as a territorial 
monopoly of a State.
48
 Indeed, as Foucault has said, the focus of government is the 
governing of ‘things’ through a ‘range of multiform tactics’ and law is one of the 
many tactics that may be deployed in this enterprise. 
Foucault also acknowledged the irreconcilability of a conception of the 
sovereign based on an economic model founded on the family.
49
 He contends that the 
‘science of government’ derestricts the ‘art of government’ through ‘the recentring of 
the theme of economy on a different plane from that of family’ to the [general] 
population. Population is critical because it is the ‘ultimate end of government’.50 He 
states: 
In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but 
the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, 
longevity, health etc., and the means that the government uses to attain these ends are 
themselves all in some sense immanent to the population; it is the population itself on which 
government will act either directly through large–scale campaigns, or indirectly through 
techniques that will make possible, without full awareness of the people, the stimulation of 
birth rates, the directing of the flow of population now represents more the end of government 
than the power of the sovereign; the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is 
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also the object in the hands of government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being 
done to it.
51
   
 
The management of a population requires a nuanced form of ‘discipline’.52 In the light 
of the discussion of the nature of governmentality in the preceding section, the focus 
here will be on Foucault’s conception of ‘biopower’. Biopower first comes to the fore 
in The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1.
53
 Foucault’s 
conception of ‘biopower’ is that it is the ‘power over life’.54 Biopower emerges in 
contrast to the exercise of the authority of the sovereign where the sovereign’s right to 
rule was based on the underlying possibility of death on the part of the subject; the 
‘right to take life or let live’.55 Biopower is bipolar; it encompasses disciplinary power 
over the individual, human body (the ‘anatomo–politics of the human body’). This 
centres on the ‘body as a machine’ and is concerned with its ‘discipline’, 
‘optimization’, ‘efficiency’, even its ‘docility’.56 The second pole of biopower is what 
Foucault calls ‘a biopolitics of the population’.57 The latter pole is concerned with the 
‘propagation’, ‘birth’, ‘mortality’, the ‘level of health’, ‘life expectancy’, ‘longevity’, 
and all factors that may enhance or undermine these conditions in relation to the 
‘species body’; that is, the population.58 In this respect, it is possible to attribute a 
global ‘outlook’ or permeation to biopower. Biopower is not the ‘old power of death’; 
it is the power that ‘invest [sic] life through and through.’59 Hence, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri have commented, for example, that biopower refers to the ‘new 
paradigm of power’ that internalizes social regulation.60 Biopower is a part of ‘a 
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complex multiplicity of power, technologies, strategies and effects’ beyond economic 
development.
61
 Power in this sense is not ‘static’; it is ‘mobile and open.’62 
It is worth noting at this point that Golder and Fitzpatrick assert that Foucault 
never discussed the relationship between governmentality and biopower. They further 
contend that because of the breadth of the conception of biopower, he never ‘fully 
thematized’ it. They contradict Timothy O’Leary who argues that biopower is 
‘conceptually […] included in the concept of governmentality.’63 To the extent that 
Golder and Fitzpatrick themselves acknowledge that governmentality ‘as a form of 
power operates alongside the disciplines’,64 it is arguable that Foucault’s conceptions 
of governmentality and biopower respectively are complementary.
65
 In my view, if 
the argument is limited to the context of ‘disciplines’, Foucault builds on biopower in 
his articulation of the narrower sense of governmentality. This is apparent in light of 
the triangle of sovereignty–discipline–government that Foucault has argued 
constitutes governmentality. 
2 Governmentality and Law 
In relation to Foucault’s general body of work, a number of academic 
commentators have argued that Foucault expels law from ‘his analyses of 
contemporary power relations.’66 The argument here – what Golder and Fitzpatrick 
call the ‘expulsion thesis’ – goes as follows: To the extent that Foucault argues that 
there is an emergent disciplinary power in modernity, this means that there is a 
transition from ‘old forms of law and sovereignty’ where law is ‘decreasingly 
important’ and serves an instrumental role to the emergent power.67 This discussion is 
limited to the relationship between governmentality and law.  
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Golder and Fitzpatrick in Foucault’s Law argue that the place of law under 
disciplinary power is ‘attenuated’ rather than completely expelled; that is, law is 
‘polyvalent’.68 It is part of a triangulation under governmentality where it is re–
configured in a ‘governmental–administrative apparatus’.69 As pointed out above, 
Foucault has argued that law is critical to the ‘finality’, that is the authority, of the 
sovereign. In the context of governmentality, law is part of the so–called ‘range of 
multiform tactics’. It is one of the many ‘strategies’ utilized in the art of government. 
Law is not as exclusive under governmentality as it is under the sovereign where it is 
‘the blunt, vicious and antiquated tool of sovereignty’.70 The point here is crucial for 
the analysis of the land question in Malawi. One of the main issues that is analyzed 
under the thesis is the primacy of law; particularly the tendency to transform land 
reform into land law reform. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will show that it is equally vital to 
focus on other non–law bases of power in analyzing the land question. 
3 Governmentality and Calculated Conformity 
The etymology of ‘conform’ indicates that its present meaning ‘[to] bring into 
or act in accordance with a pattern, etc.’ derives from the Old French word 
‘conformer’ meaning ‘make or be similar’; which itself derives from the Latin word 
‘conformāre’ meaning ‘to fashion of the same form’.71 ‘Conformity’ suggests a 
‘process’ of ‘bringing into a pattern’ or ‘making similar’. This could require action or 
(in)action according to a set ‘standard’. It invokes an imagery of a ‘standard setter’ 
and ‘standard follower’, a ‘complier’. This in turn provokes a power relationship 
where the ‘standard setter’ is the ‘dominator’ and the ‘standard follower’ is the 
‘dominated’.  
Against this background, I find James Scott’s notion of calculated 
conformity
72
 valuable and complements the Foucauldian idea of governmentality for 
the purposes of this thesis. This is the case because through the analysis of the land 
question under the on–going land reform in Malawi, I seek to demonstrate that the 
relationship among the key constituencies of the land reform is not perfectly reducible 
to that of a ‘dominator’ and a ‘dominated’. Scott’s ‘Brechtian forms of “resistance”’ 
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or ‘struggles’ are useful in understanding how the various constituencies are actually 
‘working the system’ to their ‘minimum disadvantage’.73 
Scott has observed that a ‘dominated’ constituency does not have the luxury of 
‘open, organized, political activity’.74 He has argued that, in fact, often a more open 
defiance to ‘authority’ is suicidal.75 Hence, he suggests that it is useful for analysis to 
dwell on ‘the prosaic, constant struggles’ in a society.76 The nature of these ‘prosaic, 
constant struggles’ – what James Scott has also called ‘the everyday weapons of the 
weak’ – include foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, theft, 
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, ‘culture’, argument, and imposed 
mutuality.
77
  
Scott further asserts that these struggles are not the monopoly of a particular 
constituency.
78
 In the context of land reform, the struggles may be within the land 
deprived; the Achikumbe as against the land deprived; the Achikumbe or land deprived 
as against the postcolonial State; or the postcolonial State as against the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. Hence, while the broader scheme of governmentality generates a 
‘disciplined’ population, the Brechtian struggles reveal the ‘disguised struggles’ 
simultaneously underway in a country that reveal the covert compliance or what Scott 
calls ‘calculated conformity’.79 
Indeed, Foucault has contended that in the scheme of ‘shifts’ in the ‘mode of 
‘resistance’ in modern society, it is more precise to refer to ‘counter–conduct’ as 
opposed to ‘misconduct’ or ‘dissidence’. He has said that to the active sense of 
‘conduct’, analysis cannot deploy the passive sense of behaviour depicted by 
‘misconduct’.80 Foucault argues that the use of ‘misconduct’ or ‘dissidence’ allows an 
undue ‘substantification’.81 He states: 
[T]his word ‘counter–conduct’ enables us to avoid a certain substantification allowed by the 
word ‘dissidence.’ Because from ‘dissidence’ we get ‘dissident,’ or the other way round, it 
doesn’t matter, in any case, dissidence is the act of one who is a dissident, and I am not sure 
that this substantification is very useful. I fear it may even be dangerous, for there is not much 
sense in saying, for example, that a mad person or a delinquent is a dissident. There is a 
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process of sanctification or hero worship which does not seem to me of much use. On the 
other hand, by using the word counter–conduct, and so without having to give a sacred status 
to this or that person as a dissident, we can no doubt analyze the components in the way in 
which someone actually acts in the very general field of politics or in the very general field of 
power relations[.]
82
 
 
II RESPONSIBILIZATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
So far, I have endeavoured to explain the idea of governmentality. While the 
idea of governmentality is central to the theory under the thesis; a number of ‘meta–
theories’ also emerge. This is the case considering the expansive use of the idea of 
governmentality beyond Foucault, and the incorporation of James Scott’s seminal 
work on ‘posturing’ in a society; precisely calculated conformity.  
The theory as presented is useful because it allows the thesis to focus on 
‘situations’ or ‘processes’ that enhance or undermine the resolution of the land 
question in Malawi. The ‘situations’ or ‘processes’ are primarily considered through 
the interaction of the four key constituencies in the on–going land reform. Indeed, the 
use of governmentality in the theory allows the analysis to consider the ‘tactics’ – law 
and possibly a plethora of others – underway under the land reform. However, while 
the ‘tactics’ are useful, in the context of a liberal legal order that prevails in Malawi, 
and further in light of the dominance of market–based land reform models in 
development discourse,  it is equally important in my view to establish the value that 
underlies the use of a particular ‘tactic’ in the political economy.83 It is at this juncture 
that I propose a framework for analysis based on the conception of responsibilization. 
It was noted in the Introduction that the discussion of responsibilization starts 
with Shamir. He has argued in the context of corporate social responsibility that 
‘responsibilization conceptualized as the ‘expectation’ and ‘assumption’ of ‘reflexive, 
moral capacities of various social actors’ is the link that connects the ideals of 
governance and actual practices in a political economy.
84
 The reference to the concept 
of ‘governance’ as a vehicle for responsibilization is important under the thesis. 
Governance, in this context, entails a ‘mode’ where the economic and social domains 
merge under what Shamir has called the ‘market of authorities’. Under this ‘market’, 
central governments evolve from ‘regulators’ with a top–down approach to 
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‘government’ to ‘facilitators’ who are aware of other ‘nodes’ or ‘sources’ of 
authority.
85
 Governmental authority under governance does not necessarily need the 
coercive authority of the State. Under a governance framework, ‘guidelines’, 
‘principles’, ‘codes of conduct’ and ‘standards’ have all been ‘produced, distributed, 
exchanged, negotiated and ultimately consumed’ by a host of State and inter–State 
agencies, commercial enterprises and non–profit organizations that comprise the 
‘market of authorities’.86 Finally, governance as a ‘modality of power’ ‘relies on 
predisposing social actors to assume responsibility for their actions’.87 This process of 
predisposition is the hallmark of responsibilization. 
Value underpins responsibilization. Again, Shamir has argued that 
responsibilization presupposes ‘one’s uncoerced application of certain values as a root 
motivation for action.’88 Indeed, in the context of corporate social responsibility, he 
has argued that responsibilization relies on the ‘construction of moral agency’ to 
buttress the importance of the individual as an entrepreneur.
89
 In the end, 
responsibilization only restructures the market of authorities by adding a value; it is 
through value that the convergence of the economic and the social is possible.
90
 
There are two strands of responsibilization that are submitted here for the 
analysis of the land question in Malawi. The first strand is pervasive in the academy. 
It refers to ‘processes’ at the behest of the State or a non–State ‘dominator’ that 
construct the individual – the population – to serve or indeed behave in a particular 
way to fulfil a particular role in a political economy.
91
 I have called this type of 
responsibilization hegemonic responsibilization. By hegemonic responsibilization, 
one may draw from the Gramscian notion of ‘hegemony’ where the ‘value’ of the 
‘dominant class’ is imposed on the ‘dominated’ to maintain a status quo.92 The second 
strand of responsibilization stems from the idea of governmentality; and indeed, the 
nature of Foucauldian ‘power’. Foucauldian ‘power’ is not annihilatory. Scott’s 
discussion of Brechtian or ‘disguised’ struggles under the ‘idea’ of calculated 
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conformity flourish in this context of a mobile, open ‘power’. Hence, the second 
strand of responsibilization relates to the strategies by the individual – the population 
– that shape and re–shape the nature of the exercise of authority by a State or non–
State entity at the local, State level and ultimately the global level. These strategies 
also relate to the Foucauldian ‘counter–conduct’. This is the people–generated 
responsibilization.
93
 There is an elaboration of people–generated responsibilization in 
section B below and in Chapter 7. However, as it was pointed out in the Introduction, 
people–generated responsibilization is based on people sovereignty rooted in the 
public trust and the social trust under the Constitution. The value underpinning 
people–generated responsibilization is that the right to exercise State authority lies in 
the people as a repository of constituent power.
94
 
A The Nature of Hegemonic Responsibilization 
 In societal interaction, responsibility envisages, at the innate level, that 
members will act ‘reasonably’ or ‘responsibly’ to maintain ‘harmony’, ‘inclusivity’ 
and ‘civility’.95 This notion of societal interaction stresses an underlying moral 
ethic.
96
 However, the ‘construction’ of the individual through ‘governmental 
constitution’ epitomizes hegemonic responsibilization.97 Hegemonic 
responsibilization is pervasive in the debates in the academy.
98
 It refers to processes 
that include constitutional reform,
99
 new macroeconomic frameworks,
100
 grand 
projects on legal and judicial reforms,
101
 including new approaches to land law and 
policy;
102
 all meant to attain what has been called a ‘responsibilized citizen’.103 
Hegemonic responsibilization privileges State or non–State institutional apparatuses 
                                                 
93
 See for comparison purposes T Basok & S Ilcan ‘In the Name of Human Rights: Global 
Organizations and Participating Citizens’ (2006) 10(3) Citizenship Studies 309; and O Löweinheim 
‘The Responsibility to Responsibilize: Foreign Offices and the Issuing of Travel Warnings’ (2007) 1 
International Political Sociology 203. See also T Parfitt, note 91, on the ‘creative’ and ‘destructive’ 
possibilities of Foucauldian biopolitics. 
94
 See for example R Jackson et al. Sovereignty: The Evolution of an Idea (Cambridge: Country Press, 
2007). 
95
 See J Clarke, note 91, 451. 
96
 See J Clarke, above. 
97
See J Clarke, note 95. 
98
 See for example J Clarke, note 91; T Basok & S Ilcan, note 93; and O Löweinheim, note 93. 
99
 See for example SP Huntington ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’ (1991) 2 Journal of Democracy 12.  
100
 See for example D Booth Fighting Poverty in Africa: Are PRSPs Making A Difference? (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2003). 
101
 See for example J Faundez ‘Legal Reform in Developing and Transition Countries – Making Haste 
Slowly’ (2001) 1 Law, Social Justice and Global Development available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2000_1/faundez/ [visited on 30 June, 2009].  
102
 See for example World Bank, Introduction, note 1. 
103
 See J Clarke, note 91, 451–452.  
 41 
that use techne to discipline, in the Foucauldian sense, a population. The proposition 
here is that under hegemonic responsibilization the ‘market’ based on a Hayekian 
‘catallaxy’ as the norm forms the basis of the value that informs the responsibilization 
of the individual in the political economy.
104
 The classic economic efficiency 
argument that has been applied in land reform discourse would be an example of the 
nature of hegemonic responsibilization. In the following part, I will introduce an 
agenda for a framework for people–generated responsibilization. The notion of 
people–generated responsibilization arises within the possibility under Foucauldian 
‘power’ where power is not – as alluded to before – annihilatory. Foucauldian ‘power’ 
is conducive for creation, re–creation and de–construction.105  
B The Nature of People–Generated Responsibilization 
 This part lays the foundation for the discussion in Chapter 7. The ‘idea’ of 
people–generated responsibilization is based on people sovereignty. It has been 
argued in constitutional theory that the authority to govern derives from the people as 
a repository of ‘constituent power’. Negri, for instance, has argued that ‘constituent 
power’ is an expression of the popular will; it is the power of the ‘multitude’. Negri 
contends that ‘constituent power’ is in constant conflict with ‘constituted power’, 
which is the fixed power of formal constitutions. ‘Constituent power’, in Negri’s 
thesis, would lie neither with the legislature nor the judiciary as, according to him; the 
propensity ‘to revolt’ lies with the people themselves.106  
 People–generated responsibilization necessarily requires a focus on the State. 
In the context of the resolution of the land question under the on–going land reform in 
Malawi, I propose a two–tiered framework: The first tier relates to an analysis of 
section 12 of the Constitution which provides for the public trust and the social 
trust.
107
 The constitutional provision outlines a set of duties that the State owes to the 
people of Malawi in the discharge of its legal and political authority. The second tier 
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draws from VY Mudimbe’s idea of gnosis.108 In The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe 
adopts gnosis from the Greek word ‘gnosko’ meaning ‘to know’ in developing his 
thesis on African knowledge; particularly ‘the notion of philosophy to African 
traditional systems of thought’.109 He states: 
Specifically, gnosis means seeking to know, inquiry, methods of knowing, investigation, and 
even acquaintance with someone […] Gnosis is different from doxa or opinion, and, on the 
other hand, cannot be confused with episteme, understood as both science and general 
intellectual configuration.
110
 
 
In this context, Mudimbe has argued that gnosis has a ‘sociohistorical origin’ and an 
epistemological context’ that allows ‘the notion of conditions of possibility’ to 
flourish.
111
 In this sense, gnosis is the cognitive make up of counter–conduct. It need 
not be institutionally located. It is innate to the human as a social being. Second, the 
suggestion here is that as a repository of constituent power, the people as a sovereign 
are the primordial arbiter of ‘knowing’; who can govern, what is to govern, or what or 
who is governed; and the methods of the knowing to govern.
112
 
The reference to the public trust and the social trust under the Constitution 
does not mean deference to a formal, legal ‘ordering’ as the basis for the knowing to 
govern. The invocation of Mudimbe’s gnosis is to argue for ‘possibility’; for a change 
of mindset. The public trust and the social trust under the Constitution is an 
expression of the terms of ‘governing’ between the citizen as the ‘governed’ and those 
entrusted with the exercise of State authority – the ‘governors’. 113 
In this way, people–generated responsibilization becomes the vehicle through 
which a constituency of the ‘dominated’ such as the land deprived assert themselves 
as the holders of the gnosis of ‘governing’ in a polity. The change of mindset lies in 
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the realization of the multitude as the ‘setters’ of agenda. This formulation of people–
generated responsibilization seeks to transcend the parameters of ‘legality’ and affect 
the whole political economy. This is one way of actualizing Foucauldian counter–
conduct and Scott’s Brechtian struggles under calculated conformity. In Chapter 6, 
there is a discussion of the interaction of the land deprived with the postcolonial State 
and the Achikumbe respectively which seeks to demonstrate the operation of people–
generated responsibilization. 
Scholars such as Boaventura de Sousa Santos have, in my view, tended to 
remain faithful to ‘legality’ and only criticize what has been called hegemonic 
globalization for its top–down approach. Santos’ counter–hegemonic globalization 
thesis or the subaltern cosmopolitan legality thesis argues for bottom–up 
‘construction’ of legality.114 This approach has its usefulness. The point here is simply 
that it must be recognized that a focus on ‘legality’ as the site of ‘struggle’ is narrow 
given the ‘range of multiform tactics’ in a polity. 
In this respect, people–generated responsibilization lends credence to David 
Harvey’s declaration of a ‘battle of ideas’.115 This battle is between a dominant 
narrative of the universal efficiency of liberalism (or its ‘protégé’, neo–liberalism) 
against alternative narrative to a broadly construed social well–being. This battle is 
more so pertinent in Africa under the new wave of land reform. Indeed, scholars such 
as VY Mudimbe and Achille Mbembe have been scathing.  Mbembe has argued, for 
example, that the ‘African’ has been caught in a ‘trance’ having been betrayed by the 
erstwhile nationalist elites and a complicit – at best – or ‘docile’ – at worst – middle 
class.
116
 This complicity fits into Leslie Sklair’s notion of a self–interested, 
transnational, capitalist class.
117
 
III A NOTE ON REGULATION: LAW IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 For the analysis of the land question in Malawi, I propose that law must be 
located in the political economy. By political economy, I simply mean the production 
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and redistribution of wealth; including the provision or denial of the factors of 
production of wealth. By locating law in the political economy, the analysis goes into 
‘situations’ and ‘processes’ that have defined the land question in Malawi. It allows 
for an examination of ‘ideas’ rather than a functional approach to law. It is in this 
regard that the starting point for the analysis of the land question in Malawi under the 
thesis is not merely law for its own sake. Michael McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
state: 
[T]he starting point is not law but problems in society which are likely to be generalized or 
generalizable. Here, law itself becomes problematic both in the sense that it is a contributor to 
or the cause of the social problem, and in the sense that while law may provide a solution, 
other non–law solutions, including political and social re–arrangement, are not precluded and 
may indeed be preferred.
118
 
 
This is a pertinent observation that fits in with the argument Foucault makes that 
under the art of government; law is only a part of a range of multiform tactics. Hence, 
the proposed re–positioning of law brings in the macro–economic debates on the role 
of land in the political economy of Malawi. Of prime consideration here is whether 
land reform must support the estate sector or smallholders (or both) for the country’s 
agricultural policy direction. The other debate relates to the question whether there is 
a policy synergy between the land framework – the Land Policy – and the macro–
economic framework – particularly the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. In 
sum, I am proposing a holistic approach to the land question in Malawi that does not 
merely involve the translation of land reform into land law reform. I endorse the 
sentiments of McAuslan here. He contends that the move from ‘policy’ to ‘law’ – 
precisely legislative drafting – must not focus on ‘legal technicality’; it must remain a 
‘policy’ debate throughout the reform process.119 Otherwise, ‘abstract 
instrumentalism’ perpetuates the land question in a country.120  
There is also the issue of dignified living, especially in the context of the 
levels of impoverishment of the land deprived in political economies such as Malawi. 
Garton Kamchedzera and Chikosa Banda, writing on the right to development and its 
realization amongst rural communities in Malawi, establish that dignified living is the 
primary aspiration of people in rural areas of the country. They argue that dignified 
living refers to the existence of (social) conditions in a locality that makes living a life 
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with human dignity possible. In other words, dignified living goes to the root of 
‘human–being–ness’.121 
IV FINAL WORD 
The theory that I have adopted for the thesis – based as it is on the 
Foucauldian ‘idea’ of governmentality – seeks to focus the inquiry on the ‘situations’ 
or ‘processes’ of responsibilization under the on–going land reform in Malawi. In 
doing so, the analysis will examine the interaction of the key constituencies under the 
reform in the country; namely the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the Achikumbe and the land deprived. The examination of this interaction seeks to 
determine the form and the extent to which the interaction is shaping a responsibilized 
population under market–based land reform models. 
The complementarity of governmentality and responsibilization is such that 
the latter allows for the recognition and analysis of a value that is underpinning the art 
of government in a polity. In looking at responsibilization, it has been noted that what 
I have called hegemonic responsibilization is pervasive in academic scholarship that 
uses responsibilization as a framework for analysis. Hegemonic responsibilization 
focuses on the individual as the primary ‘unit’ of a population. Hence, hegemonic 
responsibilization generates the responsibilized individual.  
Beyond hegemonic responsibilization, I make a case for what I have called 
people–generated responsibilization. I propose that the people–generated 
responsibilization must necessarily focus on the State itself; particularly the exercise 
of State authority. People–generated responsibilization must lead to a responsibilized 
State. The central point here is that the public trust and the social trust under the 
Constitution underlie the exercise of State authority. A ‘governor’ does the governing 
with the ‘consent’ or ‘legitimation’ of the people as a repository of constituent power. 
In the circumstances, if reference is made to Foucauldian ‘convenient ends’ that 
underpin the art of government, those ‘ends’ must optimally favour the people. 
Hence, in this context, one way of framing the resolution of the land question 
becomes: who optimally benefits under the proposed resolution of the question; how 
does the stated benefit arise; and why is the stated beneficiary, the one to benefit.  
Regarding the location of law in the political economy: The point that has 
been made in the realm of governmentality is that ‘regulation’ or ‘discipline’ does not 
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reveal itself in the specificity of the law only. There is a range of multiform tactics. 
Hence, ‘regulation’ or indeed ‘discipline’ emerges from multiple ‘sites’; including 
‘ideology’, ‘law’ and ‘policy’.122 It is imperative in the circumstances that law is not 
the only focus of the analysis of the land question in Malawi. A holistic approach that 
problemmatizes the whole political economy is preferable. 
The ‘reliability’ of the ‘tools’ of inquiry – the theory and a framework for 
analysis – depends upon the ‘stability’ of the social phenomenon under 
examination.
123
 In the short and even long term, the ‘reliability’ of the theory and 
framework for analysis rests on two assumptions. First, the prevailing land question in 
Malawi remains unresolved. The second assumption is that the centrality of market as 
value continues to dominate development discourse. Suffice it to say that while the 
dominance of market as value remains invasive in the debate in development 
discourse, the role of the State is once again changing; with the State gravitating 
towards the centre.
124
 
 The analysis of the land question in Malawi will require a frontal engagement 
with the abstraction thesis in rights discourse; the liberal configuration of the right to 
property, precisely the right to land; and a contextual analysis of the ‘construction’ 
and ‘re–construction’ of the individual under market–based land reform models. In 
the next Chapter, I examine the conception issues that relate to the nature of a right; 
the meaning of ‘property’; the right to property as a legal relation; the right to 
property as a social relation; the right to land as a specific ‘type’ of the right to 
property; including the nature of the ‘customary’ space. There is also a proposal for 
the recognition of the beneficial interest in land that may enhance the resolution of the 
land question in the country. The conception of market–based land reform models 
forms the basis of the discussion in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 2 
The Conception of the Right to Property in Land: The Nature of a 
‘Right’, ‘Property’ and the ‘Customary’ Space 
 
 In the Introduction, it was pointed out that a clearly defined land question must 
lead to an equally, clearly established purpose and direction of land reform. However, 
it was observed that the African or indeed country–specific land questions have been 
mired in confusion and dissensus and this has undermined the purpose and direction 
of land reform in the African postcolony. In Chapter 1, it was suggested that clearly 
defined parameters of the constitutive conception, theory and framework for analysis 
should complement strategies to resolve a land question. The confusion and dissensus 
arise because of the lack of clarity in the conception of the right to property in land 
and the ideological factors that permeate land reform discourse. The conceptual issues 
relating to a ‘right’; ‘property’; and the ‘customary’ space are discussed in this 
Chapter. The ideological issues relating to a land question are covered in Chapters 3, 
4, 5 and 6. The central point of this Chapter is that in formulating the strategies for the 
resolution of the land question in postcolonial economies such as Malawi, the 
conception of the right to property in land must be located within the framework of 
the right to property as a social relation. 
The liberal conception of the right to property in land is dominant in land 
reform discourse. This conception is based on the Lockean labour theory of property 
or appropriation.
1
 This enables a focus on the responsibilization of a homo 
economicus whose responsibilization is crucial for the sustenance of the market. The 
liberal conception of the right to property in land has meant that it is abstracted, de–
historicized and de–contextualized.  
The conception of the right to property as a social relation allows a social 
constructionist approach to ‘property’. The approach incorporates history and context 
as critical factors for the analysis.
2
 The conception of the right to property as a social 
relation enables the examination of the land question in Malawi that focuses on the 
underlying ‘technologies of normalization’ shaping and re–shaping the land question. 
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The following summation is pertinent: In relation to the nature of a right to 
property it must be observed that there are different perspectives to the notion of a 
‘right’. The dominant discourse on the nature of a ‘right’ states that it is liberal and 
exclusive to an individual. In relation to a ‘right’ to ‘property’, the reference is not to 
‘thing’ or ‘land’; it is in the ‘thing’ or ‘land’.3 The right to property is wider and the 
right to land is narrower. Further, the right to property cannot be arbitrarily deprived 
or expropriated. The liberal notion of a ‘right’ to ‘property’ informs market–based 
land reform models.  
Second, the conception of the right to property as a social relation allows the 
examination of the ‘worldview’ relating to the ‘customary’ space and ‘customary’ 
tenure. The worldview regarding ‘customary’ tenure is that it is communal in nature. 
The proponents of the reform of the ‘customary’ space under a land reform 
programme base their arguments ostensibly on the economic inefficiency of the 
communitarian ethos of the ‘customary’ tenure. In this Chapter, the ‘customary’ space 
is discussed under three approaches: the sentimentalist, the revisionist, and the legal 
pluralism approaches. The argument is that the conception of the ‘customary’ space 
has been a major factor for the irresolution of the land question in a postcolonial 
economy such as Malawi.  
Finally, and beyond the conception of the right to property as a social relation, 
the Chapter proposes a re–examination of the worldview of ‘customary’ tenure in 
ways that seek to emphasize the potential of the beneficial interest in land. The 
beneficial interest must be conceptualized in a manner that promotes the access of the 
land deprived to available arable land in a country. This conception of the beneficial 
interest takes place within an appreciative paradigm of the nature of the right to 
property in land of the land deprived. It is proposed that such an appreciative 
paradigm enhances the resolution of the land question in the country. The treatment of 
the beneficial interest in land is merely prefatory here. There is a more in–depth 
discussion of its conception in Chapter 7. 
I THE NATURE OF A RIGHT TO PROPERTY 
 The conception of ‘property’ invites varied perspectives of inquiry. Alexandra 
George, for instance, suggests three perspectives of inquiry; namely, the normative, 
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ontological and utilitarian.
4
 The normative perspective raises questions that address 
the ‘form of property’; what ‘thing’ is property, the ‘boundaries’ between private 
property and communal property, and the beneficiary of (particular) property. The 
ontological perspective raises questions that deal with the ‘innate characteristics’ of 
‘property’ in ‘particular whether the ‘innate characteristics’ are universal to all 
property ‘systems’ or they are ‘conceptually contextual’ or ‘culturally dependent’. 
Finally, the utilitarian perspective raises what George calls the ‘explanatory 
questions’; these questions confront the ‘ends’ of ‘property’. The utilitarian 
perspective seeks to establish whether the end of property is the achievement of social 
control or social justice.
5
  
 At a macro level, the normative perspective is concerned with the role the 
concept of property plays in ordering society. On the other hand, at a micro level, the 
concern is the instrumentality of the conception of property towards the production of 
‘specified social or economic ends or ideological goals in a particular society’.6 The 
various perspectives of inquiry that George suggests are not mutually exclusive. They 
are interwoven. However, these perspectives buttress the point that ‘property’ let 
alone the right to property – regardless of its conception – need not be analyzed in 
abstract and decontextualized terms. It must be historicized and contextualized in 
analysis. 
A Character of a ‘Right’ 
 The hohfeldian analysis of a ‘right’ has been significantly influential in legal 
theory.
7
 In this respect, a ‘right’ has at least four attributes; a ‘right’ as ‘claim’, 
‘liberty’, ‘power’ or ‘immunity’.8 Beyond this hohfeldian analysis of a ‘right’, there 
are differences based on the conceptual nature of a ‘right’ and the policy objective of 
a ‘right’. The conceptual differences revolve around whether benefit is a constitutive 
part of a ‘right’; that is, whether a ‘right’ must provide the ‘maximum degree of self–
assertion’ or it is enough that a ‘right’ confers a benefit. The former case is what is 
referred to as the ‘Will/Choice Theory’ which is based on personal sovereignty as a 
‘superior will’ and simultaneously lauds the sanctity of ‘individual discretion’. The 
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latter scenario – which is referred to as the ‘Interest/Benefit Theory’ – can be 
explained in two ways: Its utilitarian explanation is that a ‘right’ must have an 
inherent benefit from the performance of a ‘duty’. Second, a ‘right’ is contingent upon 
the recognition of an interest regardless of whether a ‘duty’ is imposed or not.9 The 
policy differences tend to dwell on the category of persons or things that may enjoy a 
‘right’.10  
The conceptual and policy differences converge around (de–)abstraction; 
whether a ‘right’ must be abstracted or de–abstracted.11 The abstraction thesis is 
grounded in liberal political theory whereby regardless of history and context, it is 
enough that a rights discourse is located in the supremacy of the individual.
12
 This 
corresponds with the Foucauldian assertion that the individual is a ‘site’ where 
‘power’ is most concentrated or targeted.13 The de–abstraction thesis, on the other 
hand, does not necessarily deny the supremacy of the individual. It goes further to 
state that a denial of history and context works against the very persons a rights 
discourse seeks to protect.
14
   
In this thesis, the nature of a ‘right’ in the hohfeldian sense is useful for its 
analytical value. It allows the examination of a responsibilization under a rights 
discourse. Whether a ‘right’ is granted or not depends on the ‘convenient end’ being 
served in a political economy.
15
 Further, the de–abstraction thesis complements the 
conception of the right to property as a social relation.  
B The Meaning of ‘Property’: The Right to Property as a Social 
Relation 
 
 There are three levels to the discussion of the right of property as a social 
relation. The first looks at the liberal roots of ‘property’. At this level, property is 
grounded in the Lockean labour theory. The second focuses on the right to property as 
a social relation; particularly on the social constructionist approach to ‘property’.16 
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 See MDA Freeman, above, 354–355.  
10
 See B Bix, note 1, 126. 
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 See M Tushnet ‘An Essay on Rights’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363 who argues for de–
abstraction; and PJ Williams ‘Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights’ 
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 See B Bix, note 1, 128. 
16
 See SR Munzer ‘Property as Social Relations’ in SR Munzer (ed.) New Essays in the Legal and 
Political Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 36–75. See also P Berger 
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Third, there is a discussion of conception of the ‘customary’ ‘space’, and the 
beneficial interest in land of the land deprived. This forms the crux of the discussion 
under sections II and III. 
1 The Right to Property as a Legal Relation: The Liberal Roots to 
‘Property’ 
 
The legal meaning of ‘property’ does not refer to a ‘thing’ but to the relation 
among persons on the basis of a ‘thing’. The ‘thing’ has been dephysicalized and the 
focus is no longer on the dominion of persons over ‘things’ but the dominion of the 
interpersonal relation or relationship.
17
 In this dephysicalized mould of ‘property’, 
Kevin Gray has conceived of ‘property’ as ‘thin air’ and has defined ‘property’ as a 
‘power relationship constituted by legally sanctioned control over access to benefits 
of excludable resources’.18 The relation can be strictly legal or social.19 The relation is 
what, at law, constitutes the ‘right’ or ‘interest’ in ‘property’.20 Hence, in property 
discourse, the primary reference is to a ‘right’ to ‘property’; the secondary reference 
being to a ‘right’ to ‘property’ in land.21 
‘Property’ as a legal relation is rooted in what Stephen Munzer calls ‘the 
Hohfeld–Honore orthodoxy’.22  There are four attributes of ‘property’ conceived as a 
legal relation; namely, nominal ownership, benefit, control and management.
23
 
However, even in light of Gray’s and Munzer’s conception of ‘property’, just as with 
the consideration of a ‘right’, it must be acknowledged that the conceptual character 
of ‘property’ is as problematic as its policy trajectory. At the conceptual level, there is 
what Joshua Gertzler describes as the ‘hohfeldian denial of property as a meaningful 
juristic category’ and, on the other, its ‘(re)discovery’ as a constitutive ‘block’ of the 
                                                                                                                                            
& T Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Hamondsworth: Penguin, 1971). 
17See K Vandevelde ‘The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property’ (1980) 29 Buffalo Law Review 325. See also C Reich ‘The New Property’ (1964) 
73 Yale Law Journal 773.  
18
 See K Gray ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50(2) Cambridge Law Journal 252, 295. See also K & S 
Gray, note 3.  
19
 See SR Munzer, note 16, 37. 
20
 See JE Penner The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 49–51.  
21
 See T Honore ‘Property and Ownership: Marginal Comments’ in T Endicott et al., Properties of 
Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 129–136, 131; K Gray, 
note 18; and K & S Gray, note 3. 
22
 See SR Munzer, note 16, 37 citing WN Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning WW Cook ed. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978) and AM Honore ‘Ownership’ in 
AG Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
23
 See Justice Chitty in In re Earnshaw–Wall (1894) 3 Ch.D 156; and K Gray, note 18; SR Munzer, 
note 16, 37; and GS Kamchedzera ‘Land Tenure Relations, the Law and Development in Malawi’ in 
Guy Mhone (ed.), Introduction, note 11, 188–204. 
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legal and social order.
24
 The conceptual and policy considerations of ‘property’ tend 
to be conflated in analysis. At the centre of the debates here is the role of the 
individual and the State in relation to ‘property’.25  
The Lockean labour theory is the justification for private property based on the 
supremacy of individual autonomy. This is in turn premised on the individual’s innate 
possession of ‘property’ as a reward for their labour. The supremacy of individual 
autonomy is also justified on the basis of the Benthamite utility argument and the law 
and economics argument of opportunity cost.
26
 The libertarian individual is very 
atomistic.
27
 The counter–argument to the libertarian argument is that there is a context 
to the livelihood of the individual; there are family, community and other identities 
that determine the individual’s functionality.28 
The supremacy of the individual under the liberal conception of the right to 
property is not inadvertent. In Chapter 1, it was asserted that the art of government is 
concerned with the disposal of things to achieve a convenient end. A range of 
multiform tactics is used in the process of the disposal. Under a liberal order, the 
individual is crucial to what Foucault has described as a phenomenon of scarcity. 
Hence, a liberal conception of the right to property leads to constituencies of land 
owners and the land deprived; employers and employers respectively. In an agrarian 
context, what emerges is a land owner whose responsibilization is based on the 
inordinate exclusion or the hoarding of land from a land deprived.
29
 The land deprived 
in this relation becomes a source of labour. Hence, the land owner as a producer, and 
the land deprived as a labourer all contribute towards the value of return to the 
producer. The producer’s value of return in turn feeds into the political economy. A 
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Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); and R Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
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 See M Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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critical thread to the land owner–land deprived relationship is the exclusion, hoarding 
or monopolization as a critical part of the phenomenon of scarcity. 
2 The Right to Property as a Social Relation 
 A clear understanding of the right to property as a social relation necessitates a 
quick overview of social constructionism.
30
 Social constructionism refers to a number 
of approaches to the study of human beings as social animals. These approaches 
include critical psychology, discursive psychology, discourse analysis, 
deconstruction, and poststructuralism. This is a wide category and it brings with it 
problems of essentializing subtly different approaches to social phenomena. However, 
Vivien Burr has suggested that if there is a social constructionist approach at all then 
it is useful to look at the traits of ‘family resemblance’ for its analytical linkages.31 
Members of a family are different but there are enough ‘recurrent features’ that 
identify them as members of one family.
32
 Hence, Burr argues that the ‘recurrent 
family features of the social constructionist approach are that it emphasizes critique: 
scholarship must take a ‘critical stance’ to ‘taken–for–granted ways of understanding 
the world’; the world is a ‘social world’ because it is a ‘product of social processes’.33  
 Under this labelling, the theoretical approach of the thesis may be classified as 
a type of social constructionism. A pertinent observation is that Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann have argued that while social practices of human beings shape or 
construct the ‘reality’, at the same time these human beings may experience (or seek 
to experience) this ‘reality’ as if it is fixed or pre–ordered.34 In other words, human 
beings construct the (social) world which then becomes the ‘reality’ to which they 
must ‘respond’.35 In relation to property, the emphasis is on the subjective, historical 
and cultural specifity that define the conception of ‘property’ in a particular polity.36 
Hence, if anything, the social constructionist approach underlies the law in context 
approach to (legal) phenomena. Kevin and Susan Gray succinctly capture the social 
constructionist approach in relation to the right to property as a social relation. They 
state:  
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 For a fuller discussion of social constructionism: See P Berger & T Luckmann, note 16. 
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 See V Burr Social Constructionism (London: Routledge, 2003) 2. 
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 See V Burr, above. 
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 See V Burr, note 31, 2–9.  
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 See P Berger & T Luckmann, note 16; and V Burr, note 31, Chapter 9. 
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‘Property’ is, rather, the word used to describe particular concentrations of power over things 
and resources. The term ‘property’ is simply an abbreviated reference to a quantum of socially 
permissible power exercised in respect of a socially valued resource.
37
  
 
‘Property’ as a social relation as a ‘complete conception’ can be configured as 
follows: the individual is not atomistic, he or she is a construction of various 
competing interests in society; as society is made of constructed individuals, we 
cannot ignore mutual ‘dependence; ‘power’ or ‘coercion’ that define social relation 
which in turn has implications for the nature of rights in property; the holder of 
‘power’ or ‘coercion’ can undermine or enhance ‘right’ or ‘freedom’; the existence of 
‘power’, ‘coercion’ and the constructed individual leaves no room for  (illiberal) 
‘autonomy’ in a country; the State is partisan; and finally that reform of the theoretical 
and institutional framework of property law discourse is inevitable.
38
  
In the final analysis, property as a social relation resonates with Foucauldian 
governmentality; particularly, the emphasis on the relations of ‘men’ and ‘things’.39 
Second, property as a social relation and governmentality also echoes the orthodox 
African thought that property (especially land) is life itself.
40
  
3 Reconciling the Right to Property as a Legal Relation and, as a 
Social Relation 
 
 It is acknowledged that some commentators have highlighted the conceptual 
weakness of the right to property as a social relation on the basis of the breadth of the 
‘social’ and ‘social interest’.41 This, it has been argued, undermines the delineation of 
the precise nature of the right to property as a social relation. I subscribe to the view 
that ‘property’ as a legal relation is ultimately a subset of ‘property’ as social relation. 
This is the case if relation is conceived as the interaction of persons on the basis of 
‘things’.  While the notion of ‘property’ as a social relation at law may sound 
redundant, it is useful for a number of reasons: The emphasis on ‘property’ as a social 
relation demystifies law. ‘Property’ as a social relation is useful for analysis because it 
allows for the focus on the ‘whole population’. This is the Foucauldian dimension of 
the analysis. Hence, if an analysis of ‘property’ is de–abstracted and contextualized, it 
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 See Chapter 1. 
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emphasizes the intricate interaction among persons and the construction and 
reconstruction of the individual for a defined and responsibilized role in a political 
economy. Indeed, Issa Shivji has said the conception of the right to property as a 
social relation reveals the ‘real substance, that is, the social relations of production.’42 
II THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN LAND: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
‘CUSTOMARY’ SPACE 
 
 In the discussion so far, a ‘right’ to ‘property’ entails that it is a ‘claim’, 
‘power’ or ‘immunity’ in a relation or relationship among persons on the basis of a 
‘thing’. The ‘thing’ is not corporeal, it is dephysicalized. Inherent in this conception is 
the idea of exclusion.
43
 The ‘right’ is invoked or proclaimed under a ‘threat’ of 
infringement. At common law, a ‘thing’ as ‘property’ automatically generates its 
protection from deprivation or expropriation. The deprivation or expropriation of 
property requires the due process of law and its resulting compensation.
44
 
In relation to land, the ‘right’ to ‘property’ entails that a person has a ‘claim’, 
‘power’ or ‘immunity’ over a parcel of the land in their relation with (an)other 
person(s). Precisely, a person does not ‘own’ the physical solum; they ‘own’ some 
‘unitary jural right’ over the solum.45 In the context of the ‘customary’ space and the 
nature of  ‘customary’ (land) tenure, if a ‘right’ is at least a ‘claim’, ‘power’ or 
‘immunity’ and ‘property’ is the relation among persons on the basis of a ‘thing’, then 
the nature of the nexus between a ‘right’ and ‘property’ requires a more nuanced, 
contextualized scrutiny. 
In postcolonial economies such as Malawi, a discussion of the right to 
property as a right to land in the context of land reform must necessarily involve the 
unpacking of the ‘customary’ space. In looking at the root of the ‘customary’ space; 
the argument here is that this is embedded in colonial sovereignty. The discussion of 
the root of the ‘customary’ space is important because it has influenced the worldview 
of the ‘customary’ space and ‘customary’ (land) tenure in land reform discourse.  
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A The Root of the ‘Customary’ Space 
I have suggested that there are three approaches that are identifiable in relation 
to the root of the ‘customary’ space; the sentimentalist, revisionist and legal pluralism 
approaches respectively. The following quick observation may be made regarding 
‘conception’; and ‘custom’ or ‘customary’: Building from the reference to 
‘conception’ in Chapter 1,46 ‘conception’ is grounded in the concept–conception 
dichotomy that Ronald Dworkin discusses in relation to the ‘aim’ of law in a 
jurisdiction.
47
 Under this thesis, the emphasis is on conception as a product of 
interpretive, human agency. George states: 
A concept must have an essential character or meaning if it is to survive in a variety of 
environments: there must be something about a concept that gives it communicative force as a 
linguistic term regardless of the cultural, social, legal or historical context it is used. 
Conceptions have a different nature. If the concept is the generic form, the conception is the 
specific. The conception is the way the concept is interpreted and/or implemented in a specific 
context.
48
 
 
In relation to ‘custom’ or ‘customary’; the ordinary meaning of the root word 
‘custom’ is ‘a practice followed by people of a particular group or region’ or ‘a 
habitual practice of a person’. In this sense, ‘custom’ is synonymous with ‘habit’.49 In 
law, ‘custom’ refers to ‘a common tradition or usage so long established that it has the 
force or validity of law’.50 The following characteristics are key to the designation of 
a phenomenon as ‘custom’ or ‘customary’: it is a practice; it is ubiquitous to a 
(particular) people; and time determines its validity at law.  
Turning to the approaches to the ‘customary’ space, they can be summed up as 
follows: The sentimentalist approach views the ‘customary’ space with deference and 
reverence. This approach proceeds on the basis that the ‘customary’ space is a pre–
colonial repertoire of ‘norm’ with historical continuity.51 The revisionist approach 
looks at the ‘customary’ space as a colonial invention with a historical specificity and 
whose core purpose was to entrench colonial domination.
52
 The legal pluralism 
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approach advocates an understanding of the ‘customary’ space that requires the 
analysis of the lived reality of the ‘indigene’ society; whereby State or ‘lawyers’’ 
‘customary’ law may be recreated and re–interpreted to serve interests of the 
‘indigene’ society.53  A discussion of the three approaches follows: 
1 The Sentimentalist Approach to the ‘Customary’ Space  
Under this approach, the nature of the ‘customary’ space, particularly its 
normative basis; and the extent of its survival, transformation and historical 
continuity, are often taken for granted. In relation to land, ‘customary’ (land) tenure 
has a communitarian ethos. Peters has observed that this communitarian ethos to 
‘customary’ land tenure stemmed from a patronizing, imperial attitude amongst the 
early colonial administrators and missionaries who viewed ‘communal’ tenure as 
inferior to individual, private landholding that was pervasive, for example, under the 
English landholding system.
54
 In the African context, once colonial rule got 
entrenched, the communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ (land) tenure was ‘profoundly 
shaped’ and often served the interests of the colonial State, private Europeans and an 
African elite comprising mostly of male, African chiefs and an emergent male–
dominated entrepreneurial class.
55
 This process of ‘shaping’ often led to a restatement 
of ‘customary’ law of a colony. In the case of the Malawi, for instance, one finds a 
restatement of customary land law under the Restatement of African Law Project that 
was done by the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of 
London.
56
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Two points must be made here: The ascertainment of what the ‘customary’ 
space is poses real methodological challenges because the sources are ‘suspect’ or 
simply do not exist.
57
 Critics of the approach have argued that the ‘customary’ space 
has been misrepresented or indeed ‘invented’ such that the emergent ‘distortion’ 
served a ‘purposive manipulation’.58  
2 The Revisionist Approach to the ‘Customary’ Space 
As it was briefly stated earlier, the revisionist approach proceeds on the basis 
that the ‘customary’ space is a colonial construction under a scheme that involved the 
colonial State and the African elite. Some of the most prolific proponents of this 
approach include Simon Roberts, Francis Snyder, Peter Fitzpatrick, Martin Chanock, 
Mahmood Mamdani, Anne and Robert Seidman, and Terence Ranger.
59
 These 
proponents have criticized the sentimentalist approach on the grounds that it reifies a 
normative continuity from pre–colonial to colonial (African) society; they also raise 
methodological concerns relating to the ascertainment of the ‘norms’; and more 
critically, they argue that the interface between the colonial ruler and the male, 
African elite has produced that which has been called ‘customary’ law and has been 
applied in the colonial, ‘native’ courts.60 They also argue that the violence occasioned 
by the incidence of colonialism in Africa, for example, entails that the erstwhile 
‘acephalous’ African groups were, in the words of Roberts, subjected to 
‘discontinuities, abrupt transition and coercive domination’.61 Fitzpatrick and Snyder 
have gone on to argue that this ‘shaping’ is generally imbricated in the capitalist mode 
of production.
62
 Economic and political interests have greatly influenced the 
interpretation and re–interpretation of the ‘customary’ space.63 The ‘myth’ of the 
‘customary’ space, it has been argued, was a necessary ‘totem’ for colonial capitalism 
to flourish.
64
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The critics of the revisionist approach contend that the approach does not 
make a distinction between the ‘customary’ space as applied by the colonial State 
apparatus or that ‘retrieved’ by Africanist scholars on the one hand and the 
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Franz von Benda–Beckmann has raised another distinction in relation to the treatment 
of the ‘customary’ space. He has argued that a distinction must be made between 
created ‘customary’ law that found its way into the State legal system and a 
‘customary’ law (that is, a normative system of a people) that remained outside the 
influence and confines of the State legal system. He has contended that the revisionist 
approach to the customary space conflates this important distinction.
65
 While this 
distinction may be made, in my view, the colonial influences also permeate the ‘non–
State’ system through, for example, the role of chiefs in colonial public 
administration.
66
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
3 The Legal Pluralism Approach to the ‘Customary’ Space 
The reiteration to be made here is that this approach advocates that in the 
delineation of the ‘customary’ space, the focus must be on the ‘lived’ reality of the 
‘indigene’ society.67 In relation to land relations, the scholarship on the legal 
pluralism approach has shown that African societies often had ‘multiple types of 
authority’ and equally ‘multiple sets of claims over land’.68 The scholarship here has 
increasingly argued that African society had individualized forms of land ownership 
including rentals and sales.
69
  
A number of observations must be made: First, if there is an area of (African) 
society that has had the most intrusion from the colonial and postcolonial State legal 
system it is the erstwhile land relations of indigenous (African) society. The 
distinction that Benda–Beckmann makes above is critical. I will argue here that 
notions of so–called ‘customary’ land law are in effect elements of statutory land law. 
Hence, the rhetoric of a continued communitarian ethos is not only flawed, it also 
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serves a political purpose which in the postcolony inculcates the interests of the 
‘ruling class’. In the case of Malawi, this network of the ruling class includes a coterie 
of the agents of the Bretton Woods Institutions, the postcolonial State, and the 
Achikumbe. Further, in the Malawi context, Clement Ng’ong’ola has observed that the 
construction of the communitarian ethos of the ‘customary’ space often stemmed 
from a ‘false oral tradition’ that advocates a certain ‘seniority’ in favour of a local 
elite.
70
 
4 Reconciling the Three Approaches 
Going forward, I find the revisionist approach to the ‘customary’ space 
compelling and useful for the analysis of the land question under the on–going land 
reform in Malawi. This is the case because the colonial encounter often entailed that 
newly colonized territories were treated as res nullius – land without an owner. Res 
nullius is rooted in the feudal notions of imperium – acquisition of a ‘territory’ – and 
dominium – acquisition of the land in the territory.71 The acquisition of colonial 
sovereignty implied that a new sovereign owned the land under the principle of 
eminent domain – dominium eminens – and determine the applicable law. In Malawi, 
the acquisition of eminent domain under colonial sovereignty was under a 
proclamation. It is this proclamation that transmogrified ‘native title’.72 
In the Anglophone colony, the applicable law was the English common law 
and other ‘laws’ applied after passing through the prism of non–repugnance clauses 
framed in such language as ‘justice and morality’ or ‘natural justice, equity and good 
conscience’. Hence in the emergent colonial legal system, the ‘legal reality’ was that 
there was always one ‘system’ of law – the ‘statutory’ – with an appendage called the 
‘customary’.73 In any event, if the etymology of ‘custom’ is anything to go by, what 
has emerged as the ‘customary’ space from colonialism is, I suggest, a misnomer. In 
light of the arguments from the revisionist approach which I adopt here; there is no 
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ubiquitous, timeless practice in property relations in the African postcolony that can 
be attributed to the pre–colonial practices of ‘indigene’ African society.  
A final point to be made here is that the sentimentalist and legal pluralism 
approaches are complementary. In this case, it is perilous to differentiate an 
‘understanding’ of the ‘customary’ space that has been passed down generations of 
State agents or intra–community from the ‘lived’ reality of the ‘indigene’ society.74 In 
any event, reality is a mosaic that is subjective and, among other things, it is prone to 
the complexities of perception, depth of knowledge, and interpretation.
75
 Hence, to 
the extent that ‘reality’ – as lived or otherwise – is prone to construction, the legal 
pluralism approach to the ‘customary’ space is tenuous. However, beyond the legal 
‘capture’, under a process of hegemonic responsibilization new power relations may 
arise which subordinate both the State and ‘non–State’ spaces.76 
B The Nature of ‘Customary’ Tenure 
Following from the discussion of the root of the ‘customary’ space generally, 
the central argument here is that a conception of ‘customary’ (land) tenure – with a 
communitarian ethos – as distinct from statutory (land) tenure – with a private, 
exclusive ethos – needs unpacking. Land tenure entails the nature of landholding. A 
clear understanding of land tenure is pertinent as it informs the direction of its reform. 
The colonial legacy in Africa trail blazed a dualist land tenure system often sharply 
contrasted as ‘statutory’ and ‘customary’. The worldview here is that ‘statutory’ 
tenure is based on a liberal legal order and a right holder has the power to fully 
transfer or sale the interest in land in favour of another person.
77
 The anti–thesis is 
that under ‘customary’ tenure while the interest in land is supposedly transferable, it is 
not saleable.  
In the same way that the ‘customary’ space is a colonial construction, the same 
can be said of ‘customary’ tenure. In the Anglophone African colony, the conception 
of the so–called ‘customary’ tenure under a communitarian ethos and the attribution 
of the rights in land – the usufruct – to a chief served a critical political function. The 
role of a chief under ‘customary’ tenure was the basis of indirect rule as a system of 
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control by the colonial Sovereign in the countryside. The discussion of the nature of 
‘customary’ tenure looks at the ‘juridical’ construction of ‘customary’ tenure and the 
discourse arising from the Australian case of Mabo v Queensland (No. 2).
78
 
1 The ‘Juridical’ Construction of ‘Customary’ Tenure 
In the British Empire, the juridical construction of ‘customary’ tenure 
occurred in the judiciary as well as the colony’s legislature. In the case of the 
judiciary, the construction occurred both at the level of the colony and at the centre of 
Empire through the Privy Council. This judicial and legislative intervention was 
complemented by the institution of a chief whose role was often legitimized under 
statute. The combined effect of the judicial and legislative intervention and the role of 
the chief meant that ‘customary’ tenure assumed the force of law. Below are the 
interventions: 
‘Customary’ Tenure in Court 
In the British Empire, three early 20th Century CE decisions have set the pace 
for the construction of the so–called ‘customary’ tenure. These decisions are Nireaha 
Tamaki v Baker,
79
 In Re Rhodesia
80
 and Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern 
Nigeria.
81
  The principle that has emerged from these cases is that ‘customary’ tenure 
– or precisely, ‘native title’ – is dependent on an act of annexation or cession followed 
by proclamation of a colonial sovereignty. Hence, ‘customary’ tenure is 
transmogrified from the radical title of the colonial sovereign. The comprehension of 
the so–called ‘customary’ tenure by the colonial judiciary shows a patronizing 
undertone. In In Re Rhodesia, Lord Davey in delivering the judgement of the Privy 
Council states: 
It seems to be common ground that the ownership of the lands was “tribal” or “communal” 
but what precisely that means remains to be ascertained. 
 
[...] 
 
The estimation of the rights of the aboriginal tribes is inherently difficult. Some tribes are so 
low in the scale of social organization that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties 
are not to be reconciled with the institutions or legal ideas of civilized society. Such a gulf 
cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known 
to our laws and then to transmute it into the substance of transferable rights of property as we 
know them.
82
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This propensity towards ‘othering’ the nature of ‘customary’ tenure almost 
automatically led to Viscount Haldane in Amodu Tijani declaring that native title in 
land (at least in the British Empire) was a usufructuary right.
83
 The Viscount went on 
to state that the title lay in the community and the chief often held a ‘fiduciary’ role 
akin to a trustee.
84
 He acknowledged, however, that the enjoyment of the right to 
possession required a close study of the history of the particular community.
85
 The 
terms of the annexation or cession also determined the precise nature of the 
‘customary’ tenure.86  
Once the nature of the ‘customary’ tenure was proscribed as communitarian 
and the chief was a repository of the usufruct, it then became, in my view, the 
juridical fortress of the divisive indirect rule in the Anglophone colony.
87
 This 
construction, as hinted at earlier, has had implications for the nature of the 
development of colonial capitalism. This was part of the ideology of colonial 
domination.
88
 
In the same way, there are varied approaches to the ‘customary’ space; the 
nature of ‘customary’ tenure has polarized scholarship in the academy. Beyond 
Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia and Amodu Tijani, the works by African scholars 
such as T. Olawale Elias
89
 and Africanist scholars such as Anthony Allott has 
entrenched the communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ tenure. There are however two 
schools to the communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ tenure: First, there are those who 
argue that pre–colonial African society preclude notions of individual ownership of 
property. The principle in Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia and Amodu Tijani is 
endorsed as a correct ‘crystallization’ of the law.90 The second school, and directly 
opposed to the first, is that the so–called ‘customary’ tenure was only communitarian 
prior to the allocation of a piece of land in favour of a particular family. Upon 
allocation of a piece of land in favour of a family, that family acquired all rights in 
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that piece of land exclusive of all members of that community.
91
 The precise content 
of the individualized rights is less clear.
92
 The polarization brings to the fore Berger 
and Luckmann’s observation that ‘reality’ once constructed often it is defended by the 
constructor and non–constructor alike. 
On the communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ land tenure, Clement Ng’ong’ola 
states: 
[I]t is incorrect to ascribe land rights to communities or groups identified as ‘tribes’ or ‘clans’. 
These are now ubiquitous linguistic and cultural clusters of little relevance to land tenure. The 
‘village’ occupied by persons belonging to different tribes in some cases, is the social and 
geographical unit within which land rights are exercised. But even here, the village 
‘community’ may enjoy rights of user as a group only in unallocated land or public land. 
Individuals or families may enjoy exclusive and uninterrupted use of allocated gardens. A 
sweeping statement that land belongs to the community and never to the individual obscures 
the varying interests which groups and individuals can enjoy in different land categories.
93
 
 
Beyond Ng’ong’ola, Chanock has also advanced a compelling case in relation 
to ‘customary’ tenure.94 The nature of ‘customary’ tenure cannot be divorced from the 
root of the ‘customary’ space. In this respect, attempts to locate ‘customary’ tenure in 
a pre–colonial or postcolonial society is to ignore the fact that land relations were 
most aggressively modified and subsumed under a colonial legal system. Chanock has 
argued in relation to the ‘customary’ space generally that it is a product of a three–
tiered process of ‘legal mythology’ that has involved the nature of ‘British 
functionalist anthropology’ which presented ‘traditional’ legal systems as ‘extant’ and 
tended to downplay any ‘elements of conflict’ or contradiction; the role of a ‘neo–
traditionalist African scholarship’ which has nurtured the idea of a ‘surviving African 
customary law’; and a value–added ‘African legal heritage’ that has emerged without 
a ‘history’.95  
Hence, in the context of this mythologization of the ‘customary’ space, 
Chanock has buttressed the revisionist approach to the nature of the ‘customary’ space 
(and by extension ‘customary’ tenure). Using evidence from Anglophone Africa, he 
contends: 
The law was the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of an alien state and 
part of the process of coercion. And it also came to be a new way of conceptualising 
relationships and powers and a weapon within African communities which were interpreted 
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and fought over by those involved in moral terms. The customary law, far from being a 
survival, was created by these changes and conflicts. It cannot be understood outside of the 
peculiar institutional setting in which its creation takes place. African legal conceptions, 
strategies and tactics are formed both by the impact of capitalism and by the interaction of the 
communities thus affected with the concepts, strategies and power of British colonial legal 
institutions.
96
 
 
And in respect of the ‘non–statutory’ and ‘non–English’ parts of law applied in 
colonial and postcolonial courts which have been appropriated as ‘customary law’, 
Martin Chanock comments: 
[I]f we look at how the customary law came into being, resting an Africanising strategy upon 
it can look a little odd. It is not simply that customary law has changed in both content and 
form during the colonial period. It is that the circumstances of its development made it a part 
of an idealisation of the past developed as an attempt to cope with social dislocation. It was 
defensive in spirit, defensive not only against British rulers but against those Africans whose 
growing involvement in wage labour and market agriculture was leading them towards 
different interpretations of obligations and properties.
97
 
 
The following therefore could not have been more poignant from Chanock: 
In stressing that customary law is not customary I cannot claim to have made a particularly 
startling discovery […] [I]t was a part of a process of legalisation, of a transformation in 
African institutions rather than a continuity.
98
 
 
Once the nature of the ‘customary’ space (and by extension, the ‘customary’ tenure) is 
understood neither as a continuity of the pre–colonial into a colonial status quo; nor 
that the ‘customary’ space is frozen in time and space with the declaration of colonial 
sovereignty, we can then begin to analyze the interest in the land that may accrue to 
the land deprived. I begin this discussion under section III below. 
Legislative Intervention and the Role of Chiefs 
 The communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ tenure is equally dependent on the 
chief – the traditional authority – for its optimal functionality. For it is in the chief that 
the usufruct is vested. The institution of chiefs has been problematic in the African 
colony and postcolony; particularly in the context of land relations. Whether a 
chieftaincy predates colonialism or it is its blatant creation, the charge against the 
African chiefs is that they have been ‘appropriated’ for a multiplicity of aims, 
including repression and the ‘ordering’ of society into ‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’.99  The 
preoccupation with chiefs arises from a basic tactic. Peters states:  
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[C]olonial rulers confused territoriality with sovereignty, and conflated African ritual roles, 
whose authority lay in rain–making or fertility of the land, with political roles exerting 
authority over people in lineage, clan or chiefdom. Where the colonial rulers could not 
identify an appropriate ‘chief ’, they created one.100 
 
The African colonial and postcolonial State has legislation for the regulation 
of chieftaincy through appointments, dismissals, promotions, and suspensions. 
Mamdani makes a forceful account of decentralized despotism under the British 
colonial model where the chiefs played a crucial role in ‘pacifying’ the countryside.101 
Indeed in Malawi, for example, chiefs were ‘reined in’ under the Native Authority 
Ordinance of 1913 and the Native Courts Ordinance of 1914. The incorporation of 
existing chieftaincies and the creation of chieftaincies where none existed raise 
legitimacy problems. This is particularly the case from the perspective of the 
‘beneficiaries’ of land given the fact that the chiefs are the supposed holders of the 
usufruct under ‘customary’ tenure. 
2 The Mabo Discourse 
Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia and Amodu Tijani tacitly entrenched the 
principle of terra nullius.
102
 This is the case because the decisions suggest that the 
basic presumption is that a proclamation of colonial sovereignty superseded all rights 
or interests in land. The survival of the rights or interests in land of an ‘indigene’ 
society turned on the interpretation of the terms of annexation or cession. In the 
African context, Amodu Tijani held that, if anything, the ‘indigene’ society had a 
usufruct.  
Mabo, in many respects is consistent with Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia 
and Amodu Tijani. However, Mabo is radical in the way it enunciated the following 
principles: the original right in land of an ‘indigene’ society is not extinguished by 
mere lack of recognition by a new sovereign. Second, the original right of the 
‘indigene’ society is extinguished by specific government action through a grant of 
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land in freehold or other limitation set down under statute. Third, and subject to the 
previous two principles, the colonial sovereign did not acquire eminent domain that 
extinguished original interests in land; the acquisition was by virtue of sovereignty 
and not by virtue of property.  
Since then, Mabo has been followed, for instance, in Wik v Queensland;
103
 
Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land Affairs;
104
 and Alexkor Limited and 
Another v The Richtersveld Communities and Others.
105
 However, Mabo, Wik, 
Transvaal Agricultural Union and Richtersveld must be understood in their proper 
context when considered outside the realm of Australia and South Africa. Having said 
that, in the case of the Anglophone colony, notwithstanding the sentiments in Amodu 
Tijani, the original right was extinguished by a specific government action.
106
 In fact, 
the added significance of Transvaal Agriculture Union and Richtersveld is that 
subsequent government action can reverse prior government action that deprived the 
right to land to a people. For example, in the South African scenario, the prior 
government action through the Native Land Act of 1913 (which deprived the right to 
land to largely non–white communities) was reversed by the subsequent government 
action under section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa as endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in these ground breaking cases. 
In the context of the nature of the nature of ‘customary’ tenure, the Mabo 
discourse is important because if a process of ‘government action’ has led to the 
construction of the ‘reality’ known as ‘customary’ tenure, it is possible under the 
same process to enable the deconstruction of this ‘reality’. In other words, if State 
agency is at the centre of an understanding of ‘customary’ tenure as a colonial 
construction, the same form of agency can facilitate its de–bunking.107  
III THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN LAND 
 
 So far, the discussion of the right to land as a part of the right to property as a 
social relation has shown the construction of the ‘customary’ space and ‘customary’ 
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tenure under a scheme meant to buttress colonial capitalism. The scheme and indeed 
the conception of the statutory–‘customary’ dichotomy were premised on the Lockean 
labour theory of property or appropriation. While under the scheme, the so–called 
‘customary’ space and ‘customary’ tenure was the antithesis, it is my argument that in 
view of the revisionist approach to the ‘customary’ space, the nature of the 
‘customary’ space generally and ‘customary’ tenure in particular, ought to be more 
nuanced for analytical purposes. This is even more important when examined in the 
context of the resolution of a land question in political economies such as Malawi. In 
this section, I make a case for a beneficial interest in land. Under the beneficial 
interest in land, I propose a mechanism that complements other non–legal strategies in 
seeking to provide the land deprived with a possibility of greater access to available 
arable land and in turn enhance resolution of the land question in Malawi.  
 In the context of land ownership, the proponents of the four attributes of 
property – nominal title, control, benefit, management – point out that different 
persons may have rights accruing to different attributes to property. This tiered 
accrual of rights should not automatically lead to the conclusion often reached in land 
reform discourse that there is a statutory–‘customary’ dichotomy; and further that the 
‘customary’ space or ‘customary’ tenure has a communitarian ethos. Kamchedzera 
has argued in the case of Malawi that the ‘wrong conception’ of the nature of 
‘customary’ tenure has had negative implications for (the much wider) agrarian 
reform in the country.
108
 
The question that arises is how can an understanding of the beneficial interest 
in land enhance the resolution of the land question in political economies through, as 
it were, the possibility of greater guarantees for access to available arable land for the 
land deprived? The argument here is that building on the conception of the right to 
property as a social relation, the beneficial interest in land potentially enhances the 
resolution of the land question in political economies such as Malawi. There is a fuller 
engagement with the case for the resolution of the land question in Malawi in Chapter 
7. The discussion here is limited to the conception of the beneficial interest in land. 
First, the nature of the beneficial interest: Beneficial interest is more refined in 
equity than in law. In equity, the beneficial interest is the interest of value, worth or 
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use of property that a person does not own at law.
109
 For my purposes, a beneficial 
interest must be considered in the context of a fiduciary relationship if it is to add 
value at all in land reform. A fiduciary relationship may be broadly understood as ‘a 
relationship of confidence in which equity imposes a duty upon a person in whom 
confidence is reposed in order to prevent abuse of that confidence.’110 Under a 
fiduciary relationship, a beneficiary has a proprietary right of claim against another 
person except a bona fide purchaser of a legal estate for value. A fiduciary 
relationship is routinely construed strictly to curb fraud.
111
 What underlies a fiduciary 
relationship is trust. Trust bears confidence (in some ‘entity’ or ‘being’). Trust or 
confidence connotes responsibility. Responsibility is often described as the ‘state of 
being responsible’.112 This suggests that there is a benchmark that measures this state. 
In light of people–generated responsibilization set out in the Introduction, the 
beneficial interest in land must be understood in the context of a responsibilized State. 
The nature of the beneficial interest necessitates a discussion of the conception 
of ‘customary land’ under the Land Act.113 ‘Customary land’ is defined as ‘all land 
held, occupied or used under customary law, but does not include any public land.’114 
Notwithstanding the reference to a category of land known as ‘customary land’ under 
the Land Act, the cumulative effect of the powers reposed in the Minister under the 
Act as an agent of the postcolonial State should logically lead to the conclusion that 
‘customary land’ under the Land Act in Malawi is a phantasm and a majority of the 
population in the country have interests similar to tenancies at will. This is the 
reasoning: ‘Customary land’ under the Land Act is supposedly the ‘undoubted 
property of the people of Malawi’, and further that the land vests in ‘perpetuity in the 
President.’115 Hence, the legal title in ‘customary land’ does not vest in the people of 
Malawi; it vests in the President as a symbol of the postcolonial State. The vesting 
here suggests the creation of a trust. The nature of the trust is not clarified under the 
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Act. Its creation is at best declaratory only. If the reference to the ‘people of Malawi’ 
is meant to give certainty to the objects of the trust, the rights of the objects – the 
people of Malawi – are not clarified either under the Act. In this respect, this amounts 
to a ‘political trust’ or, in the words of Vice Chancellor Megarry, a ‘trust in the higher 
sense’.116 In this respect, it only creates a government obligation which is 
unenforceable in a court of law.
117
 
Hence, the declaration that customary land is the undoubted property of the 
people of Malawi is one of principle without any legal significance under the Land 
Act.
118
 Section 5 of the Land Act does not grant the people of Malawi any enforceable 
right at law. The people of Malawi only have the right of use and occupancy over 
‘customary land’.119 The postcolonial State has powers to dispose of ‘customary land’ 
as private land under leasehold;
120
 and may also declare ‘customary land’ as public 
land
121
 in which case it is possible for the land to be converted into freehold.
122
 In 
sum, section 25 of the Land Act creates a political trust over ‘customary land’ where 
the President is a trustee of the people of Malawi in a symbolic sense.
123
  
 The reference to the people of Malawi under the Land Act is not a reference to 
legal owners. It is a reference to tenants at will with a beneficial interest based on 
their right to use or occupancy of the land. Hence, it is useful for analysis to construe 
a constitutionally–based, ‘fiduciary’ relationship between the postcolonial State and 
the people of Malawi for purposes of land reform under section 12 of the 
Constitution. The core duty of the postcolonial State under this ‘fiduciary’ 
relationship is to guarantee access to available arable land that serves as a meaningful 
benchmark for dignified living on the part of the land deprived. 
 IV FINAL WORD 
 
In this Chapter, I set out to provide an understanding of the conception of the 
right to land through the nature of a ‘right’ and ‘property’ under the framework of a 
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right to property as a social relation. The discussion has revealed that the right to land 
is dominated by liberal discourse which is located in the Lockean labour theory of 
property or appropriation. This conception is grounded in the de–abstraction approach 
to rights discourse where history and context are irrelevant for the analysis of social 
phenomenon. 
The liberal tilt of the right to land serves a critical function in a political 
economy tradition that lauds the efficacy of the market. Building from Chapter 1, I 
have reiterated the contention that the market is the value that underlies hegemonic 
responsibilization. This tilt is necessary for the responsibilization of the individual as 
homo economicus to sustain a particular form of land relations. There are land owners 
and the land deprived who in the scheme of things under the Foucauldian 
phenomenon of scarcity serve a particular ‘convenient end’ in the political 
economy.
124
 
I have also argued that the framework of a right to property as a social relation 
is useful in understanding the subjective historical and contextual specificities that 
define the conception of property, let alone the right to land, in a polity. The emphasis 
here is on the awareness of the social processes that produce (social) reality. This 
social constructionist approach is pertinent in the understanding of the ‘customary’ 
space and ‘customary’ tenure. The ‘customary’ space (and ‘customary’ land tenure) is 
a product of colonial construction that served the colonial agenda. The delineation of 
‘customary’ tenure guaranteed a dual role of skewed land relations and the 
‘pacification’ in the colony and the postcolony.  
In countering the sentimentalist and legal pluralism approaches to the 
‘customary’ space, one of the points worth repeating here is that land relations in the 
colony and postcolony have been aggressively subsumed under a State legal system. 
‘Customary’ land tenure – even as a colonial construct – is validated under statutory 
law. I suggest that it is a misnomer to talk of ‘customary’ land law because there is 
always a single statutory land law regime. One thing that emerges from Nireaha 
Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia, Amodu Tijani and what I have called the Mabo discourse is 
that the recognition and validation of ‘native title’ was through the acknowledgement 
of the radical title of the State sovereign. However, a positive aspect that emerges 
from the Mabo discourse, particularly the South African cases of Transvaal 
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Agriculture Union and Richtersveld is that government action can serve an 
‘emancipatory’ role in favour of the land deprived. I will build on this point in 
Chapter 7. 
Finally, in light of the recognition of ‘native title’, I have discussed the 
building blocks for a proposition of the beneficial interest in land that should enhance 
the resolution of the land question in Malawi. The fleeting discussion so far 
demonstrates that the ‘customary’ tenure under the Land Act renders a significant 
proportion of the population in Malawi similar to tenants at will. However, since it is 
possible to discern an interest in land based on an interest akin to a tenancy at will, the 
proposal is to explore this possibility under a framework of people–generated 
responsibilization. Again, the in–depth discussion of the point takes place in Chapter 
7.    
 
 73 
Chapter 3 
Market–Based Modelling in Land Reform Discourse 
I THE CONTEXT 
 Chapter 2 has shown how a process of customarization led to the construction 
of a particular conception of so–called ‘customary’ land tenure that is supposedly 
based on a communitarian ethos. Indeed, this communitarian ethos has led to a 
‘conventional logic’ which states that since there is an absence of individual rights 
and an apparent ‘dominance’ of ‘group rights’ in the ‘customary’ space, the individual 
is insecure. This insecurity of the individual leads to disinvestment and negative 
growth in a political economy.
1
 This train of thought is variously referred to as the 
economic inefficiency argument or the tragedy of the commons thesis.
2
 
 Since the Lugard thesis, the Swynnerton Plan and on the strength of the 
efficiency argument, proposals were rife in Anglophone Africa for the reform of 
‘customary’ land tenure by its individualization through land titling.3 Research on the 
land reform projects of the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s has documented the 
failures of these projects to foster credit and land markets, or to generate positive 
economic growth. These projects dominated the first law and development movement 
and they tended to seamlessly evolve from land reform into land law reform projects.
4
 
These were eras of the archetypal developmental State. In the 1980s, the role of 
Bretton Woods Institutions has been significant through policy developments relating 
to structural adjustment programmes and nascent poverty reduction strategies which 
have had negative implications for land reform in political economies such as 
Malawi.
5
 
 At the turn of the 1990s, there has emerged what has been called the ‘human– 
centred’ approach under the new wave of land reform. The rhetoric here is that land 
reform must be less ‘economically driven’ and ‘pro–poor’.6  The efficiency argument 
has not disappeared under the new wave. Hernando de Soto through his work aptly 
entitled The Mystery of Capital: Why Capital Triumphs in the West and Fails 
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Elsewhere,
7
 has, with remarkable tenacity, carried forward the efficiency argument. 
De Soto’s argument is that formalization of interests in land will transform the ‘dead 
capital’ of the poor into ‘generative capital’.8 De Soto’s critics have been many.9 
Peters, for one, has opined that De Soto’s thesis is a case of ‘an old idea clad in new 
language’.10 In her critique of De Soto’s thesis, Celestine Nyamu–Musembi has 
argued that five ‘shortcomings’ can be highlighted for the failure of land reform in 
sub–Saharan Africa in the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s. The five shortcomings 
are as follows: the narrow construction of legality meant that legal orders other than 
the formal legal order are extra legal and hence delegitimized; there has been undue 
emphasis on the evolutionary theory of land tenure leading to individual title; there 
has been undue emphasis on the linkage between formal title and the credit market; 
‘markets’ have been narrowly constructed as formal markets; and finally, the 
insecurity of formal title (through, for example, the threat of foreclosure) has often 
been ignored.
11
 
 Besides De Soto’s thesis, it is also worth noting that the new wave of land 
reform emerges in the context of discontent with State–led land reform. The critics of 
State–led land reform have raised a number of points: First, they have argued that the 
reforms were ‘slow’ due to State bureaucracy. Second, the reforms led to the 
distortion of land markets through prohibition of land rentals or sales of land 
earmarked for expropriation. The prohibition, it has been argued, led to land 
acquisition by inefficient ‘producers’. This led to the emergence of a corrupt, informal 
land market that encouraged speculative landholding in the absence of a ‘progressive’ 
land taxation system. Third, the reforms have been criticized for their failure to 
provide for post–redistribution ‘support services’ to beneficiaries. Finally, by reason 
of the ‘concept of sovereign guarantee’, the reforms have been criticized for being 
very expensive since the State paid the ‘landlords’ regardless of whether the 
beneficiaries paid for the land.
12
 Klaus Deininger and Hans Binswanger conclude:  
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Most land reforms have relied on expropriation and have been more successful in creating 
bureaucratic behemoths and in colonizing frontiers than in redistributing land from large to 
small farmers.
13
 
 
Beyond the problems with State–led land reform, there has surfaced a body of 
literature that increasingly demonstrates that there is competition and conflict over 
land. This competition and conflict is accentuated by ‘deepening rifts between and 
within kin–based, ethnic and regional groups’, and land expropriation by ‘local and 
non–local agents.’14 Against this background of competition and conflict, this Chapter 
looks at the land reform models that are pervasive in current land reform discourse. 
First, there is a general examination of the power dimension to land reform in section 
II. Second, section III outlines and analyzes the land reform models that are 
identifiable in land reform discourse. There are three categories of land reform models 
that are discussed here, namely; land redistribution, land restitution, and tenure reform 
respectively. The main argument being made is that to the extent that market as value 
underpins hegemonic responsibilization, the models are invariably market–based. 
However, the suggested models ignore the complexity that is presented by the 
competing interests that are ever–present in a political economy. This indifference 
undermines the efficacy of market–based land reform models in resolving the land 
question in political economies such as Malawi. Section IV covers the three emerging 
issues from the discussion of the categories of market–based land reform models, 
namely; cooperation of land owners, post–distribution support services, and 
programme financing. 
II THE POWER DIMENSION OF LAND REFORM  
Land reform must recognize the power dimension of land and the implication 
of the control of that power for land reform. Land reform that is oblivious to the 
power dimensions amongst the various constituencies in a polity will result in 
virtuous and impractical policies, plans and programmes for a country.
15
 A political 
economy setting is critical in putting land reform in a proper context. In this respect, 
land reform must clarify who the main beneficiaries are; the suitable approaches for 
‘changing patterns of land ownership’; the strategies that are in place to support the 
livelihood of new land owners etc.
16
 The nature of the responses to these fundamental 
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queries to land reform will determine the extent to which the reform will ameliorate 
critical land poverty and ultimately structural impoverishment and inequality in a 
country.
17
 
By virtue of the power dimension, the quest for clarity in respect of the 
direction of land reform is disordered because there are possibly competing social, 
economic and political perspectives to the reform.
18
 The perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive. They are intertwined and serve a national development objective with 
slightly different ‘pressure points’: What may be conceived as a social perspective is 
epitomised by the ‘new donor consensus’ with its focus on ‘livelihoods’ and the 
reform of the so–called ‘customary’ space. The role of the State is facilitative.19 
Second, an economic perspective emphasizes the growth of a ‘bimodal agrarian 
policy’ where large scale agriculture operates in parallel to a developed small scale 
agriculture sector with the former catering for an export agricultural commodity 
market and the latter satisfying home consumption. The goal here requires a State 
intervention that ‘sees value in partial ‘delinking’ from the global market’. However, 
the nature of the current global geopolitics entails that this particular aim faces 
widespread opposition.
20
 Finally, what may constitute a political perspective operates 
at the micro and macro levels: the former is a means to ‘dissolve non–capitalist 
relations of productions or excessively concentrated power structures’ at the national 
level. The latter serves as a means of obliterating ‘the political power of large agrarian 
capital’ and its links with (international) capital.21 Suffice it to say that if anything the 
ultimate goals of the three perspectives are not narrowly compartmentalized; they are 
intertwined. 
The extent to which a society ‘allocates’ a power to a member over a ‘subject 
matter’ will determine the nature of ‘ownership’ of that ‘subject matter’. Under 
market–based land reform models, Saturnino Borras, Jr., in his assessment of land 
reform discourse, has concluded that the first preference is actually for share tenancy 
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reform. He has observed that under the share tenancy reform, the tenancy contracts 
apparently give the land deprived a ‘footing’ and ‘promise’ for ‘eventual land 
ownership’ and ‘vertical mobility’ on the ‘agricultural ladder’.22 Hence, a vibrant land 
rental market is touted as the primary solution to lack of access to land.
23
  
However, market–based land reform models are more prevalent than share 
tenancy reform. This is the case because the models are meant to serve as a departure 
from conventional land policies that did not favour the land deprived.
24
 Under these 
models, a key goal is the incorporation of the land deprived themselves in the 
provision of access to land.
25
 However, it has been acknowledged that ‘the 
cooperation of the landlords is the most important factor for any successful 
implementation’ of these land reform models.26 In practice, these models are said to 
operate in a negotiated, market context: the land owners – the landlords – ‘volunteer’ 
to sell their land following an explicit demand by the land deprived to buy. The 
rhetoric goes that market–based land reform has a demand–driven approach and 
guarantees a win–win scenario.27 
A final word under these introductory observations: While realpolitik may 
partly explain the power dimension of land reform, the real battlefield, in my view, 
lies in the formulation of the ‘norms’ of land reform as a discourse. Drawing on the 
discussion of the right to property in Chapter 2, the dominance of the liberal 
interpretation of the right to property and the calls for the reform of the ‘customary’ 
space also leads to a focus on the emergence of a nascent, imperial, global State. This 
State has a ‘decentralized face’ and is ‘underpinned’ by ‘sub–national authorities and 
spaces’ in favour of ‘a transnational capitalist class’.28 In land reform, the shift to 
market–based land reform models on the basis of the critique of State–led land reform 
must also be understood in the context of the changing State. Hence, the nature of 
land reform in postcolonial economies such as Malawi is shaped by this asymmetry in 
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global inter–State relations.29 On this note, the next section covers market–based land 
reform models at the centre of land reform today. 
III CATEGORIES OF MARKET–BASED LAND REFORM MODELS 
 As the net transfer in land ownership epitomises land reform, the transfer can 
be from the land deprived to the land rich or vice versa. It has been noted that current 
land reform discourse is tilted towards market–based land reform models. For 
purposes of this discussion, there are three models designated as: a land redistribution 
model based on the willing seller/willing buyer approach;
30
 a land restitution model 
based on a historicized and contextualized approach to the right to property and more 
specifically the right to land; and a formal tenure reform model which focuses on the 
so–called ‘customary’ land tenure. In most postcolonial States, the three models are 
used in a combination of at least two or all three models. 
 Before a detailed discussion of the models ensues, it is pertinent to look at the 
market as value. In Chapter 1, the ground was laid for the argument that the market is 
the value underpinning hegemonic responsibilization. Market as value is, in turn, 
based on the Hayekian catallaxy that underlies neo–liberalism as an ideology. A 
consideration of market as value highlights the interpretation of so–called neo–liberal 
frameworks in political economy – what David Harvey calls ‘neoliberalization’ – as 
political projects seeking to re–establish and reorganize (global) capitalism.31 This re–
organization is achieved through ‘the prior construction of political consent’ rooted in 
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a Gramscian ‘common sense’.32 Indeed, in the context of the re–organization, David 
Harvey observes: 
Common sense is constructed out of long–standing practices of cultural socialization often 
rooted deep in regional or national traditions. It is not the same as the ‘good sense’ that can be 
constructed out of critical engagement with the issues of the day. Common sense can, 
therefore, be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural 
prejudices.
33
  
 
Hence, the dominance of market as a value grounding hegemonic responsibilization 
may be seen through the intellectual permeation and influence of the transnational 
corporation, the university, the international financial institutional apparatus and the 
State.
34
 In the discussion that follows below, what is highlighted is the emergence of 
market as a dominant ethos in development discourse. There are however two levels 
to this dominance. First, market as value is pervasive at the theoretical level. Market – 
and indeed neo–liberalism as an economic framework – has not been fully 
implemented in practice. Second, the nature of neo–liberalism (as the ideology 
underpinning market as value) is that it is ‘totalistic’35 and grounded in ‘meaning–
making’.36 A discussion of market as a value whose ‘goodness’ (or ‘badness’) is 
embedded in the notion of neo–liberalism as ideology seeks to show that the market is 
not simply about ‘truth’ or ‘positive description’; it is about ‘normative 
prescription’.37 In land reform discourse, the relegation of the State into a passive role 
under a supposedly ‘new’ neo–liberal order is, in my view, part of a process of 
hegemonic responsibilization whereby the land deprived are constantly shaped as a 
source of labour or inchoate ‘producers’.38 
A Market as Value 
  
First, ‘development’ as ‘discourse’ has meant that ‘certain representations’ 
have dominated its shape and reality while other ‘representations’ have been 
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disqualified ‘and even made impossible’. Hence, development as discourse – 
development discourse – has meant that development becomes a ‘tale of 
domination’.39 In this light, development discourse has emphasised the development 
of the market for economic growth. The role of the State in the market has equally 
undergone constant invention and re–invention. The role of the State has been shaped 
as ‘developmental’ in the 1970s; ‘minimalist’ from the mid to late 1980s and 1990s; 
and at the turn of the 21st Century CE ‘effective’.40 The ‘developmental’ State 
entailed that development policy privileged the role of the State in ‘managing the 
economy and transforming traditional societies’.41 The ‘minimalist’ State grew out of 
the economic failures that marked the end of the 1970s and led to the rise of new 
economic policy framework in the 1980s which advocated a limited role of the State 
in the market under structural adjustments programmes devised by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions.
42
 In this respect, the State was no longer important as the ‘logic of 
capital’ would govern the market.43 In general terms, this logic of capital in the 
market has supposedly been underpinned by neo–liberalism. 
It is argued that a distinction must be made between market as value which is 
based on neo–liberalism as an economic framework, and market as value which is 
based on neo–liberalism as ideology. The distinction is important because the rhetoric 
underpinning the ‘minimalist’ State corresponds to market as value that is based on 
neo–liberalism as an ideology. This is the case because the nature of macroeconomics 
in any country today suggests that the State is in fact far from minimalist in the strict 
neo–liberal sense.44 In this respect, I contend that what has engaged literature on 
political economy is market as value which is based on neo–liberalism as ideology.45 
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Ideology here is rooted in ‘meaning–making’ as a technique of domination. Susan 
Marks, for example, has argued that ‘ideology’ must mean ‘the ways in which 
meaning helps to ground, support, and perpetuate relations of domination.’46 She 
asserts that this conception of ideology allows a ‘critical or oppositional 
perspective’.47  
As a way of unpacking neo–liberalism, the following observations are 
pertinent: The conception of neo–liberalism is rooted in the Mont Pelerin Society’s 
economic thought which is reflected in the work of Friedrich Hayek; particularly his 
work that culminates in the catallaxy thesis. The catallaxy has been described as ‘a 
special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting 
within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract.’ On account of this avowed 
spontaneity, Friedrich Hayek contends that the market is neither ‘a natural 
phenomenon’ nor ‘is it a result of a contrived government policy’, it is something 
arrived at through rules of conduct. As the market is a ‘culture’ and not ‘reason’, 
Hayek concludes that it is unreasonable to have it regulated by the State. The role of 
the State is to secure the rule of law.
48
  
Hayek’s call for rules of conduct – the law of property, tort and contract –
resonates with the Foucauldian governmentality thesis which expounds, in part, that 
government is the conduct of conduct. From this Foucauldian perspective, the 
Hayekian catallaxy is part of the range of multiform tactics in the regulation of the 
relationship of persons and things. Hence, the Hayekian catallaxy or market as value 
are critical tactics in the regulation of production in a market–based economy. Finally, 
if the notion of neo–liberalism is grounded in the catallaxy thesis, then in recent times, 
the market as value has since been ‘concretized’ under what has been termed the 
‘Washington Consensus’.49  
The proponents of the Washington Consensus identified three ‘big ideas’ in its 
original conception: ‘a market economy, openness to the world, and macroeconomic 
discipline.’50 John Williamson articulated a set of ten economic principles as critical 
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in the development of a viable market under the Consensus: fiscal discipline; re–
direction of public expenditure towards primary health care, primary education, 
income re–distribution and infrastructure development; tax reform; liberalization of 
interest rates; competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of foreign 
direct investment in–flows; privatization of state owned enterprises; deregulation 
(through the abolition of barriers of entry and exit of goods); and the inevitability of a 
liberal (private) right to property.
51
  
The traditional frame of neo–liberal ideology is driven by the conviction that 
‘free markets and international economic integration [lead to] prosperity, liberal 
democracy and peace’.52 Colin Hay has however acknowledged the difficulty to 
underpin neo–liberalism in definitional terms, and has noted the primacy of the nexus 
of neo–liberalism as ideology and market as value.53 It has been suggested that a 
viable option in understanding neo–liberalism as ideology is to concentrate on its 
usage as ‘one true meaning of the term is impossible’.54 Hence, it is arguable that 
under a political economy analysis, neo–liberalism as ideology must be understood as 
the platform that informs economic policies that have shaped, and continue to shape, 
development discourse through privileging market as value. Hence, market as value 
based on neo–liberalism as ideology informs the agenda of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, particularly, the World Bank and the IMF. This neoliberal, ideological 
characteristic of the market is often the basis of conditionality for loans and grants 
from the two institutions.  
In light of the foregoing, the idea of market as value which is based on neo–
liberalism as ideology suggests that it is aspirational. This is the case, as it has been 
observed earlier, because Statist economic frameworks have never been strictly neo–
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liberal.
55
 It is suggested that it is more apt to refer to ‘regulated marketization’ in the 
context of a Statist economic framework.
 56
 The description ‘regulated marketization’ 
is more precise because it is increasingly acknowledged under development discourse 
that State intervention may be justified in the face of market failure. Under the 
‘emerging paradigm’ of regulated marketization, the focus is on ‘appropriate 
regulation’.57 The State is a ‘regulator’ under market–based economic reform in a 
country. Hence, while development discourse has been marked by shifts in the role of 
the State in the economy, the primacy of the market has been pervasive and the role of 
the State has been transformed to varying degrees. If under structural adjustment 
programmes the role of the State was supposedly decentred, it is also suggested that it 
has since been re–centred under the Washington Consensus and regulated 
marketization.
58
  
B Categories of Market–Based Land Reform Models 
The general principle that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that 
market as value that is based on neo–liberalism as ideology dominates development 
discourse. This domination has inevitably permeated land reform discourse.
59
 Land 
reform models being touted in the ‘South’ are invariably market–based and emerge in 
the context of the dominance of the efficiency argument.
60
  
It has already been noted that land reform must necessarily entail a net transfer 
of land ownership. A focus on net transfer means that land reform must address 
concentration of land in a country under an index of the availability of arable land per 
capita. If arable land per capita is concentrated in a few hands, the net transfer must 
mean that land transfers will move from the land rich to the land deprived.
61
 The three 
market–based land reform models will now be discussed in turn: 
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1 Land Redistribution 
Roger van den Brink et al. have argued that land redistribution is all about 
fairness and equity.
62
 They argue that this entails historicizing the land question in a 
country. If land question arises out of a historical ‘injustice’, land redistribution as a 
model of land reform may become about ‘a wrong to be righted, no matter what.’63 
Hence, land redistribution is premised on the simple fact that in countries with 
extremely skewed land relations, the distribution of the right to property in land must 
move from the erstwhile land owners to the land deprived. However, Brink et al. 
observe that there is a ‘reluctance’ to proceed with land redistribution. They state: 
Unfortunately, it is exactly this link to feelings of injustice which makes land redistribution in 
many countries such an urgent development issue, on the one hand, and too political, 
sensitive, and controversial to be dealt with as a part of the economic development and 
poverty reduction strategies by governments and development partners alike, on the other. It 
does not help that even among those who are essentially in favour of land redistribution, there 
does not exist consensus on the ‘how to do it’ part. This confuses policymakers and the 
development community at large, providing another excuse for inaction, and avoiding the 
heart of the matter—the actual redistribution of property rights in land.64 
 
These scholars note that the impetus for land redistribution must stem from the desire 
to achieve ‘conflict prevention, equity, economic growth, jobs, and poverty reduction’ 
in a country.
65
 The detractors of land redistribution as a land reform model reiterate a 
number of the arguments against the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure and State–led 
land reform. These detractors point to the efficiency argument, that is, large farms are 
economically more efficient than small farms.
66
   
The market–based land redistribution model is based on a willing 
seller/willing buyer approach. The approach requires that the land deprived as the 
beneficiaries must self–select and, through the agency of the State, enter into 
negotiation with a land owner for the purchase of land (which the land owner has 
offered to the State). If a land owner accepts the price offered by the land deprived 
(through the State) the process of transfer of title in the land may ensue. The 
implementation of the model in South Africa, for example, has shown that offers of 
land are simply not forthcoming from land owners. Where land is offered, the 
purchase price is often consistent with the market valuation or even inflated; often 
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unproductive land is placed on the market; and there is insufficient funding available 
to the land deprived to sustain viable farming and a dignified livelihood.
67
 Indeed, 
commentators have concluded that the model ‘makes for a seller’s market’.68 
Further, Borras has argued that land redistribution, whether market–based or 
not, must lead to ‘effective control’ of the ‘means of production’; it must lead to 
‘purposive change’ where the land deprived have a ‘net increase’ of their power to 
control land and a corresponding net decrease of the power of the erstwhile land 
owners over the same land; it must include the ‘right to alienate’.69 In other words, 
effective control means ‘the right of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and 
alienation.’70 When looked at in terms of an effective–control prism, the market–
based land redistribution model becomes problematic. He has said: 
[T]here are cases where a person is the full owner of a parcel of land but has no power to fully 
and effectively exercise ownership rights (the entire range, from the right of access to the right 
to alienate). This is because the degree of power of an elite to exercise effective control over 
the same land is much higher than that of the formal (nominal) owner; in this case, the elite’s 
power may cover almost the entire range of rights, except the formal right to alienate. 
However, for the elite, the right to alienate is superfluous because the formal–nominal owner’s 
right to alienate has been effectively clipped through legal or illegal, violent and non–violent 
means. Indeed, the elite has no need or want to dispose of the owner’s control over the land, at 
least not in the medium term, and so the right to alienate has no significant value. To the 
landed elite what is important is the effective control over the land, that is, all the rights except 
the right to alienate, which also means effective control over non–economic benefits, such as 
the captive seasonal electoral votes of the people of the land.
71
 
 
Given that Borras makes the point in the context of land reform in the Philippines, the 
problems that arise from lack of effective control form the crux of the discussion 
under section IV. Suffice it to say that what is clear from Borras’ point is that a 
process of formalized land transfers is not an end in itself; it can easily amount to 
tokenism and mask the entrenched role of an erstwhile land owner responsibilized as 
a producer and that of a land deprived constituency responsibilized as a source of 
labour and inchoate producers. 
2 Land Restitution 
The land restitution model has been championed largely in South Africa. The 
model is entrenched under the Constitution of South Africa and is meant to address 
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land dispossession that occurred in apartheid South Africa.
72
 Hence, land restitution 
as a market–based model is a formulation that is peculiar to the political history of 
South Africa. Under the Native Land Act, 1913 and indeed the Group Areas Act, 
1950, non–Whites in South Africa were forcibly removed from ‘their’ land to 
specially designated areas based on their profiling as black, coloured or Indian.
73
  
With the dispossessions under the Native Land Act being the cut–off point, 
dispossessions under colonial conquest are excluded. The beneficiaries under this 
model have included blacks who were ‘banished’ to ‘so–called homelands’, evictees 
from urban areas, and former labour tenants who previously earned their living on 
commercial farms.
74
 The model is regulated through ‘an expedited’ extrajudicial 
method where claimants negotiate with the (South African) Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights and the remedies include ‘restoration of land, provision of 
alternative land, payment of compensation, alternative relief, priority access to 
housing (sic), and land development programmes.’75 The model has suffered from 
‘institutional fragmentation, unnecessary litigation and a lack of leadership.’76 In 
respect of the stated weaknesses, Ruth Hall notes: 
Restitution has turned out to be a gradual and bureaucratically mediated process of returning 
land to the dispossessed. It is widely considered to be a success story in South Africa, as most 
of the claims are now settled; however, much of this has been done via payment of cash 
settlements to urban claimants. Some of the most intractable, costly and potentially conflictual 
claims in the rural areas are yet to be addressed. These raise fundamental questions about (i) 
how rights of claimants and current landowners will be addressed; (ii) financing the 
acquisition of land; and (iii) appropriate models of agriculture for resource–poor claimants.77 
 
Hall has misgivings with the land restitution model. Her misgivings stem from the 
privilege accorded to production under the model. She notes that the land restitution 
model, just as the land redistribution model, has been determined by the imperative to 
‘minimise disruption to agricultural production and political stability.’78 Again, the 
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point may be made that with all the weaknesses highlighted under the model, the 
structure of land relations before the implementation of the model remains 
entrenched. As that is the case, the relation of a land owner as the producer and the 
land deprived as the source of labour or as an inchoate producer under the process of 
hegemonic responsibilization persists.
79
 Indeed , Hall has noted that ‘[s]ettlement of 
claims is not, then, an end point of restitution, but one moment in the longer and more 
complex task of restoring land and livelihoods.’80 In relation to problems that arise 
due to lack of effective control of land as pointed out by Borras; in the South African 
context, it has been noted as follows: 
Where poor communities have lacked capital to enable them to continue with existing 
operations on commercial farms, they have sometimes entered into joint ventures with 
commercial partners able to provide finance expertise, or even leased out their land to 
previous owner. These arrangements should be expected to emerge where resource–poor 
people become owners of commercial farms in the absence of an agricultural support 
regime.
81
 
 
What emerges here is that dignified livelihood, albeit as a ‘wider’ point, is as 
important as the ‘narrower’ point of access to land. 
3 Tenure Reform 
There are two dimensions to the tenure reform model. The first relates to the 
reform of the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure. The second relates to the initiatives 
to secure the ‘tenure’ of non–White South Africans living on commercial farms in 
South Africa. The first scenario is pervasive in localities of land struggles 
worldwide.
82
 Just like the land restitution model, the second setting is peculiar to 
South Africa.
83
  
In light of the arguments in Chapter 2 in relation to the ‘customary’ space, the 
aspects of the tenure reform model relating to ‘customary’ land tenure are, in my 
view, normatively the weakest. This dimension of the tenure reform model 
emphasizes the reform of ‘customary’ land tenure. This echoes the call for reform of 
the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure that came about under the Lugard thesis and the 
Swynnerton Plan; at least in Anglophone Africa. Invariably, a legal regime is 
developed to transform the supposedly communitarian ethos of ‘customary’ land 
tenure into a statutory regime of the liberal right to property that privileges the 
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individual. Hence, strategies are put in place to ‘codify’ the ‘local systems’ of 
landholding; ‘register’ the local rights’, conduct cadastral surveys, and map land uses; 
and to ‘reform’ rules and procedures for land administration.84  
It has been acknowledged in the context of the tenure reform model that three 
difficulties arise: First, regulation of the ‘customary’ space, premised as it is on the 
‘controversy’ of the institution of the chief is a ‘profoundly political exercise’. Hence, 
the so–called codification and registration of rights in land cannot be as ‘open’ and 
‘fair’. Second, the multiplicity of interests in the so–called ‘customary’ space makes it 
difficult to resolve multiple claims of occupancy or ownership. The third point (and it 
has been made in the context of Francophone West Africa) is that the metropolis has 
been reluctant to devolve ‘real’ authority to the countryside.85 
The second trajectory of the tenure reform model is peculiar to South Africa. 
Here, the model is rights–based and the Constitution guarantees the security of tenure 
or ‘comparable redress’ to persons whose tenure is insecure as a result of racially 
discriminatory laws under apartheid South Africa.
86
 The legal regime here is meant to 
cater for former labour tenants, residents of former black homelands (the so–called 
Bantustans), and other groups of people who hold land ‘communally’.87 These 
constituencies account for an estimated 19 million people.
88
 
The regime is also complemented by the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 
1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, 1997.  The legislation aims at 
regulating ‘tenure relations between owners and occupiers of farms and determine 
when and how occupiers may be evicted so as to prevent people from being arbitrarily 
evicted and left with no alternative place to go.’89 Despite the enabling legislation 
being in place, the model has suffered from institutional capacity constraints to 
support would–be beneficiaries. Evictions are widespread; there is a lack of precision 
in terms of the nature of the rights, the holders of the rights, and the space which those 
rights affect; there is also discontent regarding ‘traditional councils’ set up under 
statute
90
 where the critics argue that they ‘reinforce the powers of unelected 
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traditional authorities and compromises democracy in rural areas’.91 Finally, Hall 
sums up the recurring problem of responsibilization of land owners and the land 
deprived. She states that the ‘extension’ of land titles will ‘aggravate rather than 
reduce disparities’ between the commercial farming space (owned by land owners) 
and the so–called ‘communal areas’ (where the land deprived reside).92 
IV REFLECTION 
 Three main issues of sustainability arise from the discussion so far; namely, 
the lack of cooperation of land owners; the prevalence of weak post–redistribution 
support services; and the atrophy in programme financing. I discuss the issues in turn: 
A Cooperation of Land Owners 
 The issue of the lack of cooperation of land owners is most pronounced under 
the land redistribution model. It has been acknowledged that land owners are a 
‘political powerhouse’ in most sub–Saharan African countries due to historical 
processes of ‘coercion’ and ‘distortion’.93 Hence, a land redistribution model based on 
the willing seller/willing buyer approach is at the mercy of the landowners. To the 
extent that it is supposedly ‘demand–driven’, it is not different from general 
conveyancing since the transaction price under the model is invariably set by the land 
owner. This goes against the view that market–based land reform models, unlike 
State–led land reform, guarantee a win–win situation. 
 It has been suggested that the State may use its power of expropriation to rein 
in recalcitrant land owners.
94
 However, even in countries such as South Africa where 
expropriation is possible under constitutional frameworks, the compensation package 
has, in practice, been driven by market valuation of land.
95
 Further, the economic 
downside of expropriation through the cost of litigation and dwindling investor 
confidence renders it a less likely option for most countries pursuing land reform.
96
 
Hence, the constraints that arise in certain cases are political rather than legal. This 
invariably renders land reform an expensive exercise and negatively affects its 
sustainability in the longer term.
97
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B Post–Redistribution Support Services 
 Market–based land reform models proceed on the assumption that cash grants 
that are given to the land deprived will adequately cater for the developing of their 
newly acquired farm land, including the hiring of expertise for farm extension 
services.
98
 In South Africa, Hall observes that the State acknowledged its capacity 
constraints to provide human and material resources for adequate agricultural support 
to the beneficiaries of the land reform.
99
 The situation points to the fact that 
beneficiaries can only be left to their own machinations, if they were given enough 
capability to withstand the vicissitudes of the market. Anything to the contrary leaves 
the beneficiaries prone to distress sales of land and a return to their designation as the 
land deprived. 
C Programme Financing 
 The issue of programme financing follows from the issue of lack of support 
services that has been pointed out in the preceding section. The assumption under 
programme financing is that market–based land reform models factor in a cash grant 
for beneficiaries of the reform that caters for the purchase of land, and post–transfer 
development projects.
100
 Further assumptions are that the ‘flexibility’ of the models 
ensures that there is no hand–out mentality among the beneficiaries; there is no basis 
for universal subsidies since grants are ‘superior’ to subsidies; grants can be targeted 
and eliminate ‘distortive effects’ and in the process keep the cost of land low; and, 
finally, since the State is not involved, the transactions costs are low following the 
elimination of ‘expensive government bureaucracies’.101 
 However, implementation of the models has shown that the critique of State–
led land reform is misplaced in respect of programme financing of market–based land 
reform. Implementation of market–based land reform models is extremely expensive. 
Some scholars have argued that the irony is that for the implementation to attain a 
likelihood of success, it must rest on sound fiscal resources of the implementing 
State.
102
 This is problematic because most countries grappling with unresolved land 
questions have weak economies and often rely on grants from the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, particularly the World Bank, for the implementation of their land reform 
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projects. Immediately, this raises issues of legitimacy, accountability and 
independence in tackling the country–specific land question. Even in relatively 
stronger economies that are engaged with the resolution of the land question such as 
South Africa, adequacy of funds to support land reform is a serious constraint of the 
implementation process because, more often than not, the projected required funding 
is humongous.
103
 Hence, far from the State taking a passive role, the State is required 
to provide financial guarantees for the success of the reform.  
V FINAL WORD 
 
 It has been noted that the impetus for market–based land reform models has 
been the increased dominance of market as value in mainstream development 
discourse and the failure of State–led land reform in the 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s. The dominance of market as value also emerges in the context of asymmetrical 
inter–State relations at the global level. Some States are more powerful than others 
and the power game is played out in the confines of the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
Indeed, in the context of resolving a land question, the assumption of support from the 
Bretton Woods Institutions or the State only serves to entrench skewed land relations 
that do not favour the land deprived. 
However, it has also been noted that market–based land reform models are not 
without their own problems. Three issues have been highlighted here: the influence of 
erstwhile land owners does not augur well for a purported level playing field in the 
implementation of the reform models; lack of post–redistribution support services 
raises the likelihood of a return to pre–redistribution land relations; and thirdly, the 
reforms are capital intensive such that in cases of countries with weak economies, the 
likelihood of the resolution of the land question is seriously undermined. Under the 
scheme of market–based land reform models, I have concluded that they account for 
hegemonic responsibilization in so far as the relationship of an erstwhile land owner 
as a producer and a land deprived as a source of cheap wage labour or as an inchoate 
producer is entrenched. Further, the assumption of support from the Bretton Woods 
Institutions or the State only entrenches the status quo of skewed land relations.
104
 At 
any rate, the land deprived do not have any meaningful in–put in shaping the land 
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reform models. In this respect, the negotiability of the interests of the land deprived is 
‘ended’ and the scheme tilts in favour of the erstwhile land owners.105 
 Chapter 3 is a watershed. In general terms, under Chapters 1, 2, and this 
Chapter, I have been discussing the ‘normative terrain’ that underpins this thesis. In 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I delve into the specific law and policy interventions that have 
been put in place in the task to resolve the land question in Malawi. Chapter 4 deals 
with the history the land question in Malawi. Chapter 5 focuses on the policy 
initiatives that have been put in place in the country to resolve the land question. The 
main focus here is the National Land Policy. In Chapter 6, I look at the various 
interests of the key constituencies relating to the land question in Malawi; namely the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the postcolonial State, the Achikumbe, and the land 
deprived. The discussion of this interaction examines the extent to which the interests 
of these constituencies enhance or undermine the resolution of the land question. In 
sum, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 contain the more ‘empirical’ trajectory of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Land Question: A Historicized and Contextualized Narrative of Land 
Alienation 
 
 In the Introduction, it was observed that besides the need for clarity of 
purpose, direction, conception and theory of land reform; history and context are 
equally critical to resolving a land question. Generally, in the analysis of social 
phenomena, sensitivity to history and context reveals an awareness of the variety of 
historical and socio–economic circumstances of an economic system prevailing in a 
polity.
1
 Geoffrey Hodgson puts the point succinctly: 
History is important, partly because every complex organism, every human being and every 
society carries the baggage of its past. Evolution builds on past survivals that encumber 
actions in the present. Choices made by our ancestors can be difficult to undo. 
 
[…] 
 
If history matters – at least in the sense of social development being path dependent – then our 
analyses must explore the particularities of the past. While we may retain general principles or 
guidelines, detailed analyses of particular events, structures and circumstances are required.
2
 
 
Beyond history and context, it was also noted in the Introduction that the 
African land question has been intertwined with the agrarian question. In this respect, 
development discourse has been replete with the dominance of the efficiency 
argument as the blueprint for land reform.
3
 This status quo is compounded by the fact 
that most postcolonial African economies have an insignificant non–agricultural 
economic base.  
 Third, the continued asymmetry in land relations has been driven by new 
‘needs’ relating to mineral resources exploitation, agricultural production, 
biotechnology, tourism and forestry. This in turn has bred new dimensions of the 
African land question that relate to rural–to–urban migration; urban and peri–urban 
land deprivation; and gender disparity in access to available arable land. Again, these 
new dimensions permeate a national land question. 
Finally, beyond the impact of colonialism, land law and policy in the African 
postcolony and marketized regulation under macroeconomic reform programmes that 
galvanize an intensified economic globalization, the exact parameters of the land 
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question are delineated by national histories. Currently, the debates amongst 
‘Northern’ State and non–State institutions, ‘Southern’ postcolonies, and lobby 
groups are polarized on the conflicting approaches and preferences to land reform 
models and the resultant structural imbalances of land ownership.
4
 
Regarding the analysis of the land question in Malawi, it has been pointed out 
in the Introduction that this proceeds under four dimensions: The nature of colonial 
capitalism; the nature of the neopatrimonial State; the normative issue of the 
conception of the ‘customary’ space; and  the analysis of the competing interests of 
the key constituencies of the land reform in country; namely, the postcolonial State, 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, the Achikumbe, and the land deprived.  
This Chapter looks at the first, second and third dimensions of the land 
question in Malawi. The historicized and contextualized narrative here seeks to show 
that the liberal conception of the right to property in land served a particular 
‘convenient end’; namely, the entrenchment of white economic enterprise. In relation 
to the conception of the ‘customary’ space, the main arguments have been developed 
in Chapter 2. The focus here is on the specific instances where the communitarian 
ethos of the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure was validated through law and policy 
and in the process became the basis for calls for reform grounded in the efficiency 
argument. The discussion of the ‘customary’ space traverses the first and second 
dimension of the land question. Further, in relation to the ‘customary’ space, there is 
also a discussion of the intervention by the Malawian courts relating to the land 
question. Regarding the fourth dimension of the land question, the treatment of the 
various interests is merely prefatory here. There is a more detailed discussion of this 
dimension in Chapter 6. All in all, the running thread in respect of the four 
dimensions has remained the sustained land alienation in favour of large estate 
agriculture. 
The land question in Malawi must be traced back to the arrival of white 
missionaries and entrepreneurs in, and the subsequent proclamation of British 
sovereignty over, the territory that came to be known as Nyasaland.
5
 Prior to British 
colonial authority, the territory was dominated by various ethnic–based ‘kingdoms’ 
                                                 
4
 See for example S Moyo, above; and S Moyo & P Matondi ‘The Politics of Land Reform in 
Zimbabwe’ in M Baregu & C Landsberg (eds.) From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving 
Security Challenges (Boulder & London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2003) 73–95, 90–91.  
5
 See Introduction, note 19. 
  95 
the most notable of which were the Ngonde,
6
 the Tumbuka, the Ngoni and the 
Maravi.
7
 White missionaries and traders acquired vast swaths of lands from African 
chiefs under transactions whose legal validity has been described as ‘dubious.’8 These 
land acquisitions were formalized under land concession treaties.
9
  
 The declaration of British colonial sovereignty over Nyasaland served as an 
official ratification of the land transactions by the missionaries and traders.
10
 The 
colonial State put in place a legal and policy framework that legitimized land 
alienation in favour of white economic enterprise, and sought to develop a ‘capitalist’ 
economy based on large estate agriculture.
11
  The black population were often 
conscripted for cheap wage labour on those estates.
12
 The colonial scheme served a 
dual role of entrenching colonial capitalism and propagating a modernization mission 
through the transformation of the apparently ‘traditional’, pre–colonial ‘indigenous’ 
society.
13
  
In the southern African context, the colonial State’s role as a labour ‘reserve’ 
is more pronounced. Even though there was an emergent local capitalist economy, the 
territory exported cheap migrant labour to the more industrialized South Africa and, 
to a lesser extent, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe).
14
 The delineation of the colonial State as a labour ‘reserve’ territory is 
apparently due to the fact that it was generally ‘unattractive’ to white colonial 
settlement. The lukewarm appeal of the territory amongst the white community at that 
time has been attributed to lack of ‘known exploitable minerals’, bad communication 
and an unfavourable climate as compared to, for instance, South Africa and the two 
Rhodesias.
15
 The nature of land relations during the colonial era led to two key 
results: erstwhile subsistence farmers became ‘labour tenants’ within the country and 
secondly, migrant labour to the mining sector in South Africa and the two Rhodesias 
                                                 
6
 See O Kalinga The Ngonde Kingdom of Northern Malawi c.1600–1895 (PhD Thesis: University of 
London, 1974); and B Pachai Malawi: The History of the Nation (London: Longman, 1973) 8–14.  
7
 See M Read The Ngoni of Nyasaland (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); and B Pachai, above, 
Chapter 1. 
8
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9
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 See B Pachai, note 8; BS Krishnamurthy, Chapter 2, note 106.  
11
 See BS Krishnamurthy, above.  
12
 See generally FE Kanyongolo, Chapter 1, note 123.   
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See M Chanock, Chapter 2, note 52. 
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 See S Amin, Introduction, note 11. 
15
See G Mhone, Introduction, note 12, 3; C Baker, Introduction, note 11, 2; and FE Kanyongolo, 
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increased. This state of land relations in the country remains an enduring challenge to 
date.
16
  
While the colonial State largely restricted the massive land alienation to 
southern Malawi, upon independence, the postcolonial State under the Banda 
Administration aggressively expanded land alienation through the emergence of large 
estate agriculture in central and northern Malawi in addition to the existent estate 
sector in southern Malawi. The emergence of the large estate sector was a result of a 
dual agricultural policy that the Banda Administration followed. The implementation 
of the dual agricultural policy under a broader development strategy was partly 
concretized under the land law regime that was finalized for the country in 1967.  
The status quo of the land relations under the Banda Administration has 
largely persisted under the Muluzi and Mutharika Administrations. Some scholars 
have argued that under the Muluzi and Mutharika Administrations, the land question 
has equally had a ‘lukewarm response’ or it has been ‘ignored completely’.17 In the 
context of wider macroeconomic frameworks based on poverty reduction, Blessings 
Chinsinga observes: 
The proliferation of the poverty reduction initiatives notwithstanding, the momentum leading 
to the implementation of land reforms has not been as swift as had been implied in the lead up 
to the political transition. Yet it is widely acknowledged that land in Malawi remains the most 
critical productive resource and without any major reforms in the land tenure patterns and 
ownership, poverty reduction initiatives are highly unlikely to deliver their intended strategic 
impact.
18
 
 
The tepid response to the land question in the country is linked to a number of 
factors. At the local level, the keys factors are the neopatrimonial nature of the 
postcolonial State, and the law and policy framework regulating the largely agro–
based economy. Political power and its legitimacy are based on the ‘big bwana’ 
syndrome and the attendant networks of patronage. The nature of the ‘persona’ under 
which the Banda, Muluzi and Mutharika Administrations respectively operated have 
led to nuanced differences in the responses to the land question. Out of the three 
Administrations to date, the Banda Administration overtly perpetuated colonial land 
law and policy whereby the land deprived continued to be responsibilized as a labour 
reservoir under a bimodal agricultural policy favourable to large estate agriculture. 
                                                 
16
 See FE Kanyongolo, above, 121–122. Labour tenancy and migrant labour were regulated by law 
through the Native Tenants (Private Estates) Ordinance, 1917 and the Native Labour Ordinance, 
1928.See also S Moyo ‘The Land Question in Southern Africa: A Comparative Review’ in L Ntsebeza 
& R Hall (eds.), Chapter 3, note 16, 60–84.  
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 See B Chinsinga, Introduction, note 57; and E Chirwa, Introduction, note 58. 
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While the Muluzi Administration linked the land question to poverty reduction, the 
‘democratization of corruption’ that ensued under its watch undermined any 
meaningful resolution of the land question. The rhetoric under the Mutharika 
Administration around 2004 pointed to the support of the smallholders. By extension, 
this support would demand the implementation of strategies that would enhance the 
resolution of the land question through greater access to available arable land by the 
land deprived. However, the implementation strategies that have been put in place – 
particularly under the Community Based Rural Land Development Project – may 
undermine the resolution of the land question. There is an in–depth discussion of the 
Project in Chapter 6. Beyond the stated rhetoric and the implementation of the 
Project, the pronouncements by the Mutharika Administration since May, 2009 
indicate a shift in favour of the estate sector. 
Finally, the prevailing global geopolitics has influenced the law and policy 
framework at the national level. The Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have been at the helm of driving 
policy through direct intervention in the agricultural policy arena (in the case of the 
Bank) and in the macroeconomic policy setting (in the case of the Fund). The 
influence has resulted in the domination of liberal conception of property and 
attendant utilization of land in the political economy in Malawi. In conclusion, the 
responses to the land question in Malawi by the three Administrations have merely 
reinforced the responsibilization of the majority of the land deprived as a source of 
labour and inchoate producers. 
I LAND ALIENATION UNDER COLONIAL CAPITALISM 
The nature of colonial capitalism is the first dimension of the nature of the 
land question in Malawi and its underlying thematic is land alienation. The precise 
nature of land alienation in the country from the colonial encounter to date has 
suffered from the absence of credible statistics on the net transfer of available arable 
land from the land deprived to the landed constituency. However, the general picture 
that emerges from the discussion below is that the development strategy of the 
country has been heavily premised on a vibrant large estate agriculture sector. 
The arrival of white missionaries and traders in the country is the beginning of 
the land question in the country. Vast tracts of land were alienated from the 
‘indigenous’ society in lop–sided transactions between African chiefs and white 
missionaries and traders. Between 1887 and 1891, an estimated 405,000 hectares of 
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arable land had been alienated under these transactions in southern Malawi. This 
represents about 4.2 per cent of the total land (arable and non–arable) across the 
country. This is the first recordable instance of the process of the responsibilization of 
the constituency of the land deprived as a constituency of tenant labourers. The land 
alienation from the indigenous society to white missionaries and traders became 
exponential. The Colonial Commissioner and Consul–General at the time, Sir Harry 
Johnston, states: 
[The] wholesale grabbing of land or, where it is not fair to describe the acquisition of land as 
‘grabbing’, at any rate huge tracts had been bought for disproportionate amounts from the 
natives.
19
 
 
Even though the colonial State investigated all claims of land ownership based 
on the land purchases that were done before 1891, these purchases were ultimately 
validated and entrenched as land titles in favour of the new white owners under the 
Certificates of Claim, 1902 issued by the Colonial Commissioner and Consul–
General. The criteria for validation included evidence of long occupation and 
improvements to the land; lack of a valid counter–claim; the (African) chief in 
question acknowledging and ‘admitting’ the ‘sale’; availability of an authentic deed; 
provision for non–disturbance of existing ‘African’ villages and gardens; and payment 
of a ‘fair value’.20 The new white owners acquired what was effectively an interest of 
fee simple absolute in the land.  
In total, the Colonial Commissioner and Consul–General issued 66 
Certificates covering some 1.5 million hectares of available arable land.
21
 The residue 
land after the issuance of the Certificates of Claim became Crown–controlled land – 
Crown land – where the Crown had a fee simple interest. The erstwhile indigenous 
owners of land became tenants at will under privately owned land under the 
Certificates. The Certificates had the following non–disturbance clause: 
That no village or plantation existing at the date of this Certificate on the said Estate shall be 
disturbed or removed without the consent in writing of Her Majesty’s Commissioner and 
Consul–General, but when such consent shall have been given the sites of such villages or 
plantations shall revert to the Proprietor of the said estate. No natives can make other and new 
villages or plantations on the said Estate without the prior consent of the Proprietor.
22
 
 
The clause was routinely ignored by the new white owners of the private estates.
23
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 See C Baker, note 15, 5.  
20
 See C Baker, note 15, 6. 
21
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 See C Baker, above. 
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Even though the pre–1891 land purchases were challenged in Supervisor of 
Native Affairs v Blantyre and East African Company Limited,
24
 the High Court 
validated the ‘transfers’ of the title in the land. In Supervisor of Native Affairs, the 
Court considered the question of title of the African chiefs in land as irrelevant to its 
determination. In the case, the Supervisor petitioned the High Court to set aside an 
agreement between the defendant Company and certain ‘native’ headmen on an estate 
of the Company. He challenged the agreement which had been entered into between 
the Company and the headmen on the basis that it was inequitable and illegal as it was 
in breach of the rights of the ‘natives’ under a Certificate of Claim issued to the 
Company in 1893.The Supervisor alleged that the Company subjected the ‘native’ 
community on its estate to payment of rental through provision of labour under the 
exploitative thangata
25
 system and this breached the Certificate. Second, he 
challenged the legality of the purported sale of land by the chiefs to the Company. 
The Supervisor argued that the ‘native’ headmen were not capable (under ‘customary’ 
law) of entering into an agreement of the sale of land which involved the alienation of 
the land belonging to their community.  
Judge Nunan set aside the aspects of agreement regarding the provision of 
labour in lieu of rent – under the thangata system – as ‘exceedingly unfair and one–
sided.’ However, he sanctioned the sale of the land by the chiefs and the legality of 
the Certificate. In effect, Supervisor of Native Affairs entrenched the interests of white 
settlers as owners of the land at common law. Supervisor of Native Affairs remained 
the settled position of the law in the country notwithstanding the decisions in Nireaha 
Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia and Amodu Tijani where native title was validated on the 
basis of the eminent domain of the Crown sovereign. The court in Supervisor of 
Native Affairs did not establish a clear link with the Crown’s eminent domain 
stemming from the British Central Africa Order–in–Council, 1902. The Order–in–
Council of 1902, purportedly issued for ‘the peace, order and good government’ of 
the colony went on to declare eminent domain in favour of the British sovereign. The 
position was reinforced under the Nyasaland Order–in–Council, 1907. The 
subsequent developments in land law and policy in 1950 and 1951 entrenched the 
position when the status of these Certificates was eventually defined as valid private 
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interests in land under the Nyasaland Protectorate (African Trust Land) Order–in–
Council, 1950 and later formed part of the definition of ‘private land’ under the Land 
Ordinance, 1951.
 26
 
In addition to the development of the legal basis under the Supervisor of 
Native Affairs and the Order–in–Council of 1902, the colonial State enacted the Lands 
(Native Locations) Ordinance, 1904 which sought to empower the Colonial 
Commissioner and Consul–General ‘to direct landowners to set aside for African 
locations of up to 10 per cent of undeveloped land, and to allot this land to estate 
residents on the basis of 3.2 hectares of land per family.’27 Colin Baker observes that 
the land vested in the ‘male tax–paying heads’ of the family under joint tenancy 
without the power to mortgage, sell or pledge in the interest in the land. The 
Ordinance of 1904 never came into force primarily because, as Baker notes, it would 
lead to ‘undue harshness’ on ‘small estate owners’.28 In the same year, 1904, some 1.5 
million hectares across the country were alienated in favour of white private interests. 
If the Ordinance of 1904 was in force, some 150,000 hectares would have had to be 
reserved as African locations.  
Further legal instruments, namely; successive Orders–in–Council between 
1936 and 1949; the Nyasaland Protectorate (African Trust Land) Order–in–Council, 
1950; and the Land Ordinance, 1951 entrenched the legal title of the new land owners. 
The systemic expansion of white land ownership was also buttressed by the land 
commissions of 1903, 1920, 1946 and 1952.
29
 While all the land commissions 
acknowledged the existing tensions between white land owners and the black 
population, their recommendations only guaranteed the rights of the black population 
as labour tenants.
30
  
Hence, land continued to be alienated from erstwhile land owners in favour of 
white land owners. The erstwhile land owners were re–socialized as a labour reservoir 
as they were tenants at will at law. Under the Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 
1928, a ‘resident African’ was entitled to provision of a hut and a small plot for 
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cultivation in exchange for payment of rent or labour. Routinely, the ‘hospitality’ of 
the land owners was paid for in kind through provision of labour.
31
 
Meanwhile, despite growing land pressure due to, primarily, population 
growth, land alienation continued unabated. For example, until 1936, the British 
South Africa Company ‘owned’ virtually the whole of northern Malawi when it 
acquired title to some 1.11 million hectares of land before relinquishing its title in 
favour of the colonial State while still retaining the mineral rights in the land. The 
mineral rights were only relinquished when Malawi became independent in 1964.
32
  
Under the Africans on Private Estates Ordinance, 1952, which replaced the 
Natives on Private Estates Ordinance, 1928, three key innovations were introduced to 
regulate land relations in light of the growing tension from land pressure prevalent in 
the country. The 1952 Ordinance provided that the white estate owners were no 
longer under an obligation to provide land for ‘sustenance’; evictions were allowed 
for rental default only; and the Ordinance created a regime for compensation in cases 
of evictions for development purposes. The 1952 Ordinance followed the 
recommendations of the Abrahams Commission of 1946 and the Land Planning 
Committee of 1947 who had concluded among other things that compulsory 
acquisition of land for redistribution to the ‘African’ was impracticable; that the 
colonial State should negotiate the purchase of land from the white owners – some 
based in London, England – for possible redistribution to the ‘African’ on private 
estates. 
33
 
The 1952 Ordinance represented a compromise between the colonial State and 
large estate owners who resented the idea of ‘forced’ sales to the State through the 
threat of a tax on idle, undeveloped private land. The constituency of large estate 
owners was powerful.
34
 Two factors worked in their favour: First, the estate sector 
was the backbone to the colonial economy. The colonial State was ‘deeply reluctant’ 
to subvert land relations between land owners and indigenous societies as this would 
affect the supply of labour to the estates. Second, the strong political connections of 
the estate owners in the political corridors of London meant that the local colonial 
agents in the country had to live with the status quo.
35
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In 1950, the colonial State passed the Nyasaland Protectorate (African Trust 
Land) Order–in–Council. Under the Order–in–Council of 1950, land was classified 
into three categories: public, native trust and private.
36
 Native trust land was vested in 
the Secretary of State.
37
 The colonial State had extensive powers of entry into native 
trust land under the doctrine of eminent domain and could dispose of such land 
through a lease or other right of occupancy as a private interest.
38
 The indigenous 
society who were the supposedly beneficiaries of the native trust land had no legal 
rights to protect their interests in the land. While the Secretary of State was to 
administer the native trust land for the benefit of the ‘Africans’ and in accordance 
with ‘African law and custom’, the application of ‘customary’ law was subject to the 
non–repugnance clause under received law. The ‘customary’ law applied to the extent 
that it was not repugnant to principles of justice and morality.
39
 Hence the normative 
administrative and legal frameworks of the native trust land were primarily developed 
to serve the white–dominated estate sector in the (colonial) political economy.  
A category of land called ‘customary land’ was created under the Land 
Ordinance, 1951. This is the first explicit manifestation at law in the country of the 
conception of the ‘customary’ tenure under a communitarian ethos. The development 
seems to have been based on the conception of the ‘customary’ space under the 
Lugard thesis and the Swynnerton Plan.
40
 In terms of legal significance, the interest in 
the land remained in the colonial State and not the ‘African’ community.41 Under the 
Land Ordinance, 1951, the conversion of the so–called ‘customary’ land holdings into 
private land was on the basis of zero value to the indigenous land holders.
42
 Yet again, 
under the 1951 Ordinance, the legal framework entrenched the status of indigenous 
society as a supply of cheap wage labour. The rights of the indigenous society were 
not recognized at all. 
Between 1955 and 1964, the colonial State embarked on a land acquisition and 
resettlement programme where idle tracts of land were purchased from the white 
estate owners in the Shire Highlands in southern Malawi for the resettlement of 
erstwhile tenants on private estates. The land acquisition proceeded on compensation 
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based on open market valuation. The interest in land of the newly acquired 
landholdings vested in the colonial State as the land was Trust land. This category of 
land was effectively Crown land.
43
 The converse effect of the programme was that it 
led to new frontiers of land alienation in central and northern Malawi.
44
 
From the foregoing discussion, two ‘tactics’ were at the centre of colonial 
capitalism in the reinforcement of the ‘convenient end’ of achieving white 
commercial enterprise. These tactics were the frenetic land alienation and restrictive 
means of production that guaranteed a constituency of cheap wage labourers. Land 
alienation was consistently supported by law and policy as exemplified under the land 
concession treaties; the Certificates of Claim, 1902; the various statutory interventions 
that validated land alienation from 1902 resting with the Land Ordinance, 1951. The 
restrictive means of production were reinforced through the Special Crops Ordinance, 
1963 where the ‘African’ tenants were prohibited by law to grow cash crops such as 
coffee, tea and tobacco. The restrictive means of production and the exploitative 
thangata system that was entrenched under successive labour tenancy legislation 
between 1917 and 1952 completed the responsibilization of the local communities of 
land deprived as a source of cheap wage labour.
45
 Hence, a number of the 
‘disciplining’ techniques – the land alienation under the processes leading to the 
Certificates of Claim, the thangata system, and the restrictive provisions on 
cultivation of cash crops – led to the responsibilization of the ‘indigene’ as an 
exploited labourer. These techniques were, as it has been shown, reinforced by law. In 
sum, the colonial State’s law and policy framework shaped the nature of the land 
question when the Banda Administration assumed office in September, 1961 under an 
arrangement of self–government.46 By this time, as much as 51 per cent of available 
arable land in southern Malawi, for example, was re–constituted under white 
ownership.
47
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II THE NEOPATRIMONIAL STATE AND THE LAND QUESTION 
  
 It has been suggested that the political landscape in postcolonial Malawi has 
been consistently neopatrimonial in nature.
48
 Scholarship by Diana Cammack et al. 
and David Booth et al. suggests that the nature of the neopatrimonial State is such that 
political power and its legitimacy are based on what they have called the big bwana 
syndrome; that is, a ‘big man’ – an incumbent leader of government – is at the centre 
of driving policy as opposed to reliance on strong institutions. The big bwana 
syndrome is imbricated in networks as opposed to political party ideology. These 
networks of patronage are self re–invigorating.49 Further, it has been argued that the 
differing ‘personalities’ and ‘leadership styles’ of Malawi’s Heads of State since 
independence – Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Bakili Muluzi and Bingu wa Mutharika – 
and the divergent global geopolitics they have operated in, have had differing 
development prospects and consequences for the country.
50
 This difference and 
discontinuity in persona and global geopolitics has led to equally varied responses to 
the land question in the country under the three Administrations. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, I suggest that in general terms, what is common from the responses to the 
land question under the three Administrations is that they have reinforced the 
responsibilization of the majority of the land deprived as a source of cheap wage 
labour and inchoate producers. 
 A cautionary intervention is appropriate here: The literature on African 
politics routinely refers to most African regimes as neopatrimonial; and their 
countries as neopatrimonial states. The conventional position of this scholarship is to 
treat ‘patrimonialism’ or ‘neopatrimonialism’ as synonyms for ‘corruption’ or ‘bad 
governance’. Anne Pitcher et al. have made a compelling case for a re–thinking on the 
usage of neopatrimonialism.
51
 They have argued that the attribution of 
neopatrimonialism to the postcolonial African State must be traced back to Max 
Weber. Pitcher et al. point out that the Weberian roots of patrimonialism or indeed 
neopatrimonialism suggests that Weber was concerned with the source of ‘authority’ 
as a basis of legitimacy and not so much the nature of a ‘regime’ in his attribution of 
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patrimonialism. Patrimonialism ‘delineated’ the basis of ‘legitimate authority’; 
through a dense network of personal networks of loyalty and reciprocity.
52
 
Patrimonialism or indeed neopatrimonialism was rooted in a cultural construction of 
the personal and the public. In this respect, Pitcher et al. discredit the tendency to use 
patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism as simply a synonym of ‘corruption’ or ‘bad 
governance’.53 They have said: 
[C]omplex reciprocities link the government and its citizens, legitimacy is created and 
reinforced through both the rule of law and personal bonds, and a mutually constitutive 
relationship exists between the personal and the public.
54
 
 
 The personal–public link resonates with Peter Ekeh’s thesis on the two 
publics; namely the primordial public and the civic public. In the case of postcolonial 
States such as Malawi, the nature of the neopatrimonial State lies in divided loyalties 
under Ekeh’s thesis. By primordial public, Ekeh refers to the moral affinity of 
groupings or settings which may be based on ethnicity or social class. On the other 
hand, the civic public relates to the amoral responsibilities that come with the 
structures of the civil, constitutional State covering the formal demarcations of 
judicial, legislative or executive government.
55
 The authority of the three 
Administrations in Malawi arose out of constitutional processes; that is, the right and 
responsibility to govern emerged from the civic public. However, the actual practice 
of State power reveals an increasing gravitation towards the primordial public on the 
part of the incumbent at every point in the country’s history. 
A The Banda Administration 
A quick reference to the state of the nationalist movement during the period 
immediately prior to Malawi’s independence in 1964 is pertinent: The nature of the 
capitalist economy in the colonial State became a major source of agitation for the 
nationalist movement especially in so far as it was critically premised on a land law 
and policy framework that configured the black population as tenants at will and a 
source of cheap wage labour under the thangata system.
56
 The agitation is 
unsurprising considering the centrality of land in the political economy.  The 
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nationalist period, however, also witnessed the emergence of a ‘totalitarian ideology’ 
that was ‘deeply intolerant of dissent’.57 The big bwana syndrome that revolved 
around Banda co–existed with a social democratic ethos within the nationalist 
movement. While the former is innately despotic, the latter cherished greater 
freedoms for the citizen.
58
 The wake of the country’s independence demonstrates the 
triumph of the big bwana syndrome which formed the basis of the Banda 
Administration.  
The Banda Administration thrived through economic relations of ‘domination 
and exploitation’59 and a political regime premised on the ‘cult of the personality’ of 
Banda himself.
60
 He became the de jure Life President of the postcolonial State when 
section 9 of the Constitution of 1966 was amended to provide for his life presidency.
61
 
He became the law unto himself and personally drove the postcolonial State’s law and 
policy direction on account of his beliefs. This personalized approach was reflected in 
the rural agrarian change that was introduced through the legal reforms of 1967.
62
 The 
reforms and the attendant legal framework are discussed below. 
Further, the Banda Administration adopted economic policies that 
subordinated the welfare of the majority of the population to the creation of a critical 
mass of the Achikumbe.
63
 The Banda Administration tied a cheap labour policy to a 
land policy. The Administration promoted ‘formal privatization of land’ in favour of 
estate agriculture.
64
 In light of the levels of available arable land to the land deprived 
at independence, the continued growth of the estate sector meant, in the context of 
high population density in the country, per capita arable land was on a steady decline. 
The land deprived could only sustain a livelihood as wage labourers on the estates. 
Further, highly interventionist State policy fitted the mode of the developmental State 
prevalent in the global economy in the 1960s and the 1970s.  
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While the logic of colonial capitalism became the ‘underlying basis’ of the 
Banda Administration,
65
 Guy Mhone argues that the ‘nationalist fervour for 
independence was not only driven by the need to eradicate the objectionable labour 
control and agricultural regulations, but was also driven by the need to open up 
mobility routes for an emerging and aspiring African elite and entrepreneurial class.’66 
The neopatrimonial approach is reflected in the Administration’s response to the land 
question in the country. Through a combination of legal and policy instruments, the 
Banda Administration merely ‘perpetuated and refined’ colonial practice and the 
status of land relations at the time of country’s independence remained unruffled.67 In 
the sections that follow below, I consider the specific responses to the land question 
by the Banda Administration by looking at the legal regime, particularly the 
constitutional order and the land law reforms that were introduced between 1965 and 
1967; the development policy framework; and the implications the recession of the 
1980s had for the land question. 
1 Postcolonial State’s Constitutional Order and the 1967 Reforms 
The legal entrenchment of land alienation under the colonial State was further 
entrenched under section 16 of the Constitution of Malawi, 1964.
68
 The provision 
proscribed the deprivation of property without the payment of adequate compensation 
under the right to property under the Bill of Rights in Chapter II of the 1964 
Constitution. The framework of the 1964 Constitution was developed at the 
Nyasaland Constitutional Conference held in London, England in 1962. It is not clear 
whether the status of land relations in the country formed part of the agenda of the 
constitutional conference. The report of the conference certainly makes no record of 
the discussion of the land question.
69
  
Even though the 1964 Constitution provided for a right to property under a 
Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights was subsequently ‘expunged’ from the republican 
Constitution, 1966. The right to property only survived in ‘tepid form’ under the 
Statement of Fundamental Principles which stated thus:  
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No person should be deprived of his property without payment of fair compensation, and only 
where the public interest so requires.
70  
 
There was a proviso to the Fundamental Principles as follows: 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of [the Fundamental Principles] to the extent that the law in question 
is required in the interest of defence, public safety, public order or the national economy.
71
  
 
The property clauses under the 1964 and 1966 Constitutions were ‘ahistorical’ and 
‘decontextualized’ and the status quo of land relations under the colonial State 
prevailed.
72
 Fidelis Kanyongolo has argued that the abstraction and 
decontextualization underway in the development of a legal order coupled with its 
lack of historicity undermines its legitimacy.
73
 At the same time, the wording of the 
proviso to section 2(2) of the 1966 Constitution allows Banda’s personal agenda for 
the expansion of large–scale capitalist agricultural sector to flourish.74 The wording 
made it easy to convert land from ‘customary’ land into private holding under the 
Land Act or forfeit property (including land) under forfeiture laws in the case of those 
deemed ‘disobedient’ to the political establishment.75 
The regulatory framework of 1967
76
 comprised the Land Act,
77
 the Registered 
Land Act,
78
 the Customary Land (Development) Act
79
  and the Local Lands Board 
Act.
80
 I have argued in Chapter 1 that the legal effect of the category of land known as 
‘customary land’ under the Land Act is that it is public land. Scholars like Mhone and 
Kanyongolo have referred to the increased privatization of land as having led to the 
reduction of ‘customary’ land available to the land deprived by as much as 40 per cent 
between 1973 and 1983 and an increase of private land by 30 per cent during the same 
period. Further, they have pointed out that the net transfer from ‘customary’ land to 
private land slowed down between 1983 and 1989.
81
 On a closer analysis of the 
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categories of land under the 1967 reforms, these reductions were actually in the public 
land sector.  
The land deprived often could not afford the formal requirements for 
privatization of land. This led to further asymmetry, rather than the improvement of 
land relations, that had marked the colonial legacy.
82
 Hence, the Achikumbe were the 
beneficiaries under the regulatory framework.
83
 It is estimated that between 1979 and 
1989, the number of estates in the country increased from 1,200 to 14,671 covering an 
estimated land size of 1 million hectares of available arable land.
84
 Banda personally 
accelerated the growth of the estate sector as a means of patronage which also fell 
within his personal conviction that the postcolonial State’s economic growth was 
hinged upon a vibrant estate sector.
85
 In fact, according to the estimates of the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform, land in the estate sector 
grew from 759,400 hectares in 1980 to as much as 1,148,000 hectares by 1993.
86
 
Banda designated himself as ‘Mchikumbe Number One’ – Farmer Number One – and 
accumulated a number of estates across the country in his personal name as well as a 
private consortium under his control and his closest political allies.
87
 The estate sector 
was virtually untaxed and the quest to rapidly develop the sector was prompted by the 
desire of the Banda Administration to de–link the country from British grants–in–aid, 
create a middle class, and, the general scepticism about ‘the ability of the smallholder 
sector to respond quickly to new economic opportunities.’88 
Since the postcolonial State under the Banda Administration tied its land 
policy to a cheap labour policy, it created State agro–based corporations and also 
subsidized private agricultural entrepreneurs by ensuring availability of cheap wage 
labour ostensibly for the benefit of the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe.
89
 The 
rhetoric was that increased agricultural productivity would lead to economic growth 
and ‘enhance the welfare of the majority of the population’ so that every Malawian 
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‘could have food in his stomach, a shirt on his back and a roof that does not leak.’90 
However, the continued decline in per capita available arable land in the public land 
sector which was also exacerbated by a high population growth meant that the land 
deprived were resigned to earn a living as wage labourers in the estate sector.
91
 
One explanation of the predicament of the land deprived may be derived from 
the Administration’s agricultural policy: The Banda Administration followed a 
bimodal agricultural policy that favoured the estate sector and not the smallholders. A 
poignant example of the preference of the estate sector is the legal prohibition of the 
cultivation by smallholders of cash crops such as burley tobacco, sugarcane, coffee 
and tea.
92
 By this statutory device, which was a continuation of colonial policy, the 
estate sector – invariably comprising the Achikumbe – had access to the favourable 
prices of the global commodity markets which capital could be re–invested into their 
sector. In contrast, smallholders were only exposed to commodity markets run by the 
State agro–based corporation, the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation, which contrary to any positive development suggestive in its name, and 
being a monopoly, bought the smallholders’ produce at less competitive prices. The 
combined effect of the legal prohibition against the smallholders and the undercut 
pricing for smallholder produce meant that the smallholders remained at subsistence 
level and had to work in the estate sector to supplement their livelihood. The 
surpluses from the undercut pricing under the Corporation’s scheme in turn financed 
the further development of the estate agricultural sector.
93
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2 Economic Recession, Emergence of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and Land Reform  
 
From about 1979 and throughout the 1980s, the postcolonial State experienced 
a recession as aftershocks to the global recession triggered by the oil crisis of 1979. 
Notwithstanding the global element of the recession, the local economic malaise has 
also been attributed in part to the clientilist approach of the Banda Administration. 
Jonathan Kydd and Robert Christiansen have argued that a development strategy 
based on estate agriculture resulted in three things: rapid land alienation amongst an 
already exploited land deprived constituency, rapid transfer of labour into wage 
employment in the estate sector, and the decline in importance of peasant 
production.
94
 The rapid land alienation emerged from the ‘preferential allocation’ of 
land to the estate sector;
95
 the suppression of peasant production stemmed from the 
need to maximize surpluses used in the re–capitalization of the estate sector;96 and 
third, the labour demand in the estate sector was met since the ‘rate of return’ in the 
smallholder sector was significantly low due to poor commodity prices offered by the 
State, there was a ‘rapid’ flow of labour into the estate sector even though the wages 
were equally poor here.
97
 The combined effect of the bimodal agricultural policy 
which was always intertwined with a cheap labour policy meant that the approach 
resulted in a ‘crisis of under–consumption’ within the domestic market.98 Finally, the 
global nature of the recession – precisely the global oil crisis of 1979, the fall in 
tobacco prices at global markets and the local adverse climate conditions such as the 
drought in the 1978–1979 rainy season – all had significant negative impact on the 
postcolonial State’s macro–economy.99  
The onset of the 1980s witnessed great intervention from the World Bank and 
the IMF under structural adjustment programmes in the postcolonial State. The 
programmes did not translate in a turn around of the recession.
100
 The interventions 
which included, among other things, cut backs on grain investment and fertilizer 
subsidy, dismantling of the National Rural Development Programme and the 
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introduction of an agricultural extension programme were not ‘adequately considered 
before implementation.’101 Uma Lele notes that the interventions had a double effect. 
On the one hand, they were laudable to the extent that they removed the grip on the 
macro–economy of Banda and his network of patronage. On the other hand, they led 
to the ‘stagnation’ or ‘near paralysis’ of the majority in the smallholder sector.102 
In the intervening years between 1981 and 2000, at the behest of the World 
Bank and the IMF, the macro–economic strategy of Malawi has vacillated. From 1981 
to 1987, the strategy changed between ‘pricist and minimalist State’; a ‘more flexible 
approach’ that marked the 1987–1994 period; and the more ‘politicized’ environment 
of 1994 and beyond.
103
 The latter period of increased ‘politicization’ – where policy 
followed ‘populism’ – epitomizes the mode of operation of the Muluzi 
Administration.
104
  
In relation to the land question, any proposals for land reform under the Banda 
Administration emerged amidst a perceived crisis in the estate sector.
105
 The ‘crisis’ 
arose because of the bimodal nature of agricultural policy under the Banda 
Administration. This led to debates on the direction of agricultural production in the 
country. Two schools of thought prevailed: first, those in favour of food security 
based on a vibrant smallholder sector supported by a State farm input subsidy 
programme. Second, those calling for food security based on a cash economy driven 
by export agricultural commodity.
106
 However, it has been noted that the World 
Bank’s call for the development of a vibrant land market, legislative reform and a 
‘gradual and systematic land reform process instead of forced redistribution has 
prevailed.’107  
In sum, land law and policy under the Banda Administration reveals the 
various avenues through which the postcolonial State overtly underwent the 
responsibilization of a particular category of the citizenry – the land deprived – as a 
labour reserve. A bimodal agricultural policy only entrenched the local networks of 
capital through the promotion of the development of the estate sector and, by 
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extension, the Achikumbe were the inevitable beneficiaries under the policy.
108
 In this 
sense, the form of responsibilization under the Banda Administration was similar to 
that under the colonial State because the ‘disciplining’ techniques were also based on 
rapid land alienation, inculcation of a labour reserve, and the cultivation of cash crops 
was restricted to the estate sector. 
B The Muluzi Administration 
 
The Muluzi Administration came to power following the victory of its 
sponsoring political party – the United Democratic Front – in the general elections of 
17 May, 1994.
109
 The Muluzi Administration went on to govern the country for two 
constitutional terms between 1994 and 2004.
110
 During the first term, the big bwana 
syndrome did not necessarily revolve around the persona of Bakili Muluzi. Its nature 
lay in class–based patronage. This changed during the second term when increasingly 
political power and legitimacy evolved into a ‘Bandasque’ model and concentrated in 
the persona of Muluzi.  
During the campaign for the general elections of 17 May, 1994, the United 
Democratic Front and other proponents of multipartyism promised to tackle the land 
question on the basis of a fair redistribution of land to the land deprived. Once in 
office, the Muluzi Administration steadily moved away from this promise. This shift 
has been attributed to three things: the nature of the property clauses under the 1994 
Constitution based as it is on a liberal democratic institutional framework; the vested 
interests of global capital which played a part in the context of the development of the 
various poverty reduction strategies for the country and in the commissioned research 
on agrarian reform;
111
 and, finally, in an environment of accountability and 
transparency in the public resource management, a lack of fiscal discipline that points 
to Bakili Muluzi himself meant the Administration increasingly relied on what has 
been called the ‘democratization of corruption’ to gain political patronage. This 
indiscipline led to a chaotic State policy climate such that the land question and any 
notions of a response to it inevitably got subsumed in the chaos.
112
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1 Promises on the Campaign Trail, 1992–1994  
The starting point of the discussion to the Muluzi Administration’s response to 
the land question is the promises that the advocates of multiparty politics made during 
the campaigns in the run up to the referendum of 14 June, 1993 and the general 
elections of 17 May, 1994 respectively. These advocates – particularly the United 
Democratic Front and the Alliance for Democracy – promised that multipartyism will 
bring with it land reform based on a fair redistribution of land to the land deprived. 
This promise was particularly made repeatedly in southern Malawi where land 
pressure is most acute.
113
 The land question was linked to poverty whereby the 
multiparty advocates often pointed out the asymmetry in land relations under the 
colonial State and the Banda Administration as a device to sustain the ‘crippling 
levels of poverty’ among the land deprived.114 The Muluzi Administration in 
conjunction with the country’s development partners commissioned land utilization 
studies which were conducted between 1995 and 1998; and empanelled a Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry on Land Policy Reform in 1996. I discuss these developments 
fully in Chapter 5. Suffice it to say that there is a disjuncture between the 
macroeconomic frameworks and the land reform frameworks. Since the former take 
precedence over all policy initiatives in the country, the disjuncture has led to the 
continued entrenchment of the land question. To use Shamir’s language, the nature of 
responsibilization here is that one market of authority (the macroeconomic 
framework) prevails over the other (the land reform initiatives).
115
 
The rhetoric of a fair distribution of land to the land deprived continued in the 
Legislature after the general elections of 17 May, 1994. There was an exuberant tone 
regarding land relations: the emphasis was on the urgent need for ‘fair distribution’ or 
‘equitable distribution’ of arable land for ‘economic use’ in favour of the land 
deprived who have had no assistance from the land rich.
116
 Honourable Thengo 
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Maloya, member of Parliament for Machinga North East (United Democratic Front), 
speaking in 1994, perfectly captures the prevailing sentiments when he observed that 
the land deprived have had no assistance for their ‘degradation’ and ‘servitude’ 
through the ‘selfishness of the wealthy’. He pointed out that the ‘“labouring class” are 
[sic] tenants at the mercy of the landlords’ and work in conditions ‘at the pleasure of 
the then party leaders and estate owners’ who considered themselves the ‘supreme 
law’.117 
But even amidst the exuberance in the Legislature, the rhetoric changed. 
Increasingly, by the time of the second term of the Muluzi Administration from 1999 
onwards, the rhetoric moved to the promotion of land reform grounded in a land 
redistribution model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach. For example, 
following the presentation of the Ministerial Statement on the National Land Policy 
delivered to the Legislature in 2002, Honourable Thengo Maloya, now as the Minister 
responsible for land matters, concludes: 
[T]his land policy has been prepared carefully and in a balanced manner to remove most of the 
pressing problems that have created tenure insecurity and undermined speedy and transparent 
land transactions in Malawi.  In many cases, the inadequacies of the existing laws, 
retrogressive customary believes (sic) delays in land administration, arbitrary application of 
the public interest criteria, constraining inheritance laws and uncertainty regarding the 
strategies for dealing with land pressures have all operated to discourage needed investment 
and the nation’s ability to eliminate poverty and pursue social harmony.118 
  
And in response to a question from a member of Parliament on land ‘acquisition’ in 
favour of the land deprived, the Minister said: 
Frankly speaking, [...]  we acquired that [land] by willing seller/willing buyer.   
 
[…] 
 
This land will definitely be reprocessed on its own to get people […] those who are really 
pressed to be resettled at this place.  But, the only model is that we are not going to resettle 
everybody and create no farms.  It will be a model that will create homes, houses and then be 
able to make the same land more productive. 
 
[W]hen there is any land and a willing seller/willing buyer […] we will buy more and more 
land that is under-utilized and land being given for sale in order to resettle Malawians.
119
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The constitutional order of 1994 provides a framework for an analysis of the turn 
around on the initial campaign promise regarding the land question. The discussion on 
the nature of the constitutional order and its implications for land reform in the 
country follows in the next section. 
2 The Property Clauses in the Constitution of 1994 
In 1994, Malawi adopted a new Constitution that is generally based on a 
liberal democratic order.
120
 The Constitution replaced a scheme dominated by the 
colonial and one party, postcolonial State embodied under the 1964 and 1966 
Constitutions. It is not clear that the choice for a liberal, democratic constitutional 
order was based on informed consensus by the citizenry.
121
 The adoption of the 
liberal, democratic constitutional order seems to have merely conformed to the trends 
of post–Cold War geopolitics.122  On the general adoption of the 1994 Constitution, 
Kanyongolo has said: 
The 1994 Constitution was drafted by a [committee] whose members lacked any popular 
mandate. There was no subsequent popular legitimation of the Constitution through a 
referendum or similar process and the resolutions of a ‘civil society’ constitutional conference 
were disregarded by Parliament when it promulgated the final document. In Malawi, 
therefore, liberal democracy as a system of governance has no demonstrable public 
legitimacy.
123
 
 
However, the Constitution is significant because it reversed the 
authoritarianism of the Banda Administration and, at the same time, complying with 
the constraints set by the Bretton Woods Institutions and the country’s other 
development partners. Richard Carver has observed that prior to the multiparty 
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general elections of 17 May, 1994, ‘the World Bank ran a series of seminars for 
political parties on economic and financial management.’ The apparent aim of the 
seminar series was to ensure that the political parties’ agenda reflected World Bank 
thinking. This may explain the lack of a detailed examination of the land question 
during the constitution formulation process.
124
 During the parliamentary debate on the 
certification of the Constitution, a member of the Opposition lamented at the 
supposedly external interference when he alleged that ‘certain provisions’ of the 
Constitution had to be approved by the International Monetary Fund.
125
 
A general overview of the Constitution is that it is the supreme law of the 
land;
126
 provides for a Bill of Rights under Chapter IV; states that the authority to 
govern is derived from the people of Malawi as expressed through equal and universal 
suffrage in an election;
127
 proceeds on a very fundamental principle and states that all 
legal and political authority of the State derives from the people of Malawi and shall 
be exercised in accordance with the principles of the Constitution;
128
 and creates the 
public trust and the social trust where all persons exercising powers of State shall do 
so to the extent of their lawful authority and in accordance with their duties and 
responsibilities to the people of Malawi.
129
 There is an in–depth discussion on the 
public trust and the social trust in Chapter 7. Suffice it to say that the Constitution 
advocates the development of a free market economy in section 13(n). It is suggested 
however that section 13(n) is tempered down somewhat with an ‘egalitarian’ 
approach towards State responsibility on, for example, health in section 13(c); 
education in section 25; and economic and social development in section 30, of the 
Constitution. In relation to property, section 28 of the Constitution provides: 
(1) Every person shall be able to acquire property alone or in association with others. 
 
(2) No person shall be arbitrarily deprived of property. 
 
The Constitution further provides that ‘expropriation of property shall be permissible 
only when done for public utility and only when there has been adequate notification 
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and appropriate compensation, provided that there shall always be a right to appeal to 
a court of law.’ 130 Existing rights of persons in property at the coming into force of 
the Constitution were saved through section 209 of the Constitution. The property 
clauses in sections 28, 44(4) and 209 of the Constitution are the definitive references 
to land.
131
  
It must be noted, however, that the property clauses under the Constitution are 
neither historicized nor contextualized. The clauses do not address the ‘land 
grabbings’ under colonial capitalism and tolerated by the postcolonial State under the 
Banda Administration. This arises in the context where the proponents of a multiparty 
political system in the country, especially the podium politicians, used the prevalent 
landlessness (particularly in southern Malawi) to gain the support of the land 
deprived.
132
 
It is an obtrusive omission that the status quo of land relations in the 
postcolonial State was not a key issue during the constitutional development process 
nor did it form part of the key resolutions of  the ‘civil society’ constitutional 
conference.
133
 Perhaps, this is in part due to the nature of the participants to the 
constitutional development process, and indeed the ‘civil society’ in the postcolonial 
State, which was mainly ‘urban–based, elite–led’ and ‘profess[ed] the philosophy of 
liberal democracy’.134 Kanyongolo notes, in respect of ‘civil society’, that the ‘typical 
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[non–governmental organization]’ in Malawi is complicit in the scheme of a liberal 
democratic constitutional order and does not engage in any radical challenge to the 
status quo of land relations in Malawi.
135
 
Section 13(n) of the Constitution advocates the development of a free market 
economy which is then complemented with an obligation on the part of the State to 
invest in health, education, economic and social development.
136
 While individual 
autonomy justifies the free market, Kamchedzera and Banda rightly observe that this 
is ‘deficient because of [the] assumption that capabilities are equal or necessarily need 
to be equal.’137 Hence, the liberal legal order of 1994 continues to obscure the 
asymmetry in the quality of life amongst persons in the country.
138
  
Turning to the actual property clauses, section 28 of the Constitution is as 
similarly worded as Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A 
notable difference is that the operative word under the Constitution is ‘acquire’ as 
opposed to ‘own’ under the Universal Declaration. The wording under the 
Constitution is broader and may encompass expectations of acquisition of property.
139
 
However, there is need to reconcile the reference to ‘arbitrary deprivation’ in section 
28(2) of the Constitution and ‘expropriation’ in section 44(4) of the Constitution and 
there implications for land reform in the country. 
The proscription of arbitrary deprivation under the Constitution relates to the 
exercise of police powers of State without due process or a reasonable relationship 
between the means of the exercise and the purpose of the deprivation.
140
 No 
compensation is ordinarily available for the exercise of police powers.
141
 
Expropriation relates to the exercise of powers of eminent domain by a State. Section 
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44(4) of the Constitution lays down three conditions for expropriation: the 
expropriation shall be for public utility, there must be adequate notification and 
appropriate compensation. The Constitution does not define these conditions. 
Commentators and indeed the courts have concluded that ‘public utility’ or ‘public 
purpose’ must confer a public benefit or advantage.142 There need not be actual 
physical use of the expropriated property by the public. It is enough that the 
expropriation confers a discernible direct or indirect benefit or advantage to the 
public.
143
 Finally, expropriation invokes compensation. In view of the trends in 
comparable jurisdictions, ‘appropriate compensation’ under the Constitution will 
mean the market value of the property.
144
 Since the Constitution in Malawi does not 
expressly authorize the State to expropriate land at a value lower than the market 
price, as does the South African Constitution, for example, there is likelihood that the 
courts may adopt an open market valuation as a yardstick for computing 
compensation. A compensation regime based on open market valuation poses 
significant financial challenges for political economies such as Malawi.
145
 
For comparison purposes, the South African position is illuminating. Section 
25(3) of Constitution of South Africa provides for factors that will determine the level 
of compensation: the current utilization of the property; the history of the acquisition 
and utilization of the property; the level of State intervention in the initial acquisition; 
the market value of the property; and the purpose of the expropriation. On the basis of 
section 25(3) of Constitution of South Africa, some commentators have concluded 
that in South Africa compensation can actually be less than the market value of the 
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property.
146
 In comparison, the property clauses under the Malawi constitutional order 
are clearly less elaborate on the normative framework for deprivation and 
expropriation of property. 
In light of the foregoing, the following conclusion can be made in the context 
of land reform in Malawi: The entrenchment of the right to property under the 
Constitution suggests that land reform in the country can only proceed under a land 
redistribution model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach. This is the case 
because the property clauses are ahistorical and decontextualized; existing rights of 
persons in property are entrenched under section 209 of the Constitution; land reform 
is constitutionally sanctionable where ‘public utility’ is broadly construed to mean a 
‘public advantage or benefit’; and in the absence of a provision similarly worded as, 
for instance, section 25(3) of the Constitution of South Africa, expropriation even for 
purposes of land reform will be based on market valuation. In sum, the Constitution 
protects existing rights in property more strongly than it guarantees the rights of the 
land deprived to acquire property. While the Constitution makes provision for 
expropriation, it is short on details as to whether such expropriation can be effected 
for purposes of land redistribution to the land deprived and for compensation which is 
less than the market value. This rigid, liberal interpretation of the property regime has 
been pervasive in the courts in Malawi. 
3 Democratization of Corruption 
In light of the constitutional framework adopted in 1994, the Muluzi 
Administration increasingly resorted to what has been described as the 
‘democratization of corruption’. Booth et al. have argued that apart from the poverty 
alleviation programme, the Muluzi Administration did not have a clear development 
strategy for the postcolonial State.
147
 In the context of the stringent accountability and 
transparency frameworks under the new constitutional order, the Muluzi 
Administration often engineered policy to facilitate patronage.
148
 Hence, patronage 
was not restricted to loyalists. It was used to induce political opponents to toe the 
Administration’s line. While the Banda Administration has been described as 
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practising a centralized, repressive mode of patronage, Booth et al. observe that at 
least the Banda Administration restricted its plunder to the ‘profits’ of public 
enterprises. Under the Muluzi Administration, the plunder targeted both the capital 
and the ‘profits’ of public enterprises.149 Hence, under the Muluzi Administration, 
corruption was practised with ‘impunity’; it was ‘democratized’.150 The 
‘democratization of corruption’ lies in the fact that patronage pervaded all levels of 
the State apparatus; from the President’s office all the way down to the lowest ranked 
public servant.
151
 
In relation to the land question, the Muluzi Administration does not 
unsurprisingly exhibit a clear policy of its own initiative.
152
 While the processes that 
led to the adoption of the Land Policy began under the Muluzi Administration, as it 
will be shown in Chapter 5, its implementation is problematic especially in light of 
what has been described as the ‘development aid game’. Booth et al. have observed 
that the development aid game leads to poor policy because of the self–induced 
pressure to disburse on the part of development partners and the manipulation on the 
part of the local political players for purposes of patronage. The cooperation of the 
Muluzi Administration during the development of the Land Policy confirms this 
propensity to cooperate for vested parochial interests.
153
 This point is fully discussed 
in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say that by 2002, the democratization of corruption had 
become widespread and the development partners withheld most of the development 
aid commitments to the country.
154
 
C The Mutharika Administration 
 Bingu wa Mutharika came to power following the general elections of 20 
May, 2004. He completed a first term (May, 2004 to May, 2009) and following 
victory in the general elections of 19 May, 2009, he began a second and last term of 
his Presidency.
155
 After the general elections of 2004, he fell under difficult 
circumstances when he fell out with his sponsoring party – the United Democratic 
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Front – and formed his own political party, the Democratic Progressive Party.156 
During its first term, the Mutharika Administration was increasingly undermined at 
the behest of Bakili Muluzi’s politicking. In turn, the Mutharika Administration 
perpetuated the neopatrimonial nature of the postcolonial State to inculcate and 
reinforce its own networks of patronage for its political survival. Diana Cammack et 
al. state: 
Mutharika has utilised both formal and informal resources in an attempt to build personal and 
political support, including reaching out to civil society and the media, a zero–tolerance anti–
corruption campaign and populist policies (e.g. fertiliser subsidies, road–building). He has 
also encouraged opposition politicians with political appointments and patronage to cross the 
floor and harassed media and opponents.
157
  
 
The neopatrimonial traits have persisted under the Mutharika Administration. 
Mutharika has now assumed titles of grandeur such as the Ngwazi; which means ‘the 
Ultimate Warrior–Conqueror’; Mose wa Lero; which literally translates as ‘the 
Present–day Moses’ and it is a title based on the biblical Moses. Mutharika as Mose 
wa Lero epitomizes the god–sent saviour just as the biblical Moses. The continued 
trend here may be explained in terms of the peculiar nature of African 
neopatrimonialism. Booth et al. have argued that African neopatrimony is innately 
based on the big bwana syndrome.
158
  
In addition to the acrimonious political climate the Mutharika Administration 
found itself in, it also inherited a very weak macro–economy following the high level 
of corruption and patronage–driven policy making under the Muluzi Administration. 
Malawi’s development partners withheld all levels of development aid for the country 
(except for balance of payments support) following their loss of confidence in the 
Muluzi Administration.
159
  
However, in spite of the stated weaknesses that beset the Mutharika 
Administration, his technocratic background – having worked as a high ranking 
public servant with the United Nations and the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa – has endeared his Administration to the country’s development 
partners. Further, the Administration’s commitment to development and the country’s 
sustainable economic growth has cemented the support from the country’s 
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development partners and increasingly from the general Malawian population.
160
 
Again Diana Cammack et al. sum up the Mutharika Administration as follows: 
Mutharika appears to be a suspicious and isolated president, one preoccupied with maintaining 
his position while implementing challenging reforms, especially in the agricultural sector. 
These reforms, if they are successful, may well create ‘winners’
 
and supporters in the 2009 
elections.
161
 
 
In the context of the responses to the land question under the Mutharika 
Administration, there is continuity regarding the initiatives that were started under the 
Muluzi Administration. Further, just like under the Banda Administration, the 
Mutharika Administration is also implementing a bimodal agricultural policy. The 
only difference between the two Administrations however is that during the first term 
of the Mutharika Administration, the postcolonial State sought to boost the small 
holder sector under a targeted farm input subsidy programme which has been in place 
since 2004.
162
 The Mutharika Administration is also implementing the Community–
Based Rural Land Development Programme. The Programme is one of the strategies 
for the implementation of the Land Policy. The Policy and the Programme are 
discussed fully in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively.
163
 As it has been noted, however, 
these initiatives are implemented in the shadow of an overarching macroeconomic 
framework which serves as the country’s main development strategy. 
Since May, 2009, the Mutharika Administration is shifting towards a more 
mechanized, large scale estate agricultural policy. This is apparent from the Budget 
Statement for the 2009/2010 financial year. In the Statement, the Minister responsible 
for finance asserts: 
Mr. Speaker Sir, Government recognises the fact that agriculture will remain the backbone of 
the economy for the foreseeable future. In this regard, Government intends to transform the 
agriculture sector mainly within the framework of the Green Belt Initiative. In the medium 
term, Government in addition to smallholder farming will promote medium and large scale 
commercial farming. This would among other things entail increased mechanization and 
irrigation.
164
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The Minister’s sentiments echo the President’s State of the National Address on the 
official opening of Parliament on 23 June, 2009. In relation to the Administration’s 
agricultural policy, the President stated that agriculture and food security is one of the 
Administration’s priorities within priorities; that targeted farm input and subsidy that 
began in 2004 would continue; that the Administration will start the implementation 
of what has been called the ‘Green Belt’ programme which will see the utilization of 
some 1 million hectares of land under irrigation agriculture. This is a strategy that is 
apparently meant to enhance food security for the country considering the 
unreliability of rain–fed agriculture.165 Both the President’s and Minister’s statements 
respectively only make tangential rather than direct reference to the land question in 
the country. Hence, outside the rural land development programme and the Land 
Policy, the Mutharika Administration has not put in place any deliberate strategies 
targeted at the land question. 
III JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND THE LAND QUESTION 
This part looks at the intervention by the Malawian courts and its implication 
for the resolution of the land question. This discussion follows from the jurisprudence 
of Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia, Amodu Tijani and the Mabo discourse that was 
discussed in Chapter 2. It was noted that Nireaha Tamaki, In Re Rhodesia and Amodu 
Tijani have established that the basic legal principle of land relations in the 
Anglophone colony is that a proclamation of colonial sovereignty superseded all 
rights or interests in land. The survival of the rights or interests in land of an 
indigenous society turned on the interpretation of the terms of annexation or cession. 
Indeed in the African context, Amodu Tijani held that, if anything, the indigenous 
society had a usufruct.  
Further, the Mabo discourse established the following principles: the original 
right in land of an ‘indigene’ society is not extinguished by mere lack of recognition 
by a new sovereign. Second, the original right of the ‘indigene’ society is 
extinguished by specific government action through a grant of land in freehold or 
other limitation set down under statute. Third, and subject to the previous two 
principles, the colonial sovereign did not acquire eminent domain that extinguished 
original interests in land; the acquisition was by virtue of sovereignty and not by 
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virtue of property. Indeed, Transvaal Agriculture Union and Richtersveld have shown 
that subsequent government action can reverse prior government action that deprived 
the right to land to a people. It was also concluded in Chapter 2 that Nireaha v Baker, 
In Re Rhodesia, Amodu Tijani and the Mabo discourse must be understood in the 
context of their localized spaces.  
In Malawi, the land question has not been clearly tackled by the courts. The 
few cases that have gone before the courts that would have implications for the land 
question have been dealt with in an abstract, legal positivist manner. There are two 
trains of thought that emerge from the courts; namely the abstraction thesis, and 
second, the validation of so–called ‘customary’ land interests under section 28 of the 
Constitution. The adoption of the abstraction thesis is apparent from the Press Trust 
(High Court) Case, the Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case, Mwawa v Jekemu
166
 and 
Nchima Tea and Tung Estates v All Concerned Persons.
167
 The constitutional 
validation approach is best exemplified in the case of Administrator of the Estate of 
Dr H Kamuzu Banda v The Attorney General.
168
 Before discussing the two 
approaches two points must be made: First, under both approaches the communitarian 
ethos of the ‘customary’ space is not problematized at all; it is taken as a well settled 
principle. I have argued in Chapter 2 that the failure to recognize the colonial 
construction of the ‘customary’ space undermines the resolution of the land question 
in postcolonial African economies such as Malawi. Second, the lack of the 
problematization of the ‘customary’ space has led to inconsistency in dealing with the 
underlying conceptual issues that relate to the land question.  
  As pointed out, the abstraction thesis emerges from the Press Trust (High 
Court) Case, the Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case, Mwawa v Jekemu and Nchima 
Tea and Tung Estates. The facts in the Press Trust (High Court) Case and the Press 
Trust (Supreme Court) Case can be merged as follows: The cases revolved around 
ownership of the Press Trust. The Press Trust was incorporated under the Trustees 
Incorporation Act
169
 in 1992; the Trust Deed was settled in 1982 but the registration 
under the Trustees Incorporation Act was only done in 1992. The Press Trust was 
initiated by President Banda ostensibly for the benefit of the nation. The subject of the 
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trust was the shares held in a limited liability company – the Press Holdings Limited. 
Press Holding Limited was part of a conglomerate that dominated the private sector in 
Malawi between 1969 and 1994. The domination was considered beneficial for the 
development of the country’s economy. The conglomerate received considerable 
privileged treatment from the Banda Administration. 
  In 1995, the Muluzi Administration enacted the Press Trust (Reconstruction) 
Act.
170
 The Act was meant to reconstruct the administration of the Press Trust. The 
Muluzi Administration was of the view that the Trust benefitted Banda’s cronies in 
his party, the Malawi Congress Party, and his family to the exclusion of the rest of the 
Malawian population. One of the strategies under the reconstruction was that the Act 
empowered the President to appoint new trustees of Press Trust replacing the first 
trustees and erstwhile incumbent trustees. The respondents argued, among other 
points, that the Press Trust (Reconstruction) Act violated the right to property under 
section 28 of the Constitution in so far as the Act purported to deprive the existing 
trustees of their property in the trust. 
In both the Press Trust (High Court) Case and the Press Trust (Supreme 
Court) Case, the courts followed an abstraction thesis in the conception of the right to 
property; that is, they followed the liberal, positivist approach to the right to property. 
The difference in the two decisions is that in the Press Trust (High Court) Case, 
Justice Mwaungulu held, among other conclusions, that only the ownership of legal 
title can be protected under the Constitution. On the other hand, Justice of Appeal 
Mtegha, delivering the judgement of the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal in the 
Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case, held, among other points, that the beneficial 
interest in land is capable of constitutional protection and where the beneficial interest 
is under threat; remedial government action cannot be unconstitutional under section 
28 of the Constitution. For purposes of the thesis, the Press Trust (Supreme Court) 
Case is significant for its recognition of the beneficial interest in land and the remedial 
importance of government action in property discourse.  
It is arguable therefore that the Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case overrules 
the narrow, abstractionist view of Mwawa v Jekemu and Nchima Tea and Tung 
Estates regarding the right to property in land. In Mwawa v Jekemu and Nchima Tea 
and Tung Estates, the defendants were (illegal) ‘occupiers’ on private land belonging 
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to the plaintiffs. In both cases, the plaintiffs brought an action in trespass seeking an 
order of eviction against the defendants. The courts here adopted the legal positivist 
dichotomization of a land owner and trespasser in finding against the defendants and 
making orders of eviction accordingly. Unlike the approach in the Press Trust 
(Supreme Court) Case, there was no attempt in Mwawa v Jekemu and Nchima Tea 
and Tung Estates to consider the existence of a beneficial interest in land in favour of 
the defendants. This would be a worthwhile examination of the case considering that 
the locality of the land occupied by the defendants in both cases was in the Shire 
Highlands in southern Malawi; this is an area with acute land shortage following the 
history of land alienation in favour of the estate sector. The Malawian courts’ 
approach in Mwawa v Jekemu and Nchima Tea and Tung Estates is consistent with 
that of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has entrenched a 
liberal, positivist approach in relation to the rights of indigenous communities. In 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia,
171
 the Court did not recognize the right of 
ownership and jurisdiction of the ‘aboriginal tribes’ in relation to the land they 
inhabited. The Court however recognized the right of those tribes to occupancy 
subject to state law. The cases reveal the courts’ attitude against a historicized and 
contextualized approach to interpretation of property.  
Turning to the second approach by the Malawian courts; namely, the 
constitutional validation of ‘customary’ land, the first case on the point is 
Administrator of the Estate of Dr H Kamuzu Banda v The Attorney General. In the 
case, the ownership of a cattle ranch belonging to President Banda was the subject of 
an acquisition order by the Minister responsible for land matters. The Minister 
ordered that part of the ranch was required for distribution to the people in the 
surrounding area. The ranch comprised 4,636 hectares of so–called ‘customary’ land. 
Subsequently an order of eviction was served on the administrators of the Estate of 
President Banda. The High Court held (Justice Chimasula Phiri presiding) that the 
right to property under sections 28 and  209 of the Constitution, applies to all rights in 
property including rights of property in ‘customary’ land; that even those holding 
beneficial or equitable rights or property in customary land are, under the 
Constitution, equally entitled to adequate notice and appropriate compensation in 
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terms of section 44 of the Constitution;  and following the ‘treatise’ by JO Ibik,172 that 
users of customary land hold the beneficial interest in it in perpetuity with additional 
rights to bequeath it to their heirs or share it with their kin; that the beneficial interest 
of the user is superior to the allocative power of the chief and the nominal title of the 
President as provided under the Land Act. 
Even though the judge in the Administrator of the Estate of Dr H Kamuzu 
Banda v The Attorney General did not make specific reference to the Press Trust 
(Supreme Court) Case, it re–affirmed the principle that a beneficial interest in land is 
capable of constitutional protection. However, in light of the discussion of the 
‘customary’ space in Chapter 2, it is tenuous in my view, to justify the recognition of 
the beneficial interest in land on the basis of the Ibik discourse. It has been argued that 
scholars such as Ibik gave academic legitimacy to the colonial construction of the 
‘customary’ space. Further, under the scheme of interests in land under the Land Act, 
it has been contended that the so–called ‘customary’ land is in full legal effect public 
land. In this respect, the users of the land are similar to tenants at will. The beneficial 
interest in the land accrues to these users under the ‘tenancy at will’ and not so much 
under the so–called ‘customary’ land. The chief serves a political function and not a 
property discourse function in this scheme.
173
 
 This problem in the interpretation of the conceptual issues lies at the root of the 
contrast between Administrator of the Estate of Dr H Kamuzu Banda v The Attorney 
General and Henry Mbirintengerenji v Traditional Authority Nsomba and Others.
174
 
In Mbirintengerenji Case, the plaintiff had obtained an ex parte injunction against the 
defendants stopping them from erecting a teacher’s house (as part of a State–run 
secondary school) on a piece of land the plaintiff claimed he owned. The piece of land 
was on ‘customary’ land and the plaintiff’s ‘claim to title’ was that he had inherited 
the land from his parents who traced their claim to title to his grandparents. His 
grandparents had been allocated the land by a chief of the area. The High Court 
(Justice Manyungwa presiding) discharged the injunction restraining the defendants 
from building the teacher’s house arguing that the plaintiff could be adequately 
compensated in damages if it was later found that his land had been unlawfully 
expropriated. Justice Manyungwa said: 
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It is important […] to note that the land in question is customary land, and not private land. Section 
25 of the Land Act provides that all customary land is property of the people of Malawi and is 
vested in perpetuity in the President. Thus, although a person may acquire some interest in the 
customary land, as is the case with the plaintiff, the same cannot be said to amount to title. Simply 
put, the plaintiff is not the owner of the land as he has no title to it, all he has is beneficial interest. 
Moreover section 28 of the Land Act provides for compensation to be paid to a person whose 
interest[s] have been disturbed by converting customary land to public land, and that the acquisition 
has to be in the public interest.
175
 
 
Besides the conceptual problems relating to the conception of the ‘customary’ space 
and the lack of analysis of existing principles that have been developed in, for 
example, the Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case and Administrator of the Estate of Dr 
H Kamuzu Banda v The Attorney General, the Court in Mbirintengerenji Case 
suggests that beneficial interest in land is not amenable to constitutional protection. 
In sum, an important principle that has emerged from the judicial intervention 
of the Malawian courts in relation to the land question is summed up in the Press 
Trust (Supreme Court) Case: the beneficial interest in land has constitution protection 
under the Constitution. Second, government action can reverse a status quo that 
impedes the enjoyment of a beneficial interest in property, and by extension land. 
These points are further developed in Chapter 7. 
IV FINAL WORD 
 The land question in Malawi has not been resolved under the colonial and 
postcolonial law and policy frameworks for a host of reasons. Colonial capitalism in 
the country was based on a large estate agriculture sector dominated by white 
entrepreneurs. The black population was semi–conscripted into labour reserves to 
support the colonial State’s development strategy. Under the Banda Administration, 
colonial practice was merely deracialized. This is apparent from its continued 
preference of the large estate sector to the smallholders. I have also endeavoured to 
show that under the Banda Administration, the nature of the neopatrimonial State was 
such that policy drove patronage. Under the colonial State and the Banda 
Administration, the nature of responsibilization was marked by land alienation, cheap 
labour policies, and restrictions on the players in commercial cash crop agriculture in 
order to reinforce the estate sector.  
Under the Muluzi Administration, policy had to fit patronage resulting in a 
patronage–policy framework. Hence, while the Muluzi Administration put in place 
initiatives towards the resolution of the land question, besides the nature of the 
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neopatrimonial State, these have been undermined by three factors: the liberal 
democratic institutional framework, especially the property clauses under the 
Constitution; the ‘democratization of corruption’ that defined the Administration’s 
ethos; and the role of the Bretton Woods Institutions that has been alluded to here as 
shaping the nature of the macro–economy.176  
Just like the Banda Administration, the Mutharika Administration has also put 
in place a bimodal agricultural policy. During its first term, the Administration 
suffered from the political reality of being a ‘minority government’ whereby the 
implementation of its policies was critically hampered by a hostile opposition 
majority. The rhetoric during this period had been that there were rewards for both the 
large estate and smallholder sectors. The early signs of the second term of the 
Mutharika Administration from the post–May, 2009 period seem to be that there will 
be increasing preference for a large scale agricultural sector. 
 In light of the increasingly shrinking size of available arable land to the land 
deprived, the nature of the neopatrimonial State and the Banda, Muluzi and Mutharika 
Administrations respectively has had varying implications for the land question. I 
would like to argue that under the Banda Administration, the response was indeed 
‘lukewarm’ to the extent that it merely reinforced colonial practice. The 
implementation of policies under the Muluzi Administration was ad hoc, perilously 
jejune and self–serving, particularly in relation to those within the networks of 
patronage. In this respect, under the Muluzi Administration, the land question 
received attention only where it served a particular patronage strategy. The Mutharika 
Administration’s bimodal agricultural policy is increasingly mirroring the policy 
under the Banda Administration. In that light, the Mutharika Administration’s 
approach (or lack of it) to the land question does not augur well for its resolution. 
 In the context of a dire situation of the land question where going by 
1996/1997 national figures, only 0.8 hectares of available arable land accrued to a 
household (this translates into 0.18 hectares per member of a household),
177
 in 
Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, I discuss the interventions that have been put in place 
to purportedly resolve the land question. These interventions are primarily the Land 
Policy and the attendant initiative by the Malawi Law Commission. These are central 
to the discussion in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I discuss the competing interests of the 
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key constituencies in land reform in Malawi and how those interests are enhancing or 
undermining the resolution of the land question; where a resolution would entail an 
improved access to available arable land by the erstwhile land deprived in the country. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Policy Intervention and the Land Question 
 
It was noted in the Introduction that the postcolonial State adopted the Land 
Policy on 17 January, 2002; that the Land Policy is central to the discussion of the 
policy intervention in relation to the land question in Malawi; and that the adoption of 
the Policy is located within the new wave of land reform. Second, Chapter 2 
demonstrates that the liberal conception of the right to property in land dominates 
property discourse. This dominance stems from the supremacy of market as value in 
development discourse. Chapter 3 in part traces the root of market as value back to the 
Hayekian catallaxy.  
It was also observed in Chapter 3 that the implementation of market–based 
land reform models is beset by three issues: the preferential treatment of land owners 
in the estate sector; particularly under the land redistribution model based on a willing 
seller/willing buyer approach has led to the conclusion that the model amounts to a 
seller’s market. Second, the lack of post–redistribution support services has meant 
that land distributed to the land deprived is amenable to distress sales. Third, the 
nature of programme financing disfavours weak economies since the implementation 
of the models requires heavy capitalization which, in the case of weak economies, 
often is only possible through external capital from the Bretton Woods Institutions. A 
conclusion of Chapter 3 is that the combined effect of the three issues epitomizes the 
process of hegemonic responsibilization of the land deprived as a source of cheap 
wage labour and inchoate producers. 
Regarding the Land Policy, the following observations may be made: The 
Policy was formulated under the aegis of the World Bank. It is grounded in a market–
based approach to land reform. Its main thrust is that it ‘reflect[s] the imperative of 
changing economic, political and social circumstances’ in Malawi.1 It forms the basis 
for the development of ‘a comprehensive land law with immense economic and social 
significance.’2 It also seeks to provide ‘a sound institutional framework for 
democratizing the management of land and introduces […] procedures for protecting 
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land tenure rights, land based investments and management of development at all 
levels.’3  
The process that led to the adoption of the Land Policy follows closely from 
agrarian and other studies commissioned by the Muluzi Administration in cooperation 
with the country’s development partners between 1995 and 1998. Notable among 
these national interventions were the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land 
Policy Reform; and the Public Land Utilization Study, the Estate Land Utilization 
Study, and the Customary Land Utilization Study. The broad mandate and 
methodology of the Presidential Commission and the three land utilization studies 
required them to lead to the development of sound ‘scholarly discourse’ which would 
in turn lead to an informed intervention towards the resolution of the land question. 
The rhetoric was that this informed intervention would lead to the development of a 
robust national land policy. The Presidential Commission and the land utilization 
studies used a wide participatory approach involving the private sector, ordinary 
citizens and non–governmental organizations, all geared to aid land reform in the 
country.
4
  
The Presidential Commission’s Report of 1999 and the findings of the three 
studies are, as it will be shown, contradictory. However, the rhetoric still states that 
the findings of the Commission and the studies purportedly became an informed basis 
for the development of the Policy. In turn, the Policy is meant to be the blueprint for 
the development of a new land law regime for the country.
5
 The Law Commission 
was tasked with translating the Policy into law. A special Law Commission was 
empanelled in 2003 whose mandate, among other things, included the review of 
existing land–related legislation, the development of new legislation for effective land 
administration, codification of ‘customary’ land law, and the definition of the role of 
traditional authorities and local government in land administration.
6
 While the 
Commission finalized its work in March, 2006, Parliament is yet to enact its 
recommendations into law.
7
 Chinsinga, writing in 2008, concludes: 
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[T]here is mounting evidence that the delays in implementing the land reforms – championed 
as a priority policy issue to galvanise popular support for the democratization project – is 
stretching the patience of the ‘land hungry people’.8  
 
The work of the Presidential Commission, the land utilization studies, the Policy and 
the work of the Law Commission are a result of the urge to develop a ‘single’ or 
‘comprehensive’ national framework on land.9 It was noted in Chapter 4 that a fairly 
robust sectoral policy, albeit a bimodal one, has always covered the country’s 
agricultural sector.
10
 However, there has been a sustained lack of policy synergy in 
the strategy deployed for the resolution of the land question. The Presidential 
Commission, for instance, identified other sectoral policies, namely, the National 
Land Use and Management Policy; the National Environmental Policy and Action 
Plan; the National Forestry Policy; the National Irrigation Policy and Development 
Strategy; the National Housing Policy; and the National Physical Development Plan. 
However, the Presidential Commission noted that while all these sectoral policies 
addressed land issues, particularly land tenure; they lacked intersectoral synergy 
which merged into an integrated framework that forms a basis for efficient resource 
utilization in the national political economy.
11
  
 This Chapter considers the policy intervention that has been undertaken in the 
country and examines the extent to which the land question can be resolved under the 
intervention. The policy intervention here emerged on the back of the logic that ‘clear 
and unambiguous policies [must] precede plans, programmes and implementation 
instruments.’12 A number of observations may be made regarding the intervention: it 
has been dominated by an underlying market–based land reform modelling which has 
been championed by the postcolonial State’s development partners. It was noted in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that history and context has not been a key consideration. As the 
discussion below reveals, this has undermined the nature of the recommendations 
under the intervention. 
Second, the conceptual problems relating to the ‘customary’ space highlighted 
in Chapter 2 have been perpetuated under the policy intervention in so far as the 
‘conception’ of the ‘customary’ space is not problemmatized at all. The nature of 
‘customary’ land tenure based on a communitarian ethos has been taken for granted.  
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Third, the lack of intersectoral synergy that the Presidential Commission itself 
identified remains. There is a lack of concerted linkages between the country’s 
macroeconomic frameworks and the initiatives under the land reform. This 
disjuncture between the macroeconomic framework and the Land Policy is discussed 
in more depth in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say that to the extent that the macroeconomic 
framework is formulated as the overarching framework for the country’s 
development, it means that the Bretton Woods Institutions define the negotiability of 
the issues that relate to the land question by the constituencies under the land reform, 
at least at the policy level. This is yet another manifestation of the Foucauldian 
technologies of normalization under a process of hegemonic responsibilization. As 
noted in Chapter 1, uncertainty (in this case revealed through policy disjuncture) is a 
trait of biopower. 
Fourth, while the rhetoric is that the Presidential Commission and the three 
studies proceeded on a common platform meant to ultimately feed into a national land 
policy, there is no synergy between the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission and the three land utilization studies; nor is there any synergy among the 
studies themselves. Finally, and more critically in relation to the resolution of the land 
question, the various initiatives failed to ascertain in definitive terms the area of 
available arable land in the public land, private land and the so–called ‘customary’ 
land sectors. This is the case despite the fact that one of the objectives of the studies 
was to precisely ascertain the levels of availability of land under the sectors. 
In the end, although the Presidential Commission and the three studies are 
touted as having informed the development of the Policy, a close examination of the 
processes does not support this position. The conflict and confusion among the reports 
of the Presidential Commission and the studies does not enrich the Land Policy as a 
blueprint for the resolution of the land question in the country. In any event, the report 
of the Presidential Commission was not supported by the postcolonial State. This in 
my view suggests a further disjuncture between the processes under the Presidential 
Commission and the three studies, on the one hand, and the Land Policy, on the other. 
Hence, to the extent that the ‘theory’ of the Policy is problematic, an automatic 
transition from policy to law through the work of the Law Commission is equally 
problematic and only entrenches the irresolution of the land question. 
I ‘LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE’: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF 
INQUIRY ON LAND POLICY REFORM, 1996 
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 The Presidential Commission was appointed by the Muluzi Administration on 
18 March, 1996. It comprised fifteen Commissioners drawn from the academia, 
private business, parastatal corporations, the estate sector, political parties, women 
groups, chiefs, and the clergy.
13
 The Commissioners were pre–dominantly urban–
based and male; two were male chiefs; two were women; and none were 
representatives of the land deprived. The Commission’s terms of reference included, 
among other things, ‘to undertake a broad review of land problems throughout 
Malawi, and recommend the main principles of a new land policy which will foster a 
more economically efficient, environmentally sustainable and socially equitable land 
tenure system.’14 Beyond the principles for a new land policy, the Commission was 
mandated to ‘suggest guidelines for basic land law and subsidiary legislation to give 
effect to the new policy.’15  
The Commission commenced its work in earnest on 8 January, 1997 up to and 
including 31 March, 1999, a period of some 26 months, when its Report was 
published. During this period, the Commission conducted 230 public hearings, three 
regional consultative workshops, and one national workshop on its preliminary 
findings.
16
 At the beginning of its work, the Commission re–interpreted its terms of 
reference and concluded that: it was not a court of law, the legislature nor a land 
distribution agency. Hence in its approach to the land question, the Presidential 
Commission resolved that it would conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the history 
of land law and policy in the country; the social reality of the land question; the 
‘nature’ and ‘performance’ of the land tenure systems under the 1967 reforms; the 
inheritance systems; and the land administration.
17
  
Despite the re–interpretation, in relation to the land question in the country, 
the recommendations of the Presidential Commission may be summed up in their own 
language at page 20 of their report: In view of ‘political and economic expediency,’ 
the country must ‘let sleeping dogs lie.’ This is the Commission’s position despite 
acknowledging the serious land asymmetry due to land law and policy that was 
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followed under the colonial State and, subsequently, the Banda Administration. The 
following discussion looks at what the Presidential Commission meant by ‘letting 
sleeping dogs lie’ and indeed why the dogs could not be awakened.  
 The Presidential Commission was funded by the postcolonial State; the Danish 
International Aid Agency (DANIDA); the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); and the World Bank.
18
 
Besides the Commissioners, a team of at least three Malawian consultants, an FAO 
team and at least four foreign consultants provided ‘technical’ support.19 In fact, the 
Commission acknowledges that the delay to the start of its work (from the time of 
gazetting on 18 March, 1996 to the actual commencement of work on 8 January, 
1997) was due to ‘a number of logistical and substantive issues involving funding, 
working conditions and infrastructure [that] were [unresolved] by the [G]overnment 
of Malawi and its bilateral and multilateral partners’ and that work only started when 
the Project Support Document was signed.
20
 
 The Presidential Commission makes a number of observations and findings, 
and gives recommendations regarding the land question where it deemed it 
appropriate. Three areas are highlighted: First, the Commission acknowledges the 
nature of colonial land law and policy as a critical factor in buttressing the land 
question in the country.
21
 Their observation complements the discussion of the land 
question in Chapter 4. The Commission observed that since the logic of colonial 
capitalism was to inculcate white economic enterprise through systemic land 
alienation, the Commission found that the colonial State ‘stultified’ the evolution of 
‘customary land law’.22 This was the case because the ‘indigenous’ society lacked 
title to land. The ‘customary’ law that applied to them could only be personal as 
opposed to property law.
23
 Hence, the Commission recommended that the 1967 
Reforms must be repealed as they perpetuated colonial practice.
24
 The Commission 
states: 
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If ‘customary land’ remained, in law, an integral part of ‘public’ (or crown) land, what regime 
of law governed its occupation and use? An answer to that question is to be found in the fact 
that since under colonial law Africans had no title to land, the only issue of concern was how 
to regulate occupation rights among them. This was clearly a personal (not property) law issue 
governed by customary law.  
 
[...] 
 
The domain of customary law was therefore very severely curtailed. That is the position in 
which indigenous communities found themselves at independence in 1964. At independence 
the Governor ceased to exercise any power in Malawi. It was now open to the new 
administration to define its own land policies and law without direct intervention from the 
colonial administration. In 1965 it passed the Land Act. The Land Act 1965, however, did not 
change this situation. It merely repeated the existing categories of private, public and 
customary land adopted in the Land Ordinance of 1951.
25
 
 
 The Commission also concluded that it was impossible to implement radical 
land redistribution from erstwhile land owners in favour of the land deprived. This 
was the case notwithstanding the fact that the nature of the land question demanded 
such a radical step. Hence, the Commission recommended that the postcolonial State 
must ‘refrain’ from disturbing the titles derived from the Certificates of Claim that 
were issued in 1902.
26
 The Commission observed that in light of the ‘neglect’ of the 
‘indigenous’ society under colonial law and policy, an alternative approach to the land 
question would be more meaningful. Here, the Commission recommended the setting 
up of ‘a meaningful social development fund and plan’ and the contributors to the 
fund were to comprise the British Government, large estate owners with freehold title 
and the postcolonial State. It was the Commission’s view that this would lead to the 
reduction of unemployment and impoverishment, and the ‘alleviation of land 
pressure’ particularly in the southern Malawi districts of Thyolo, Mulanje and 
Chiradzulu.
27
 A possible explanation is that the alternative approach defines the 
Commission’s language regarding the impossibility of a rather radical approach to the 
land question. As far as they were concerned this was impossible due to the nature of 
‘political and economic expediency’ in resolving the land question.28  
The Commission took the ‘compromise’ position while simultaneously duly 
noting the colossal problems relating to land scarcity, land management and land 
auditing.
29
 These three aspects to land transcended problems of security of tenure. 
Beyond the proposed social development fund, the Commission suggested further 
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alternatives to the resolution of the land question: In light of the ‘highly 
unsustainable’ population growth, the Commission held the view that the postcolonial 
State must develop strategies that ease land pressure through the ‘restoration’ of 
erstwhile ‘customary’ land from idle leaseholds or freeholds; ‘enhancement’ of the 
smallholder sector; and ‘promotion’ of non–agrarian based economic sectors.30 In the 
Commission’s view, the short term response to easing this land pressure was through 
a robust and aggressive implementation of the Environment Management Act.
31
 
 Third, and more critical, the Presidential Commission observed that the 
continued land alienation from the so–called ‘customary land’ sector as defined under 
the Land Act into the private land sector through the combined application of the 
Land Act, the Registered Land Act and the Customary Land (Development) Act, 
undermined the resolution of the land question.
32
 It will be clear from the conclusion 
on the conception of the ‘customary’ space in Chapter 2 that the land alienation if at 
all occurred in the public land sector. As it was pointed out in Chapter 4, this land 
alienation from the public land sector was a result of the implementation of the 
bimodal agricultural policy under the Banda Administration which favoured the estate 
sector. The Commission recommended that these private land interests must revert to 
traditional authorities as custodians of communities under customary law.
33
 The 
recommendation is intriguing considering that the Commission, by its own analysis, 
concluded that no ‘customary’ land law applied in the country as the ‘indigenous’ 
society did not have title to land at law.
34
 Hence, the reversion of title to chiefs only 
highlights the problem of the conception of the ‘customary’ space that has been 
discussed in Chapter 2. It has been noted in Chapter 4 that the problem stems from the 
failure to recognize that the so–called customary land is in fact public land under the 
Land Act especially when the full effect of the legal regime under the 1967 Reforms 
is taken into account. 
 Finally, the Presidential Commission recommended that the postcolonial State 
must develop a new land policy that would be ‘fully integrated’ into the (national) 
development policy. The Commission recommended that the national land policy 
would be guided by the principles of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 promulgated 
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at the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (the ‘Earth 
Summit’) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June, 1992.35 Specifically, the land policy would 
encompass sovereign control of land; tenure regimes; management systems; land 
administration procedures; dispute processing procedures; institutional arrangements 
and sectoral linkages.
36
 The Commission concluded that the robust policy framework 
would then be legitimated through a land law regime that builds upon existing land 
laws.
37
 
 The Commission’s Report was not well received by both the postcolonial 
State; specifically the Muluzi Administration, and an intransigent coterie of the 
country’s development partners. While the report was presented to President Muluzi, 
it was not formally embraced by the State as a policy document nor, contrary to 
official rhetoric, was it used in the development of the Land Policy. One of the 
sticking points for this reception is the proposal for the development of the social 
development fund in the absence of a more radical redistribution of land in favour of 
the land deprived. The Commission had proposed that the fund that would support the 
land deprived would be financed by the British government (as the former colonial 
power in Malawi), large estate owners and the postcolonial State. The proposal for a 
fund was unacceptable (particularly to the British government) considering that at the 
regional level the agreement between the British government and Zimbabwe in 
relation to the latter’s land question was turning ‘acrimonious’ with the Zimbabwean 
government contemplating the implementation of the fast–track land reform 
programme.
38
  
Another issue regarding the Commission’s work was the heightened 
expectation for land redistribution following the campaign promises which have been 
discussed in Chapter 4. The Commission calculatingly represented itself as a ‘research 
organization’ rather than ‘the land redistribution agency’ the land deprived in the 
country were anxiously waiting for.
39
 Second, it is possible to infer overbearance of 
the country’s development partners because the Commission’s work was 
simultaneously conducted with the land utilization studies commissioned by the 
postcolonial State between 1995 and 1998 at the prompting of the country’s 
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development partners. It is unclear why the objectives of the Presidential Commission 
and the three land utilization studies were not reconciled. Even though the works were 
contemporaneous, they were in many respects contradictory. At any rate, a 2004 
assessment of the involvement of the Department for International Development 
(DFID) of the British government observed that strategic British intervention in the 
land sector in Malawi remained critical to the entrenchment of a market economy in 
the country.
40
  
II THE LAND UTILIZATION STUDIES, 1995–1998 
 
 Between 1995 and 1998, the postcolonial State commissioned three land 
utilization studies; namely, the Public Land Utilization Study; Estate Land Utilization 
Study and the ‘Customary’ Land Utilization Study. The Public Land Utilization Study 
was funded by the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), the Estate 
Land Utilization Study by the then Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of 
the British government, and the ‘Customary’ Land Utilization Study by the European 
Union (EU) through the Bureau pour le Developpement de la Production Agricole 
(BDPA) of the French government.  
The studies were commissioned to create a data map ascertaining the land 
sizes (particularly of arable land) in the public, private and ‘customary’ land sectors; 
and the levels of land utilization in those sectors. This objective was not sufficiently 
achieved as the confusion on the statistics on the availability of arable land and its 
utilization remains. This confusion in part undermines the resolution of the land 
question. 
 The Public Land Utilization Study established that very little land remains idle 
in the sector. The Estate Land Utilization Study found that minute tracts of land – less 
than 1 per cent – were under–utilized and these were predominantly in the medium 
sized estates band. Finally, the ‘Customary’ Land Utilization Study established that 
pieces of land that were recorded as under–utilized in this sector were in fact wetlands 
or fallow land in the public land sector.  
A Public Land Utilization Study 
 
 This Study was conducted between April, 1996 and March, 1998. The Study 
was funded by the USAID who commissioned a team from the University of Arizona 
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to conduct the Study. The team was led by a non–Malawian Doctor of Philosophy 
candidate in the University’s Department of Arid Land Studies. Out of the four main 
authors of the report of the Study, only one was a Malawian. 
The main objective of the Study was to ‘provide biophysical data and social 
information on the status and use of publicly held lands’ and once the information was 
collated, it would form a basis for ‘decision making within Malawi’s land policy 
reform programme.’41 In the discharge of this broad mandate, the Study looked at: 
‘the location, distribution, size, and rationale for protection of Malawi’s protected 
areas; the agricultural suitability, erosion hazard, population pressure and impact on 
these areas; the resource use patterns by neighbouring populations; the role these 
populations play in local economies; the location, size, purpose, and current status of 
Malawi’s agricultural schemes; and an analytical framework for site–specific tenure 
change decisions.’42 The Study adopted a narrow interpretation of ‘public land’; 
limiting it to forest reserves, national parks and wildlife reserves.
43
 Notwithstanding 
this narrow interpretation of ‘public land’, the Study incorporated agricultural 
extension schemes across the country.
44
 
 The following are 1998 figures: The Study established that 20 per cent of 
Malawi’s total land area is protected areas. 10 per cent of the land under protected 
areas is suitable for agriculture ‘at an acceptable risk of soil erosion.’45 As expected, 
population pressure was greatest in southern Malawi followed by central Malawi; 
with Mulanje in southern Malawi having a high population pressure relative to the 
protected area of 25 persons per hectare. The Study also noted that while northern 
Malawi presented ‘lower population pressure’ on protected areas, it did not 
necessarily mean that the region experienced ‘lower demand for land.’ For instance, 
the Study established that in Rumphi, northern Malawi, the tobacco estates that had 
mushroomed in the so–called ‘customary’ land sector posed significant risk of land 
occupation in the protected areas to alleviate land scarcity in the smallholder farming 
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sector.
46
 Indeed, as Kanyongolo writes in 2005, these land occupations have since 
occurred in Rumphi.
47
 
 More critically, the Study made these two findings: First, changes in the 
protected areas (except the agricultural extension schemes) will entail changes in 
tenure and land use. This would not be the case in the estate and the so–called 
‘customary’ land sectors. Second, on the basis of an average land holding size of 1 
hectare per family household and a population growth of 3.2 per cent; even if all 
public land were available for redistribution, it would only stem the land question for 
a period of twenty years up to 2018 (with time beginning to run in 1998 which is the 
date of the report).
48
 
 The Study then made some ten recommendations towards the development of 
a national land policy.
49
 For my purposes, the following four are the most crucial: 
land policy must be holistic and triangulate the peculiar factors of the public, private 
and the so–called ‘customary’ land sectors respectively;50 the long term resolution of 
the land question will not entirely be ‘land–based’ and there may be need to develop 
alternative sources of livelihood for the erstwhile smallholder sector;
51
 the need to 
ascertain, in definitive terms, the size of available arable land in the so–called 
‘customary’ land sector;52 a biophysical cost–benefit analysis must precede any 
programme to de–gazette protected areas for purposes of making land available for 
subsistence farming.
53
 
B Estate Land Utilization Study 
 The Study was conducted between July, 1995 and April, 1997 and was funded 
by the ODA through a grant–in–aid. The Study was concentrated in the tea estate 
sector in the Shire Highlands in southern Malawi. There were four main authors of the 
report under the Study; only one was a Malawian; and a non–Malawian led the team.  
The broad objective of the Study was ‘to contribute to a better understanding 
of the effectiveness (physical, social and economic) of land utilization on estates 
compared with that on customary and on other land, and the potential impact of land 
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policy options.’54 In relation to the land question, 65 per cent of land in the tea estate 
sector was deemed ‘suitable’ for agriculture. The tobacco estate sector had 78 per cent 
of ‘suitable’ land and the sugar estate sector close to 80 per cent. Further, there was no 
‘suitable’ land that remained underutilized in the sugar estate sector; only 1 per cent 
of ‘suitable’ land in the tea estate sector, and 29 per cent in the tobacco sector 
remained underutilized.
55
  
The Study established that the southern Malawi districts of Thyolo and 
Mulanje experienced acute land pressure. This was mainly due to the very high 
population densities in the districts; which at the time of the Study stood at 246 
persons per square kilometre and 335 persons per square kilometre respectively.
56
 The 
Study concluded that land redistribution in the estate sector especially in Shire 
Highlands in southern Malawi would be counter–productive if the land use after the 
redistribution would result in maize monocropping. The counter–productivity 
primarily arises because the topography of the area supposedly favoured plantation 
crops only.
57
  
C ‘Customary’ Land Utilization Study 
 The Study was conducted between March, 1995 and February, 1997 by a team 
of BDPA researchers. The main objective was ‘to provide the Government of Malawi 
with reliable information on the extent, intensity and efficiency of the land utilization’ 
in the so–called ‘customary’ land sector.58 The Study had some eight components 
looking at, among other things, land use, socio–economic analysis of the so–called 
‘customary’ land tenure, land allocation, and the interaction of the estate and the so–
called ‘customary’ land sectors respectively.59 The Study noted that by virtue of the 
definitions of ‘public land’, ‘private land’ and ‘customary land’ under the Land Act, 
‘customary’ land in fact operated as a default once public land and private land had 
been ascertained under the Act. It concluded that the categorization of land under the 
Land Act creates problems of ascertainment of the definitive land area under the so–
called ‘customary’ land and this undermines the resolution of the land question in the 
country.  
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The Study made the following pertinent observations: Land pressure is a 
‘highly localized phenomenon’ such that certain areas of Malawi have acute land 
shortages and other areas less so. In turn, land redistribution in areas of acute land 
shortage would only serve as a short–term measure that would wither away in five to 
ten years. This finding corresponds with the finding under the Estate Land Utilization 
Study; that land distribution in Malawi in relation to the land question would be a 
short–term measure that would stem the problems associated with the land question 
only up to 2018. The second finding was that the estimation of the area under the 
‘customary’ land sector suffers from poor data records as a result of several factors 
including mis–recording of wetland and other fallow land as available ‘customary’ 
land, and fraudulent under–recording of the sizes of small to medium sized estates by 
the owners to evade higher land rentals.
60
  
D Reconciling the Three Land Utilization Studies 
Two points emerge from the three studies; one logistical and operational, the 
other conceptual and strategic. First, the objective of the creation of a data map on the 
statistics ascertaining land sizes in the public land, private land, and customary land 
sectors respectively and information on land utilization was not achieved. Second, the 
studies concluded that land redistribution would be a short–term resolution of the land 
question and there was need to consider other non–land–based strategies. Hence, 
since the three studies did not definitively establish the extent of the available arable 
land in the country, the nature of the land ownership and land use, it becomes difficult 
for purposes of analysis to assess the definitive nature of the land question. This is 
critical since, as it will be shown in section III and Chapter 6, the land redistribution 
model based on the willing seller/willing buyer approach is central to the land reform 
in the country.  
III LAND POLICY 
 
The Land Policy is touted as the national framework for land reform.
61
 The 
rhetoric is that the Policy is a result of the Report of the Presidential Commission; and 
the three land utilization studies that have been discussed in the preceding sections.
62
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It has been observed that the Presidential Commission recommended that the 
postcolonial State needed a comprehensive national land policy. The rationale for the 
Commission’s recommendation was that existing policy statements and legislation 
were conflicting and lacked inter–sectoral linkages to enable the land sector to 
meaningfully contribute to economic development. Three problems; namely, poor 
access to available arable land, improper land use and insecurity of tenure were 
identified as major constraints to the efficient usage of land.
63
  
While the Presidential Commission noted the nature of the land question was 
greatly entrenched under the colonial State and the Banda Administration, it 
recommended that ‘for reasons mainly of political and economic expediency’, the 
postcolonial State under the Muluzi Administration should ‘refrain’ from overturning 
the status quo of skewed arable land availability and access between erstwhile land 
owners and the land deprived.
64
 There is no evidence of a deliberate integration of the 
findings in the report of the Presidential Commission, and the three land utilization 
studies into the Land Policy. I have argued that there is a disjuncture between the 
Presidential Commission’s Report and the studies, and the development of the Land 
Policy.  
The disjuncture is also apparent in the development of the Land Policy itself. 
The Policy was primarily developed by the policy planning unit established in the 
Ministry responsible for land matters. The unit was funded by the EU. It was headed 
by a consultant under a World Bank contract. Even though the Policy makes reference 
to the Presidential Commission’s Report and the three land utilization studies, the 
reference in my view, is a casual acknowledgement since there is no clear linkage of 
principles from the Report and the studies, on the one hand, and the Policy.
65
 In any 
event, the Policy in large measure proceeds to make recommendations on the 
‘customary’ space that ignore the critique of the efficiency argument in land reform 
discourse advanced by, for example, Borras, Deininger and Binswanger, McAuslan, 
Platteau and Nyamu–Musembi.66 Second, the recommendations confirm the 
conception of ‘customary’ tenure under a communitarian ethos. There is a general 
failure under the Land Policy to engage with the conception of the ‘customary’ space 
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in the manner that was discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the recommendations ignore 
the critique of the transition to formalization of interests in land by for example, 
Borras, Deininger and Binswanger, McAuslan, Platteau and Nyamu–Musembi.67  
The following are the specific positions of the postcolonial State under the 
Policy: A land policy must reflect the changes in the economic, political and social 
factors in a country. Hence, the key guiding principle of the Policy is that it must lead 
to a comprehensive land law ‘with immense economic and social significance.’68 The 
Policy is underpinned by ten principles: secure land tenure; sustainable land 
management; productive and efficient land use; effective land administration; 
protection of vulnerable groups (these are women, children and persons with 
disabilities); development of an institutional framework for land management, land 
information system, and optimum utilization of land.
69
  
The postcolonial State has argued that the ‘[f]ailure to reform and secure the 
tenure rights of smallholder [sic] [farmers in Malawi]’ has had a causal link with 
‘under–investment, reliance on primitive technology and […] low wages in rural 
areas.’70 A legal framework is meant to ‘institutionalize, once and for all, a land 
administration system at the local and district government level.’71 The guarantee of 
security of tenure shall be ‘without any gender bias [or] discrimination to all citizens’ 
under section 28 of the Constitution.
72
 Further, security of tenure is meant to ‘curb 
land encroachment, unapproved development, land speculation and racketeering’.73 
The discussion below seeks to show the responsibilization of the individual – as the 
embodiment of the general population – through a market–based conception of two 
key elements under the Policy; namely, the ‘customary’ estate as part of the categories 
of land under the Policy, and the land market. The responsibilization raises serious 
doubts in relation to the resolution of the land question under the Policy.  
A Categories of Land under the Land Policy 
The Land Policy urges for ‘formal and orderly arrangements’ of titling.74 The 
postcolonial State under the Muluzi Administration equally acknowledged the nature 
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of the land question under both the colonial State and the Banda Administration and 
its entrenchment through law and policy.
75
 In this respect, there are three categories of 
land proposed under the Policy as a possible means of redress of the land question. 
The categories are government, public and private land. The Policy provides the 
definitions for the three categories of land. Government land shall comprise ‘land 
owned by government and dedicated to a specified national use or made available for 
private uses at [its] discretion’. This category shall encompass land reserved for 
government schools, hospitals or offices etc.
76
 Public land shall comprise ‘land held in 
trust and managed by government or [a] traditional authority and [shall] be openly 
accessible to the public’. This category shall cover national parks, forest reserves, or 
unallocated land within an area of a traditional authority.
77
 Private land shall comprise 
land held under freehold, leasehold or ‘customary’ estate.78 
1 ‘Customary’ Estate 
There is a major departure from the present land law regime in respect of 
‘customary’ land as defined under the Land Act. The Policy provides that all 
‘customary’ land under the jurisdiction of each traditional authority shall be 
demarcated and registered as a traditional land management area in recognition of the 
central role of a traditional authority to ‘customary’ land tenure.79 In each traditional 
land management area, ‘customary’ landholdings shall be registered and titled as 
individual landholdings to be known as the ‘customary’ estate. The ‘customary’ estate 
may be registered in ‘an individual, a family, corporation or organization allocated 
‘customary’ land’.80 The rights in the ‘customary’ estate shall be ‘private usufructuary 
in perpetuity’.81 The Policy also provides that ‘once registered, the title of the owner 
will have full legal status […].’82 The titling and registration of ‘customary’ land is 
intended to provide security of tenure, promote access to credit and provide an 
incentive for investment. The assumption here is that titling and registration of all 
‘customary’ land will lead to the emergence of a ‘vibrant formal land market’.83 
However, the titling and registration of the ‘customary’ estate shall not render that 
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land freely alienable. The sale, lease or mortgage over the ‘customary’ estate shall be 
subject to the interest of the community and shall require the consent of a traditional 
authority of the area in which the ‘customary’ estate is located.84  
The ‘customary’ estate is a peculiar fusion of the orthodox perception of land 
tenure. However, a number of observations may be made regarding the ‘customary’ 
estate. The effect of titling and registration of the ‘customary’ estate at law is that a 
registered person is the owner of the ‘customary’ estate. Hence, the ‘customary’ estate 
is freely alienable subject, of course, to existing planning or other legislation.
85
 The 
registration of usufructuary rights as envisaged under the Policy is a misnomer. A 
usufruct arises as an inferior interest in land legally owned by another person. A 
usufruct cannot accrue to an owner.
86
 The usufruct can arise if the legal ownership in 
the land is reposed in a traditional authority under a trust or other mechanism under 
the proposed traditional land management area. Under the ‘customary’ estate, the 
‘constructed’ or ‘responsibilized’ individual as the title holder sustains the credit or 
land markets. Suffice it to say that the problems that relate to involvement of chiefs in 
land issues in a political economy such as Malawi have been highlighted in the 
academy.
87
 I discuss the role of chiefs in the country’s land question in Chapter 6. 
Suffice it to say that this construction of the customary estate perpetuates the colonial 
principle of recognition of ‘native title’ that was settled in Nireaha Tamaki, In Re 
Rhodesia and Amodu Tijani.  
B Creation of a Vibrant Land Market 
The development of a formal land market is one of the key components of the 
Policy. Hence, once the ‘customary’ estate is registered and titled, it may be made 
available in the credit market. My assessment, however, is that this is not possible 
under the present nature of the ‘customary’ estate. A vibrant market will only emerge 
if the ‘customary’ estate is freely alienable subject to, as already pointed out, to 
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existing legislation. It has been observed that the nature of the ‘customary’ estate 
under the Land Policy is that it is not freely alienable. At any rate, the emphasis on the 
development of a ‘vibrant land market’ may negatively affect the land deprived 
through increased insecurity as a result of distress sales, the ‘threat of foreclosure’ and 
the probability of the dominance of landed elites such as the Achikumbe in the market. 
The insecurity will be inevitable in the absence of enduring strategies to support the 
livelihood of, for example, post–land redistribution owners under initiatives such as 
the Community Based Rural Land Development programme. It has been pointed out 
in Chapter 3 that post–land redistribution support services is a problem under market–
based land reform models. Hence, the conception of the ‘customary’ estate as 
presently constituted is problematic.  
From the preceding discussion and the observations that have been made in 
Chapter 3, I suggest that the development of a formal land market and the facilitation 
of access to available arable land are contradictory objectives in the context of the 
history of the land question in the country. A market–based approach to land reform 
means that land is redistributed based on the willing seller/willing buyer approach. 
This raises questions about the financial capacity of the postcolonial State to ensure 
that the land deprived benefit under the model.
88
 Malawi simply does not have such 
financial capacity.
89
  
Finally, in Chapter 4 it was argued that under the Constitution, land reform in 
the country can only proceed on the basis of market–based models. On this basis, 
compensation for expropriation can also be at the open market valuation only. Hence, 
the resolution of the land question under the Policy is undermined because, as it has 
been observed, the preferential treatment of land owners under market–based land 
reform models; the need for post–land redistribution support to avoid, among other 
things, distress sales; and the need for sustained programme financing entail that weak 
economies such as Malawi may have to rely on external funding to sustain a land 
reform programme.  
IV INTERVENTION OF THE MALAWI LAW COMMISSION  
In October, 2002, the Malawi Law Commission received a submission from 
the Ministry of Lands, Physical Planning and Surveys requesting the review of 
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existing land legislation and the formulation of a new legal framework for land 
matters in line with the Policy.
90
 The request followed the finalization and adoption of 
the National Land Policy by the postcolonial State. Hence, In January, 2003, the 
Malawi Law Commission empanelled a special Law Commission on the Review of 
Land–Related Laws under section 133(b) of the Constitution. The Commission 
commenced its work in earnest in March, 2003. The terms of reference for the 
Commission included the review of existing land–related legislation with a view to 
developing a new legislative framework for land matters that articulates the principles 
of the Policy.  The work of the Commission was funded by the European Union. In 
March, 2006, the Commission finalized its Report on the review of existing land–
related laws; namely the Land Act, the Customary Land (Development) Act, the 
Local Land Boards Act, the Registered Land Act, the Town and Country Planning 
Act,
91
 the Forest Act,
92
 the Public Roads Act,
93
 the Mines and Minerals Act,
94
 the 
Land Survey Act,
95
 the Lands Acquisition Act, the Adjudication of Title Act,
96
 the 
Wills and Inheritance Act,
97
 the Local Government Act,
98
 the Malawi Housing 
Corporation Act,
99
 the Temporary Control of Premises Act,
100
 and the Investment 
Promotion Act.
101
  
 The Commission recommends the enactment of eleven Bills relating to core or 
attendant land matters: the Land Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Registered Land 
Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Physical Planning Bill, 2006; the Forest Act 
(Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Public Roads Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Mines 
and Minerals Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Land Survey Bill, 2006; the Lands 
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Acquisition Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; the Local Government Act (Amendment) 
Bill, 2006; the Malawi Housing Corporation Act (Amendment) Bill, 2006; and the 
Customary Land Bill.
102
  Of these eleven bills, the Land (Amendment), the Registered 
Land (Amendment), and the Customary Land Bills respectively are directly pertinent 
to the land question in the country. 
 Under the Land (Amendment) Bill, the Commission recommends two 
categories of land: Public land and Private land. Public land will comprise 
government land as defined under the Policy and what has been described as 
‘unallocated customary land’. Private land will comprise freehold land, leasehold land 
and the ‘customary’ estate.103 The Commission recommends that the ‘customary’ 
estate under the Policy must be retained in pursuit of promoting private ownership of 
‘customary’ land.104 They re–define the ‘customary’ estate: 
‘customary estate’ means any customary land which is owned, held or occupied as private 
land within a Traditional Land Management Area under a freehold title and which is 
registered as such under the Registered Land Act; 
 
They also recommend a new definition of ‘freehold’: 
‘freehold’ means an interest in land of unlimited duration which is held under free tenure;105 
 
 The Commission’s recommendation regarding the ‘customary’ estate 
individualizes (as opposed to privatizing) ‘customary’ tenure. This is the case because 
the recommendation leaves no doubt at all that a ‘customary’ estate is, subject to 
existing legislation, freely alienable; and as observed by Peters and Kambewa, it 
provides ‘further means’ with which the landed elites such as the Achikumbe can 
secure their interests in land ‘possibly at the expense’ of the land deprived.106  
Further, the Commission recommends, as a general rule, a minimum land size 
of 0.5 hectares of arable land per household for the registration of ‘customary’ estates. 
The Commission states: 
[T]he Commission agreed that there is need to empower the Minister to make rules to regulate 
minimum holdings of all types of land that should be registrable [sic].  The Commission 
recommends that in the case of customary estates, the minimum holding should be 0.5 
hectares
107
 to prevent fragmentation of agricultural land. It was however agreed that 
exceptions should be made for already existing rights in customary land which are less than 
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the proposed minimum and for units which are proven to be economically viable but the 
holding is less than the minimum, such as poultry farming.
108
 
 
It is conceded that the Commission envisages situations where interests in land of less 
than 0.5 hectares may be registered under clause 18 of the Customary Land Bill. In 
effect, all interests in land that fall under the definition of customary estate may be 
registered under the Commission’s proposal. Looking at the statistics, by 1996, the 
average size of available arable land per household had ‘shrunk’ to 0.8 hectares.109 In 
any event, some scholars have doubted that land sizes as low as 0.5 hectares can be 
collateralized in a credit market.
110
 Beyond this performance in a credit market, it has 
also been observed in the Introduction and Chapter 2 respectively that a decent size of 
available arable land is crucial to support dignified living. 
Hence, the Law Commission’s initiative entrenches the market–based land 
reform models and further inculcates the land deprived as the ‘responsibilized’ 
population who would have title to land without the requisite support through capital 
investment. This would make the land deprived as new beneficiaries under a market–
based land reform modelling vulnerable to distress sales. The possibility of distress 
sales stems from the fact that land sizes of as low as 0.5 hectares may not be 
collateralized in a credit market. This status quo is arguably a recipe for the 
reinforcement of this ‘responsibilized’ individual – the unit of a population – as a 
source of cheap wage labour. The nature of the responsibilization is that if the land 
deprived risk losing their land through distress sales, they may have to continue 
earning their living through provision of labour to the Achikumbe who dominate the 
estate sector. 
 Another critical point for discussion is that the Commission in its work did not 
engage with the issues relating to the conception of the ‘customary’ space at all. The 
category of land referred to as ‘customary land’ under the Land Act and attendant 
legislation was taken at its face value. There was no attempt to problematize it in spite 
of the debates, as shown in Chapter 2, relating to the ‘customary’ space in the 
academy. In the context of this oversight, the Commission, in my view, incipiently 
entrenches the supposed communitarian ethos of the so–called ‘customary’ space.  
                                                 
108
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Under its recommendations, the Commission has also reposed statutory 
powers of land administration in chiefs in relation to a sub–category of public land 
known as ‘customary land’ under the Land (Amendment) Bill. Under clause 27 of the 
Land (Amendment) Bill, the Law Commission has recommended that chiefs should 
have statutory land administration powers over the so–called ‘customary’ land. The 
exercise of the powers shall be in accordance with the ‘customary’ law in the area of 
the chief.
111
 Further, under clause 3 of the Lands Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, a 
chief has power to acquire land for public purposes.
112
 Finally, the Law Commission 
has actually developed a whole bill – the ‘Customary’ Land Bill – to regulate the 
supposedly ‘customary’ space. Under the ‘Customary’ Land Bill, the role of chiefs 
with the help of ‘customary’ land committees and land clerks is even more detailed 
and pronounced.
113
 It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the chief in property discourse 
under the scheme of colonial capitalism served a political function. The continued 
recognition of a chief under a legal framework such as the proposed ‘Customary’ 
Land Bill is to ignore this ‘convenient end’ that the chief served under the colonial 
State, and continues to do so under the postcolonial State. Further, in light of the 
observations by Ng’ong’ola highlighted in Chapter 2 that conferring ‘rights’ or 
‘interests’ to ‘villages’ or ‘tribes’ is problematic, the proposed clause 27 of the Land 
(Amendment) Bill; clause 3 of the Lands Acquisition (Amendment) Bill; and indeed 
the scheme under the Customary Land Bill, are untenable. 
 The Land (Amendment) Bill has largely been a mechanistic approach to the 
land law regime in the country set on entrenching the role of chiefs in land matters in 
the country. There has been no attempt to engage with the underlying issues relating 
to the conception of the ‘customary’ space, the so–called ‘customary’ land tenure, and 
the institution of chiefs as a network of patronage. The role of chiefs is further 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 The Commission’s recommendations, in some respect replicate the 1967 
Reforms. The Customary Land Bill, for example, proceeds on the same philosophy 
that led to the development of the Customary Land (Development) Act in 1967. The 
Customary Land (Development) Act was developed on the back of the efficiency 
argument. Hence, to have a so–called ‘customary’ land bill in 2006 proceed along the 
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lines of the efficiency argument is to remarkably ignore a wealth of scholarship that 
has critiqued this line of thought in land reform discourse.
114
 
 In the end, the Commission’s initiative is a travesty in light of the nature of the 
land question in Malawi: McAuslan has correctly pointed out that land reform in the 
African postcolony has meant land law reform to correct historical inequality that 
underlies the (African) land question.
115
 He has argued that the move from ‘policy’ to 
‘law’ – precisely legislative drafting – must not focus on ‘legal technicality’; it must 
remain a ‘policy’ debate throughout the reform process.116 Otherwise, ‘abstract 
instrumentalism’ perpetuates the land question in a country.117 
V FINAL WORD 
 
 In this Chapter, it has been demonstrated that while the report of the 
Presidential Commission and the three land utilization studies were touted as the 
informed basis of the Land Policy, there is a clear disjuncture between the report of 
the President Commission and the three land utilization studies, on the one hand, and 
the Policy on the other.  
One of the objectives of the three land utilization studies was to ascertain the 
area of available arable land in the postcolonial State for purposes of the land reform. 
However, besides a blanket statement on total available arable land in Malawi in the 
Presidential Commission’s Report – that arable land constitutes some 5. 3 million 
hectares,
118
 the three land utilization studies did not ascertain in definitive terms the 
hectares of (available) arable land in the various sectors and the levels of land 
utilization in those sectors. 
What also emerges from the Presidential Commission’s Report and the three 
studies is a reluctance to historicize and contextualize the strategies for the resolution 
of the land question in the country. Indeed, looking at the Presidential Commission’s 
recommendations and the three studies, it is difficult to fathom how those 
recommendations will enhance the resolution of the land question considering the 
discussion in Chapter 4 on a historicized and contextualized process of land alienation 
in the country. The status quo remains – in the language of the Presidential 
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Commission – for ‘economic and political expediency’. This is a euphemism that 
raises a lot of speculation but belies analysis. 
The three land utilization studies, particularly the Estate Land Utilization 
Study, conclude that land redistribution would negatively affect the value added to the 
economy. In my view, the three studies placed less emphasis on the issue of access to 
available arable land, especially the asymmetry between the landed elites (comprising 
the Achikumbe), on the one hand and the land deprived, on the other. In the 
discussions on the existing land relations, the studies focussed on the relationship 
between the Achikumbe and the land deprived in the prism of landlord and tenant or 
employer and employee. Finally, from the studies; the lack of viability of land 
redistribution as a strategy to resolve the land question begs the question whether 
there are strategies in place by the postcolonial State to ease land pressure through the 
development of a viable non–agricultural economic base. 
The Land Policy has embraced the market–based land reform models. The 
innovations under the Policy, particularly the ‘customary’ estate, do not demonstrate 
an appreciation of the critique that has been developed in land reform discourse 
regarding the efficiency argument. In any event, the conception of the ‘customary’ 
space is not problematized at all under the Policy. 
 The intervention of the Law Commission also reveals the concerns that have 
been highlighted in the preceding section regarding the Land Policy. Further, the 
intervention shows the following: A straightjacket translation of land policy to land 
law in Malawi is perilous, as it ignores a number of important considerations, such as 
the macro–economic debates on the role of land in the political economy of the 
country, and whether land reform must support the estate sector or a smallholder 
sector (or both) for the country’s agricultural policy direction. Furthermore, it does 
not address the question whether there is a policy synergy between the land and 
macro–economic frameworks. 
 In the context of hegemonic responsibilization, it must be noted that the 
country’s development partners need not exert ‘direct’ influence beyond the funding 
of the various policy initiatives. What is crucial is what John Braithwaite and Peter 
Drahos have described as ‘modeling’. This is based on what they call a ‘globalization 
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of regulation’ through ‘norms, standards, principles and rules’.119 This resonates with 
Shamir’s idea of a ‘market of authorities’ and also fits in with the range of multiform 
tactics’ under Foucauldian governmentality.120 This is implemented by ‘model 
missionaries’ and ‘mercenaries’ located at the centre and a periphery such as 
Malawi.
121
 Hence, the policy intervention is skewed towards market–based land 
reform modelling. This outcome reveals an ‘embeddedness’ with the conception of 
market as value.
122
 
In sum, the responses to the land question so far overlook the nation’s history 
and context, and exaggerate the importance of the centrality of market as value in land 
reform.
123
 Suffice it to say that in Chapter 3, it was demonstrated that the dominance 
arises in the context of the centrality of market as value in development discourse. 
The promise of the rhetoric of a fair redistribution of land to the land deprived has 
been undermined by the lack of concrete proposals to address the needs of the land 
deprived. Chapter 6 looks at the interaction between the key constituencies in the land 
reform in the country and how land relations shape their interaction; particularly 
within a framework of hegemonic responsibilization. The discussion centres on the 
interests of the key constituencies under what I have called the ‘multiverse’. The task 
is to examine how these interests can or cannot lead to the resolution of the land 
question in the country. 
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Chapter 6 
The Land Question and the Challenge of the Multiverse 
This Chapter looks at the interaction of the key constituencies in land reform 
in Malawi; namely, the postcolonial State; the Bretton Woods Institutions; the 
Achikumbe; and the land deprived, and the implications of their parochial interests for 
the reform. The socio–economic snapshot of the land question is that as much as 85 
per cent of the Malawian human population earn their living as subsistence, tenant 
workers; that the intercensal population growth between 1998 and 2008 has been as 
high as 32 per cent; that landholding is as low as 0.16 hectare per capita for the ‘ultra 
poor’ and 0.28 hectares for the ‘non–poor’; and that the land deprived (as the 
constituency of households with access to less than 0.5 hectares of arable land) 
account for 10.48 million people in the country.
1
  
In Chapter 1, it has been argued that governmentality involves the introduction 
of the economy into family or political practice. This has meant that the regulation of 
the population should involve the disposition of ‘things’; or rather the relation of men 
and things. The disposition has led to the adoption of a range of multiform tactics; and 
these can be law, policy, codes of conduct, standards, guidelines and proposals for 
reform. Regarding governmentality and a land question in a polity: Foucault states 
that the focus is on production.
2
 Hence, under the policy of grains and phenomenon of 
scarcity, ‘man’s greed’ or ‘the need to earn more’ prevails.3 If production is the main 
focus under the phenomenon of scarcity, the producers for the purposes of the thesis 
constitute the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Achikumbe. 
The land deprived form the constituency of labourers and inchoate producers. These 
constituencies and their roles are made possible through the process of ‘normation’ 
which is in turn possible through biopower.
4
 
Chapter 1 also discusses Scott’s notion of Brechtian forms of ‘resistance’.5 
These are the ‘everyday’ ‘struggles’ which a particular constituency utilizes in order 
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to achieve calculated conformity. Scott has argued that the Brechtian struggles are 
techniques of ‘behaviour’ used by a particular constituency to ‘work a system’ to their 
‘minimum disadvantage’.6 In this Chapter, the discussion looks at the extent to which 
the key constituencies are actually working the system to their minimum 
disadvantage. While this direction of the analysis is pertinent, it is important to 
mention that the relationship among the various constituencies in the country is not 
perfectly reducible to that of the ‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’. The Brechtian 
struggles are not the monopoly of a particular constituency. In the context of the land 
question, the struggles emerge in the interaction between the postcolonial State and 
the Bretton Woods Institutions; the Achikumbe or the land deprived, and the 
postcolonial State; the Achikumbe and the land deprived; and indeed within the 
constituency of the land deprived.  
It is suggested that the interaction amongst the constituencies is complicated. 
Hence, the central argument in this Chapter is that the multiverse of the interests of 
the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Achikumbe and the land 
deprived undermines the resolution of the land question under the on–going land 
reform in Malawi. The multiverse emerges through the interaction of these 
constituencies. The idea of multiverse has been appropriated from multiverse theory 
in quantum physics. In broad terms, multiverse, in quantum physics, relates to the 
possibility of the existence of more than one universe in the conception of the 
‘cosmos’. Bernard Carr states: 
[T]he term ‘universe’ is usually taken to mean the totality of creation, [there is] the possibility 
that there could be other universes (either connected or disconnected from ours) in which the 
constants of physics (and perhaps even the laws of nature) are different. The ensemble of 
universes is then sometimes referred to as the ‘multiverse’ [.]
7
  
While the debate on the multiverse rages on in the field of quantum physics, its usage 
here emphasizes the ensemble of interests of the key constituencies in land reform in a 
country. Hence this ensemble lies in the competing and parochial interests that are 
manifested through the interaction of these constituencies. The multiverse requires a 
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meticulous triangulation of the various interests at play at the level of law and policy. 
The multiverse creates enormous challenges for land reform that proceeds on a rule–
based, positivist approach to law as a catalyst for social engineering. The triangulation 
is essential in light of the varying agenda that scholars have pointed out exist in land 
reform discourse and practice.
8
 The competition amongst the social, economic and 
political perspectives to land reform has meant that land reform discourse and practice 
is often disordered.
9
 
The discussion of the multiverse uses Scott’s notion of calculated 
conformity.
10
 This is done under two strands of calculated conformity; namely 
‘predatory calculated conformity’ and ‘preservatory calculated conformity.’ Predatory 
calculated conformity refers to a type of conformity that is prescribed by the 
‘dominant’ to the ‘dominated’. It does not rely on brute force. Its application is fluid 
and involves standards, guidelines, policy frameworks and even law reform. In this 
respect, predatory calculated conformity corresponds to hegemonic responsibilization. 
For example, as it will be shown in this Chapter, this could be in the form of poverty 
reduction strategies that the Bretton Woods Institutions ‘export’ to the South. 
Preservatory calculated conformity, on the other hand, is a coping mechanism used by 
the ‘dominated’ to ensure that any disadvantage is minimized as far as possible within 
the reality of their social setting. For instance, this may involve a process of false 
compliance where a constituent gives an impression of compliance when in fact they 
are not. The circumstances surrounding the (non–)enactment of the Land 
(Amendment) Bill, 2006 by the Malawi legislature are a case in point.
11
 Both the 
predatory and preservatory calculated conformity operate within the fluidity of 
Foucauldian power. This fluidity is discussed in Chapter 1; Foucauldian power is not 
annihilatory, it is mobile and open. It in fact enables Brechtian struggles to flourish.  
The two strands of calculated conformity are discussed at macro and micro 
levels. The discussion at the macro level engages with the relationship between the 
postcolonial State (as a local space) and the Bretton Woods Institutions (as a global 
space). At the micro level, the discussion takes place at four levels: The relationship 
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between the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe; the postcolonial State and the land 
deprived; the Achikumbe and the land deprived; and finally, the intra–‘community’ 
dynamics. These dynamics require an analysis of the political institutions of the 
‘community’, especially the chiefs, and the implications of their vested interests for 
the resolution of the land question. The dynamics also focuses on the complication 
that emerges among the land deprived. This tiered analysis is not to suggest that there 
is a lack of ‘influence’ across the various relationships. It merely serves to highlight 
the interests of the various constituencies under the on–going land reform in the 
country. 
I PREDATORY CALCULATED CONFORMITY 
 The nature of predatory calculated conformity must be analyzed first, under 
Malawi’s macroeconomic framework; and second, the World Bank’s land policy 
framework of 2003, and their implications for the resolution of the land question in 
the country. The central point here is that the nature of the frameworks developed by 
the Bretton Woods Institutions as blueprints for (local) political economies such as 
Malawi gridlock any meaningful esoteric policy development at the local space. In the 
context of the land question, the postcolonial State must implement a market–based 
land reform framework that has been prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions. In 
the end, predatory calculated conformity as a form of hegemonic responsibilization 
undermines the resolution of the land question in the country. 
A The Macro Level Analysis of Predatory Calculated Conformity 
First, in the examination of the relationship of the postcolonial State and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, it is useful to consider the influences that the global space 
has had on the policy framework at the local Malawian space. In this respect, when 
one looks at the various macroeconomic frameworks that have been developed in 
Malawi, it becomes clearer how inevitable it is that land reform in the country has 
been market–based.  
In recent years, the macroeconomic framework in Malawi has been formulated 
in the context of the poverty reduction strategies promoted by the Bretton Woods 
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Institutions.
12
 In this regard, it is pertinent to consider the poverty reduction strategy 
in Malawi and examine the extent to which it has shaped the direction of the 
postcolonial State’s land reform. Two documents are worth consideration; the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper which ran between 1999 and 2004, and the Malawi Growth 
and Development Strategy which runs from 2005 to 2011. The two documents are the 
constitutive parts of the macroeconomic framework in the postcolonial State and are 
considered simultaneously as a site of conformity.  
Further, I discuss the World Bank’s land policy framework of 2003 and its 
influence on the nature of Malawi’s Land Policy. The context within which the 
various frameworks for the postcolonial State emerge is narrow and concretized in 
light of the requirement, as it were, to ensure consistency with the frameworks 
designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions, particularly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
1 The Macroeconomic Framework as a Site of Conformity 
 The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper stems from a process that 
began in 1994 with the development of what was called the Vision 2020 programme. 
The programme was championed by the Bretton Woods Institutions on the back of a 
changed mindset that long term economic planning (as opposed to the short periods 
under structural adjustment programmes) were ‘beneficial’ to national economies. 
Under the Vision 2020 programme, the postcolonial State was to evolve into ‘a 
technologically driven, middle income country’ by the year 2020. The Vision 2020 
programme was launched with salute and splendour by the Muluzi Administration on 
31 March, 1998 as the blueprint to guide Malawi’s development for the next 22 years. 
The following issues were given priority under the programme: good 
governance, sustainable economic growth and development, vibrant culture, well 
developed economic infrastructure, food security and nutrition, science and 
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technology–led development, social sector development, fair and equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, and sustainable environmental management. In 
relation to the land question, the following ‘strategic challenge’ was identified under 
the issue of sustainable economic growth and development: increasing access to land 
by smallholder farming households. The ‘strategic’ options that were developed 
included: ‘undertaking land reform; moratorium on the conversion of land from the 
‘customary’ land sector to the private land sector for the growth of estate agriculture; 
establishing an agricultural credit guarantee scheme and establishing a land bank to 
provide agricultural credit; widening the window of credit provided by financial 
institutions to all agricultural stakeholders for production, marketing and agro–
processing.’13 
The Vision 2020 programme did not run its full course. The Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper
14
 replaced the Vision 2020 programme after the latter had 
been in the implementation stage for a period of four of the projected 22 years. In 
turn, the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy
15
 is a continuation of the Malawi 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper after the expiration of the Paper in 2005. In general 
terms, apart from the difference in periodization, the Vision 2020 programme, the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
are a continuum.  
 It is pertinent to situate the Malawi Poverty Reduction Paper and the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy in the global context. Poverty reduction strategies 
in the South emerge following the shortcomings of structural adjustment 
programmes.
16
 The rationale of the poverty reduction strategies is grounded in their 
five core principles; namely: that they are country–driven; that they are result–
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oriented; that they are multidimensional in nature in combating poverty; that they are 
partnership–oriented; and that they are based on a long term strategy for combating 
poverty reduction.
17
  
The World Bank has stated that the poverty reduction strategies represent a 
‘new form of social contract’ whereby the strategies are the basis for all Bretton 
Woods Institutions’ financing to low–income countries of the South.18 The strategies 
are the condition precedent for qualification under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC) Initiative. The emphasis on poverty reduction strategies was meant to 
symbolize a change in approach by the Institutions themselves. The changed approach 
is contained in the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) 
and the International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). 
The CDF and PRGF are to be reflected in poverty reduction strategies developed by 
country authorities. Countries qualifying for the HIPC Initiative and the Institutions’ 
concessional lending generally are required to produce a poverty reduction strategy 
paper. The HIPC Initiative itself has two major preconditions: first, access to HIPC 
benefits is ‘conditional on the adoption of a range of policies believed necessary for 
debt sustainability to improve connections between local economies and 
(international) capital and commodity markets, and to implement mildly nuanced 
Washington Consensus regimes of macro–fiscal management’.19 Second, poverty 
reduction strategy papers serve as an ‘accountability framework to explicitly bind 
country debt management into global macro–economic, governance and social 
policies.’20 
 The advocates of poverty reduction strategies state that the strategies 
ameliorate the ‘power asymmetry’ prevalent in international development financing.21 
The antithesis is that the nature of the changed approach is largely oratorical. Celine 
Tan has argued that, contrary to the rhetoric, poverty reduction strategies perpetuate a 
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‘mythologization’ of ‘laboratory’ free market economics.22 Second, Tan argues that 
poverty reduction strategies are a form of ‘discipline’. She contends: 
[T]he framework serves, to a large extent, as a regulatory restraint for the [S]tates subject to 
its discipline. It follows from the conceptual principles and operational directives 
underpinning the […] approach that the [poverty reduction strategies] [S]tate as recipient of 
concessional financing and debt relief, must demonstrate its desire to be disciplined by a set of 
rules representing the universal normative framework for all [S]tate resource extraction, 
allocation and administration.
23
 
The point resonates with the notion of hegemonic responsibilization. In a market of 
authorities, the State is a ‘facilitator’ of prescribed code of conduct, standards or 
guidelines. Poverty reduction strategies are, in this context, prescriptions of ‘conduct’ 
that the State then facilitates.  Under the facilitation, both the State and a non–State 
may be the agent of responsibilization. 
 Poverty reduction strategies are expected to boost country ownership of the 
HIPC Initiative but at the same time they are a mechanism for the accountability and 
transparency of national budgetary policy at the global level. This represents an 
inherent contradiction. The reality is that poverty reduction strategy papers are linked 
to macro–budget planning and expenditure control devices of Bretton Woods 
Institutions; most notably, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).
24
 The 
MTEF links poverty reduction to the top–down resource envelope and a bottom up 
estimation of the current and medium term costs of development policies.
25
 Indeed, 
David Craig and Doug Porter have concluded that the ‘PRSP/MTEF linkage’ forms 
an ‘extra–parliamentary technocratic decision making’ serving the interests of 
(international) capital – precisely ‘Northern’ economies – by ensuring adherence to 
conditionality – often a plethora of ‘pre–defined ends’ – governing sovereign 
governments.
26
 
 The foregoing sets the context of the postcolonial State’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. It has been 
observed in Chapter 5 that even though the development of the Land Policy was 
contemporaneous with the development of the poverty reduction strategy paper for 
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the country, the land question was not addressed within the context of the 
macroeconomic framework that was being formulated for the country. 
 The prescriptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions are apparent within the 
macroeconomic framework at the local Malawian space. There is a lack of synergy 
between the macroeconomic frameworks that have been developed by the 
postcolonial State over the years and the Land Policy. The Malawi Poverty Reduction 
Paper stated that it was ‘the overarching strategy that will form the basis for all future 
activities by all stakeholders, including Government’ and its overall goal was ‘to 
achieve sustainable poverty reduction through empowerment of the poor.’27 The 
postcolonial State asserted that ‘[r]ather than regarding the poor as helpless victims of 
poverty in need of hand–outs and passive recipients of trickle–down growth, the 
[State] sees them as active participants in economic development.’28  
 While limited access to land was identified as one of the five key causes of 
poverty in the country,
29
 it has been observed that under the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, land was ranked seventh among the issues that needed to be 
resolved to enhance agricultural productivity for pro–poor growth.30 This is the case 
despite the acknowledged centrality of access to land in boosting the agricultural 
sector and ultimately the postcolonial State’s efforts in poverty reduction.31 
The lukewarm prioritization of the land question is perpetuated under the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy. The Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy is – again – the ‘overarching strategy’ for the 2006/2007 to 2010/2011 fiscal 
years and will serve as the ‘single reference document’ for ‘Government policy, 
private sector, non–governmental organizations and cooperating partners’ in relation 
to socio–economic growth and development priority.32 It is the national blueprint for 
poverty reduction through economic growth and infrastructure development. The 
Strategy is based on five themes: sustainable economic growth; social protection and 
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disaster management; social development; infrastructure development; and good 
governance.
33
  
There is no clear linkage between the Strategy and the Land Policy. The 
Strategy however provides for agricultural productivity under the theme of sustainable 
economic growth. The postcolonial State states that smallholder farmers will have to 
increasingly ‘commercialize’ for them to be competitive in the domestic and export 
markets.
34
 The postcolonial State asserts that low agricultural productivity has been 
due to dependence on rain–fed agriculture, poor land and crop husbandry, declining 
soil fertility, poor land rights, non–existence or weak linkage to domestic and export 
markets.
35
 This call for increased commercialization of the ‘smallholders’ resonates 
with the findings of the DFID in 2004 and indeed the Ministerial and Presidential 
Statements of 2009.
36
 The confluence of language here reveals the nature of 
responsibilization underway.  
One of the implementation strategies to arrest the low agricultural productivity 
is the recognition and formalization of ‘customary land rights’ of smallholders 
through appropriate legislation.
37
 While the Strategy does not make specific reference 
to the Land Policy, the implementation strategy in respect to ‘customary land rights’ 
is the only connection between the two Government policy frameworks especially 
keeping in mind that land tenure is one of the central issues under the Policy.
38
 The 
implementation strategy localizes the ‘new approach’ to land reform that the World 
Bank is now advocating. As I have argued in Chapter 2, the issue is not so much 
whether an approach is ‘old’ or ‘new’; conception of the ‘customary’ space is 
problematic. To the extent that land reform in Malawi does not accept that the so–
called ‘customary’ land is in fact part of public land and that the occupants under 
those parcels of land are akin to tenants at will, then the wrong prescription at the 
normative level may render the land reform in the country futile. 
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Further, the increased commercialization by smallholders may require 
increased land consolidation. Land consolidation would be in sharp contrast to the call 
for land redistribution that is advocated under the Land Policy at least in the short 
term. What is clear, and what seems to be missing from the Strategy, is that increased 
land pressure points to the absence of a non–agricultural economic base in the 
country. Clear efforts to develop an alternative economic base in the country may 
complement initiatives towards the resolution of the land question. 
Ultimately, the lack of synergy between the processes of the development of 
the Land Policy and the macroeconomic frameworks is telling for two reasons. First, 
the macroeconomic frameworks have been the ‘overarching framework’ for the 
‘development’ of the postcolonial State such that in the event of a contradiction 
between the poverty reduction strategy and a sectoral policy the former takes 
precedence.
39
 Second, the macroeconomic frameworks have formed the linkage 
between the local Malawian space and the global space whereby the Bretton Woods 
Institutions dictate the direction of the postcolonial State’s macro economy.  
This possibility of overriding can be related to Foucault’s apparatuses of 
security. In Chapter 1, four apparatuses – the dispositifs – of security were 
highlighted; namely, space, uncertainty, normalization and correlation of security of 
the population. It was noted that the Foucauldian notion of security relates to the 
technology of power whereby a process of normation – normalization – is key. In the 
context of the land question, the normative problems relating to the conception of the 
‘customary space that have been pointed together with the ‘supremacy’ of the 
macroeconomic frameworks drive this process of normation. 
2 The World Bank’s Land Policy Framework, 2003 
The postcolonial State’s implementation strategy to enhance agricultural 
policy resonates with the World Bank approach to land reform where the land 
redistribution model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach is promoted as 
the benchmark for land reform. In 2003, the Land Policy Division of the World Bank 
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commissioned a blueprint on land policy frameworks.
40
 The World Bank’s land 
policy framework of 2003 emerges in the shadow of the Land Reform Policy Paper, 
1975 and two key draft reports; the Land Institutions and Land Policy and the Land 
Policy for Pro–Poor Development, both of 2002, where it was recognized that land 
reform plays a key role in the wider macroeconomic framework in promoting 
economic growth and good governance.
41
 This recognition jolted the Bank into taking 
a leading role in setting the policy agenda in land reform. The recognition culminated, 
as it were, in the land policy framework of 2003.
42
 The land policy framework of the 
2003 advocates a supposedly ‘human–centred approach’ to land reform. In this 
respect, the Division contends that there is need for ‘secure property rights’ where 
there is legal recognition of ‘customary’ tenure systems.43 The Division makes this 
conclusion following findings that there is no empirical evidence between individual 
title and economic growth.
44
 The Division recognizes a ‘bundle of property rights’ 
which may comprise access rights, usufruct or full ownership.
45
 The Division also 
acknowledges that a ‘unitary model of the household is often inappropriate’ and that 
‘formal title is not always necessary or sufficient for high levels of security of 
tenure’.46 Hence, the major shift in the Bank’s 2003 paper is the consistent reference 
to ‘secure property rights’ as opposed to ‘formalized title’.  
Four key issues are identified under the land policy framework of 2003 to 
ensure that a land reform makes ‘meaningful’ contribution to the economic growth of 
a country: the promotion of owner–operated farms for increased agricultural 
productivity; security of land tenure; land disputes as disincentives to investment; and 
promotion of a credit market based on land as collateral.
47
 
The views of the Bank’s Land Policy Division as contained in the land policy 
framework of 2003 are not shared by its Macroeconomic, and the Environment and 
Sustainability Divisions. Anne Whitehead and Dzodzi Tsikata conclude that the 
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Macroeconomic, and the Environment and Sustainability Divisions of the Bank 
respectively are still rooted in the property rights concept under the Bank’s seminal 
paper on land of 1975.
48
 Hence, these Divisions argue that communal forms of 
property ownership lead to an inefficient market and over–exploitation and suggest 
that the modernization of the ‘customary’ space must remain the central pillar of the 
implementation of land reform in political economies such as Malawi.
49
 The concerns 
and observations of the Land Policy Division of the Bank seem to have been 
overridden by the ‘philosophy’ within the Macroeconomic, and the Environmental 
and Sustainability Divisions of the Bank. 
Alvaro Santos suggests that the diametrically polarized positions by different 
divisions of the Bank are not atypical. He points out that there is often a lack of 
consensus within the Bank generally due to ‘institutional inertia and constraints, 
groups’ struggles and competition over resources and prestige, and the relationship 
between groups at the Bank and the governments of borrowing countries.’50 While the 
internal dynamics in the Bank reveal a lack of consensus, the ‘dissensus’ is often 
reduced under the rubric of the ‘rule of law’.  
The absence of consensus within the Bank (especially) means that the nature 
of land reform, the implementation of reforms in aid–dependent and heavily indebted 
economies (symptomatic of most postcolonial states) is highly inconsistent and 
contradictory.
51
 However, Joel Ngugi argues that the contradiction in the Bank 
represents a strength since any traits of ‘systemism’ are ‘decentred’ and, in the 
process, mask its hegemonic character.
52
 This suggests that the contradiction may be 
exploited by the Bank to its ‘advantage’.  
While the rhetoric in the Land Policy Division is for a ‘human–centred 
approach’ to land reform, the implementation strategy suggests deference to the 
philosophy of the Macroeconomic, and the Environment and Sustainability Divisions 
of the Bank. In relation to the broader development agenda, Kerry Rittich has 
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observed that the ‘basic institutional architecture’ and the ‘core legal reform agenda’ 
of the international financial institutions have not changed.
53
 
Notwithstanding the dissensus within the Bank, the dissensus at the local 
Malawian space is ameliorated in two ways. First, the quest for the resolution of the 
land question is immersed in the broader context of poverty reduction. Second, the 
coalescing of land reform and poverty reduction leads to an even broader agenda 
under the rubric of ‘good governance’. The focus on poverty reduction is one way of 
marginalizing the land question. Suffice it to say that ‘good governance’ is contested 
territory and its critics consider it a legitimation apparatus for an ‘imperial’ agenda.54 
One of the critics, Antony Anghie, has observed that the ‘good governance’ initiative 
is a basic task for the ‘reproduction of principles and institutions’ for ‘progress’ and 
‘stability’ in the South.55 The point can still be made that the strategic iteration by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions under the rubric of good governance ensures that their 
various frameworks are in apparent symmetry at both the global and the local spaces.  
B The Micro Level Analysis of Predatory Calculated Conformity 
The discussion here takes place at four relational levels. These levels are: the 
relationship between the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe; the postcolonial State 
and the land deprived; the Achikumbe and the land deprived; and the intra–
‘community’ dynamics. In relation to the intra–‘community’ dynamics, the discussion 
looks at the role of chiefs and its implications for land reform. Further, the discussion 
considers the complication that emerges among the land deprived. 
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1 The Postcolonial State and the Achikumbe 
 In the wake of the adoption of a multiparty system of government in Malawi 
in 1994,
56
 the nature of the so–called ‘fast track’ land reform in Zimbabwe has, in my 
view, prompted a more proactive approach to land reform in Malawi from the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and its ‘Northern’ partners. In turn, the approach has influenced 
the nature of the relationship between the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe.
57
 A 
quick recapitulation of the local context is pertinent: In Chapter 4, it was pointed out 
that in the run up to the referendum of 14 June, 1993 and the general elections of 17 
May, 1994; land reform was a key ‘manifesto’ issue for galvanizing popular support 
by the proponents of a multiparty system of government. However, these proponents 
are also part of the Achikumbe and invariably benefited from the 1967 land reforms 
and the patronage that ensued.
58
 
 In the run up to the 1993 referendum and the 1994 general elections, the call 
for a land reform based on the land restitution model was either a genuine rallying cry 
to revolutionize land relations in the country by ensuring that the land deprived have 
improved access to land or it was mere campaign posturing on the part of the 
proponents for political mileage. If the quest for a land reform based on the land 
restitution model was legitimate, it soon evolved into land distribution model based 
on a willing seller/willing buyer approach in conformity with the trend under the new 
wave of land. However, if the call was mere politicking, it is more revealing of the 
vested interests of the proponents of multipartyism as part of the Achikumbe. This 
change in the rhetoric arises from the involvement of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and the country’s development partners in the development of the Land Policy 
through, most notably, the EU, the DFID and the USAID.
59
 The intervention in the 
postcolonial State was apparently crucial to avoid ‘another Zimbabwe’; where the 
State unleashed a fast–track land reform programme to ‘repossess’ predominantly 
white–owned commercial farms.60 In view of the violence that ensued under 
Zimbabwe’s programme, it is possible to suggest that the intervention of the Northern 
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agents in Malawi was calculative. This has meant that purportedly ‘excess’ land from 
the Achikumbe is only available to the land deprived through the land redistribution 
model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach. This seeks to ‘protect’ the 
estates under white ownership.
61
 
The ostensible sincerity of the quest for a land reform based on the land 
restitution model is depicted in the nature of parliamentary debates during the First 
Meeting of the 30
th
 Session of the Proceedings of Parliament. During the nine days of 
this Session, the issue of the land question in the country was raised a total of twenty 
times. In his Inaugural State of the Nation Address to Parliament, the then newly 
elected State President, Bakili Muluzi, said: 
I would like to remind the House of the fact that land is, next to man, the most important asset 
a nation may have.  With land to live and work on, men and women may be able to translate 
their nation’s dream and aspiration into reality.  In this regard, Government is committed to 
ensuring that land is distributed fairly and put to economic use.
62
 
As it was observed in Chapter 4, the contributing legislators to the debate in 
this period, who were predominantly from southern Malawi, adopted a firebrand 
approach to addressing the land question. The incumbent Minister responsible for 
land matters buttresses the point: 
Malawi is an agrarian economy and land is the main factor of production. Unfortunately, for 
30 years we have had no comprehensive national land policy.  Consequently, land was 
distributed on ad hoc basis.  There is in this country […] a conflict between the smallholder 
on one hand and the estate sector, the wildlife, the game reserve on the other.  We need a 
solution to this conflict.  The situation prevalent now, is that a large percentage of the 
population has no access to land especially in areas such as Thyolo, Mulanje, Zomba et cetera.  
Until Malawi makes land available to smallholders, we shall never free ourselves from 
poverty.  Access to arable land […] by the smallholders will ensure economic and food 
security and reduce unemployment problems. 
I would therefore, Mr. Speaker, Sir, like to endorse word for word His Excellency’s statement 
on 30
th
 June, that the Government is ‘committed to ensure that land is distributed fairly and 
put to economic use’. In this regard, my Ministry […] is undertaking to review the Land 
Legislations and come up with a comprehensive land policy. 
[…] 
I would like […] to make use of this opportunity to send an open invitation to all interested 
individuals and groups to come forward with suggestions and any land related problems in a 
spirit of open debate.
63 
The contributions to the debate on land reform based on a land restitution 
model changed to that of a land redistribution model based on a willing seller/willing 
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buyer approach. In Chapter 4, it was noted that then Minister responsible for land 
matters, Honourable Thengo Maloya, suggested that the Land Policy had been 
prepared in a careful, balanced manner; that tenure insecurity would be removed; that 
land transactions would be speedy and transparent; that inadequacies of the existing 
laws, retrogressive customary beliefs, delays in land administration, arbitrary 
application of the public interest criteria, constraining inheritance laws and 
uncertainty regarding the strategies for dealing with land pressures all operated to 
discourage needed investment and the nation’s ability to eliminate poverty.64 It was 
also observed in Chapter 4 that the nature of the property clauses under the 1994 
Constitution, and the ‘overbearance’ of the country’s development partners has meant 
that the change in the rhetoric was inevitable.65 
Hence, the call for land reform based on the land restitution model is political 
ruse if looked at in the context of path dependence.
66
 The postcolonial State has 
acquired estates from erstwhile white owners for the purported distribution to the land 
deprived. The so–called fair redistribution has been marred by cronyism. While the 
cronyism has not been accompanied by violence that has, for example, engulfed 
Zimbabwe, three rather extreme cases of the cronyism in Malawi are worth 
highlighting: The first case involves President Mutharika. The President has ‘bought’ 
the Ndata Estate in Thyolo, southern Malawi. As it has been stated already, Thyolo 
has colossal problems of access to arable land for the land deprived. At a focus group 
discussion, a discussant observes: 
To the north of this village, there is Ndata Estate. We had heard rumours that the Government 
has bought the estate to redistribute land to the landless. Later, we heard that the President has 
bought Ndata [Estate]. We were surprised that the President has bought an estate for himself 
considering that there is no land for farming here.
67
 
The second case involves a one time senior Cabinet minister under the Muluzi 
Administration. In 1997, the postcolonial State acquired a tea estate – Chitakale Tea 
Estate – in Mulanje, southern Malawi from erstwhile white owners for land 
redistribution to the land deprived. The redistribution of the land under the estate was 
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overtaken by efforts by Brown Mpinganjira, using his influence as a senior Cabinet 
minister at the time, to purchase the estate in his individual capacity. The postcolonial 
State only took steps to repossess the estate in question when Mr. Mpinganjira fell out 
with the Muluzi Administration. The repossession was the subject of litigation in the 
case of Brown J Mpinganjira v Chitakale Tea Estate Limited and the Attorney 
General.
68
  
The third case involves a conglomerate of private business, Mulli Brothers 
Limited. The directors of this conglomerate are closely connected to President 
Mutharika; they belong to the same political party, one of the directors is a member of 
Parliament and a Cabinet minister under the Mutharika Administration, and the 
directors and the President are from the same ethnic group. The conglomerate has 
since bought Chitakale Tea Estate Limited as a private entity. While the sale of the 
Estate was conducted under a privatization programme run by the postcolonial State, 
the fact that Chitakale Tea Estate has still not been made available to the land 
deprived buttresses the self–interest among the politicians as, simultaneously, part of 
the postcolonial State machinery and the Achikumbe.
69
 
The political cronyism is also evident at the regional context. In relation to 
Zimbabwe, Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros have discussed the blatant political cronyism 
practised by the State under the fast track land reform programme in that country. The 
beneficiaries under the programme have been members of the ruling political party 
and members of the war veterans’ grouping.70 
 Hence, under predatory calculated conformity, the relationship between the 
postcolonial State and the Achikumbe has been ambivalent. At one level, the 
intervention of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the agents of the country’s 
development partners has benefited the Achikumbe and has meant that the prospects 
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of a land reform based on the land restitution model have been foreclosed. As it has 
been discussed in Chapter 3, land reform under a land redistribution model based on 
the willing seller/willing buyer approach favours the Achikumbe.
71
  
At another level, the key players in the postcolonial State’s political hierarchy 
are themselves the Achikumbe such that the nature of the predatory calculated 
conformity is really in disfavour of the land deprived. To the extent that the key 
players in the political hierarchy of the country are also the Achikumbe, their impact 
on land relations gravitate towards entrenching the networks with the global 
commodity chain through a liberal, abstractionist interpretation of the right to 
property that underpins market–based land reform models such as a land 
redistribution model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach.
72
 
2 The Postcolonial State and the Land Deprived 
 Beyond the Land Policy which has been discussed in Chapter 5, the interface 
between the postcolonial State and the land deprived is most pronounced through the 
Community Based Rural Land Development Project. The Project is one of the 
implementation strategies of the Land Policy. From 2004, the postcolonial State, with 
support from the World Bank, has been piloting this Project in four districts of 
southern Malawi.
73
 At the start of the Project, the estimated total budget was USD28, 
958,940; with the postcolonial State contributing USD1,958,940 and the Bank 
USD27,000,000.
74
 The Project, in its pilot phase, was to run for four years. On 19 
November, 2009, the World Bank’s Board approved the extension of the Project to 
September, 2011 together with a grant of USD10,000,000.
75
 Beyond 2011, the 
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postcolonial State intends to scale up the Project to rest of the country. The scaling up 
is subject to availability of funds from the postcolonial State’s other development 
partners besides the World Bank. The Bank is reluctant to solely fund a scaled up 
implementation of the Project.
76
 A key informant working under Project states: 
The Project is a pilot which will be scaled up nationwide. The design will involve a lot more 
donors than just the World Bank. Donor interest is crucial; but the World Bank does not want 
to fund a scaled up project on its own.
77
 
 
This brings to the fore the issue of programme financing that has been discussed in 
Chapter 3. I have argued in that Chapter that since the implementation of market–
based land reform models requires heavy capitalization, it poses enormous challenges 
for weak economies such as Malawi. 
Poverty reduction is the purported central driver under the Project through 
‘directly facilitat[ing] access to land by the land deprived beneficiary groups.’78 In 
this respect, it is projected that at the end of the pilot phase, some 15,000 ‘rural poor 
households’ in the four districts will have been resettled on new tracts of land whose 
title shall be in the name of the households respectively.
79
 
The Project provides for an elaborate eligibility criteria which the land 
deprived must meet. The land deprived are required to form beneficiary groups which 
become the minimum level of consideration for an application for land redistribution 
under the Project. The eligibility criteria
80
 states that each applicant under a 
beneficiary group must: 
1) be a citizen of the Republic of Malawi;  
2) be land deprived and food insecure and a member of a rural household from one 
of the pilot districts; 
3) have the least amount of land  but has the ability to work on more land than 
presently accessed, that is, they must have excess labour; 
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4) be with lowest income and least wealth; 
5) have inadequate means to secure their annual food requirements and are 
chronically dependant on food handouts or other forms of external assistance for 
survival; 
6) be an ‘eligible vulnerable individual’; that is, for example, an orphan or a person 
with disability; 
7) not presently be encroaching on land being applied for, nor involved in a labour 
disputes with owner of the being applied for. 
There are specific requirements relating to the eligibility of a beneficiary group 
under the Project.
81
 A beneficiary group must: 
1) consist of members that have not benefited from previous land redistribution 
programmes; 
2) have a minimum of twenty and a maximum of thirty five members; 
3) have a constitution and demonstrate sound organizational capacity; 
4) have strong and identifiable leadership with capabilities to mobilize groups; 
5) be willing to be relocated and engage in farming; 
6) must develop a proposal that: 
a. reflects a need for land as a priority for the land deprived; 
b. directly benefit the land deprived; 
c. includes a capacity building element for the beneficiaries to develop and 
manage the asset; 
d. demonstrates that transparency and accountability processes were 
adhered to in the process of negotiating for land; 
e. demonstrate that there was and will be active participation by the entire 
group;   
f. is consistent with sectoral norms and recommended practices; 
g. ensures that identified land has the potential for improvement by the 
purchasing community. 
The Project implementation guidelines state that the land deprived under a 
constituted beneficiary group are responsible for identifying land for acquisition and 
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must directly negotiate with the landowner for the price. If a price is agreed, the land 
deprived are required to submit a provisional sale agreement to the local government 
who will then approve or reject the proposed sale. If a sale is approved, the price is 
paid to the landowner under the Project.
82
 
If a sale has been concluded, the following events ensue:
83
 
1) each emigrating household is allocated a minimum of two hectares of land 
2) each emigrating household is provided with transportation if the acquired is 
more than fifty kilometres from their erstwhile home 
3) each emigrating household is provided with a one–off payment of USD1050 
for resettlement and farm development; 30 per cent of the amount is for land 
acquisition, 10 per cent for settlement, and 60 per cent for farm development. 
The resettlement package includes: six bags of fertilizer, two hoes, a panga, a 
pick, and maize and tobacco seeds 
4) the newly acquired land cannot be transferred or leased during the first five 
years from the date of purchase 
5) the emigrating beneficiary group is responsible for ground rent, in the case of 
leasehold land, or land tax, in the case of freehold land. 
A civic campaign through the electronic and print media complements the 
implementation strategy of the Project. Under the civic campaign, the Project is 
designated as ‘kudzigulira malo’ – which literally means ‘buying land for oneself’. 
Such designation of the Project serves three purposes: First, it portrays the land 
deprived as equal partners with the postcolonial State under the land reform in the 
country. It presents the land deprived as having financial capacity to ‘buy’ available 
arable land for their livelihood. Finally, the designation legitimizes the Project which 
in real terms is rooted in a land redistribution model based on the willing 
seller/willing buyer approach. As pointed out earlier, far from the land deprived 
‘buying’ land for themselves, the postcolonial State, with support from the World 
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Bank, provides grants to the land deprived for the land transactions under the Project. 
Hence, the responsibilization lies in the ‘ideology’ of ownership underpinned by the 
grants. 
Further, the scope of the beneficiaries amongst the land deprived under the 
Project is delineated by the requirement that those who ‘encroach’ on private land do 
not qualify to benefit from land redistributed for resettlement under the Project. The 
view of the postcolonial State is that dealing with ‘land invaders’ amounts to 
‘rewarding encroachers’ and exacerbates ‘encroachment’ on private land.84 In this 
respect, the postcolonial State has taken a laissez faire approach and has desisted from 
using its statutory powers under the Lands Acquisition Act.
85
 According to the 
postcolonial State, this approach ensures that the Project is ‘assimilative’ and less 
‘confrontational’.86 A key informant states: 
The State adopts a laissez faire approach because historically the State has been weak in 
enforcing lease covenants. Therefore, under the Project, the Minister’s power of compulsory 
acquisition under the Lands Acquisition Act is not used. The application of the Land 
Acquisition Act is not an option under the Project because management [of the Project] feels 
that using the Lands Acquisition Act will aggravate ‘problems’ that are already there in the 
application of the Act; especially the enforcement of the lease covenants. Secondly, the Act is 
not used because the management of the Project does not want to appear ‘confrontational’ to 
the estate owners.
87
 
 
In the final analysis, some commentators have stated that it is less clear as to 
whether the Project is piloting the implementation of the Land Policy or a land 
redistribution model based on the willing seller/willing buyer approach.
88
 In my view, 
the Project does constitute an implementation of the Land Policy since both 
frameworks have the same principles; particularly, the land redistribution model 
based on the willing seller/willing buyer approach. Further, the Project represents a 
subtle shift in the manner of hegemonic responsibilization. The processes under the 
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colonial State and the Banda Administration fostered the responsibilization of a 
labourer. Under the Project, the responsibilization is that of an inchoate producer who, 
given the concerns of sustainability raised in Chapter 3, is vulnerable to the 
vicissitudes of the land market in his or her new capacity as a post–distribution land 
owner. In this sense, the responsibilization is based on the device of a contract. Third, 
the intervention of the Malawi Law Commission and its recommendations as 
discussed in Chapter 5 are incipiently being overtaken by the postcolonial State’s 
initiative under the Project. While the Law Commission’s intervention is meant to 
translate the Land Policy into law,
89
 as a scheme under a range of multiform tactics, 
the Project has received support from the ‘North’ most notably, through the World 
Bank, which has in turn re–aligned the purported resolution of the land question under 
the guise of kudzigulira malo.
90
 
3 The Achikumbe and the Land Deprived 
 The relationship between the Achikumbe and the land deprived reveals the 
tensions in land reform discourse relating to the appropriate model and approach for a 
reform in a particular country. In the context of Malawi, I examine the relationship of 
the Achikumbe in the tea estate sector in southern Malawi with the land deprived in 
the periphery of the estates. The relationship demonstrates that there is tension 
between the Achikumbe and the land deprived which has revolved around calls from 
the Achikumbe for land reform that does not supposedly jeopardize the postcolonial 
State’s agricultural productivity based on large estates on the one hand, and the 
agitation from the land deprived for land reform that addresses landlessness as a 
historically constructed ‘wrong’. In the constant posturing that emerges, the 
Achikumbe rely on the efficiency argument and the land deprived base their position 
on history, context and culture. 
 The Achikumbe in the tea estate sector in southern Malawi have embarked on 
a number of community–targeted initiatives that are aimed at dissuading the growing 
‘dissent’ that simmer beneath their relationship with the land deprived living in the 
periphery of the estates. The dissent arises out of lack of access to available arable 
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land for their dignified livelihood. The Achikumbe’s community–targeted initiatives 
have included the promotion of smallholder tea growers’ cooperatives, provision of 
technical assistance in crop husbandry, and the provision of social infrastructure and 
related programmes. 
 The Achikumbe have promoted the formation of cooperatives as a way of 
‘formalizing’ their relationship with the land deprived. It is a symbiotic relationship 
that serves to guarantee a labour force for the Achikumbe and provide a livelihood for 
erstwhile land deprived without necessarily subverting the status quo of existing land 
relations. This is the case because the cooperatives will receive support from the 
Achikumbe on the condition that the cooperatives grow tea which will be sold to the 
Achikumbe. The sale of the tea harvest is to occur in a ‘participatory’ setting where 
the price is reached by the ‘consensus’ of the Achikumbe and land deprived under a 
particular cooperative.  
 The Achikumbe’s core agenda in the formation of cooperatives is to curb the 
high labour turnover in their sector.
91
 This transforms the land deprived from mere 
labourers into inchoate producers under a nascent sharecropping scheme. A key 
informant, a manager at an estate states: 
[We] have encouraged [villagers] to form an association. The association shall operate as a 
farmers’ cooperative. The long–term strategy is that these associations must be self–sustaining 
through, for example, ownership of a factory. The community initiative is industry–wide; all tea 
estates are involved. The high population density in the area means that it is possible to have 
labour from the local community as well as keep the association going. At the moment, there is 
high labour turnover.
92
 
 
The rationale here is that under cooperatives, the land deprived will be more settled 
and to the extent that they are earning an income under a quasi–oligopostic market 
arrangement, it diffuses calls for land redistribution.
93
  
 The provision of the technical expertise in crop husbandry is a technique to 
ensure the longevity of the cooperatives. In this respect, the initiative by the 
Achikumbe in the tea estate sector is yet another example of a process of normation. 
The Achikumbe provide the green leaf from their nurseries and other farm inputs to 
the land deprived under the cooperatives. This gesture is to ensure that the 
cooperatives produce a leaf that is ‘suitable’ for an international market.94 In sum, the 
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cooperatives scheme entrenches the roles of the Achikumbe as the land 
owner/producer and the land deprived as the labourer/tenant worker and an inchoate 
producer that fit a ‘norm’ of production based on market as value. 
 Further, the Achikumbe provide social infrastructure to the land deprived in the 
form of school blocks, boreholes for clean and safe water supply, support of HIV and 
AIDS programmes where the Achikumbe assist with the public awareness of the 
pandemic through civic education, and the provision of anti–retroviral drugs for those 
who are HIV positive and AIDS sufferers.  
 Finally, the change towards greater community involvement on the part of the 
Achikumbe has been a recent development.
95
 It is not mere coincidence that the 
change in approach that has led to the Achikumbe investing more in social capital 
emerges in the context of greater agitation for access to arable land under the land 
reform underway in the postcolonial State. The Achikumbe’s supposedly 
contextualized social ‘responsibility’ is a manifestation of responsibilization.96 The 
difference here is that the technique in place has gone beyond the ‘construction’ of the 
individual as a wage labourer. The technique permeates the individual’s very 
livelihood; in the Foucauldian sense, the approach is constitutive of ‘biopower’ – ‘the 
power over life’. A key informant from the Achikumbe (a manager–owner at an 
estate) states: 
The market guarantees better social welfare. Better income through provision of labour means 
that the communities can afford a dignified livelihood. We consider them our partners in 
progress. The Tea Exporters Association of Malawi [a grouping of tea estate owners] never 
integrated community initiatives. A change in approach has led to greater community projects’ 
involvement. We now have HIV/AIDS programmes. We are involved in the construction of 
school blocks; provision of boreholes. We think investment in the communities is a good 
thing. We have encouraged the communities around our [estate] to form cooperatives. The 
long term strategy is to empower the cooperatives to have their own factory. We think the 
future of the sector requires greater support of the government in the smallholder sector.
97 
In the process, there is a slight re–focus; from the issue of access to available arable 
land to contentment with a healthy, well–looked after labourer. The commonality in 
the processes governing the relationship of the Achikumbe and the land deprived is 
that they all seek to promote a greater, consensual biopower relationship. A recent 
statement by a wage labourer at Chitakale Tea Estate sums up the point: 
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Since Mulli Brothers Group bought this estate, it is no secret that we are the highest paid 
estate workers.
98
 
 
The labourer goes on to state that he has worked with the estate when it was both 
under white and State ownership and he observed that no one envisaged that ‘working 
life’ at the estate would be as ‘sweet’ under the ‘new’ terms of conditions of service. 
The labourer further quipped that he and his family now lived in a ‘company house’.99 
4 The Intra–‘Community’ Dynamics 
The focus on the intra–‘community’ dynamics seeks to illustrate that it is 
erroneous to portray the interests of the land deprived and their social setting – the 
‘community’ – with a high degree of consensus. The discussion looks at the role of 
chiefs, as a key political institution of the ‘community’, and its implications for the 
resolution of the land question in the country. The complication that emerges among 
the land deprived themselves is also considered. This complication relates to the tense 
interface between those among the land deprived that have benefited under some 
restorative postcolonial State programme and those that are yet to benefit under any 
programme. The distinction is made between the so–called eni malo – who often are 
the non–beneficiaries – and the so–called obwera – who often are the beneficiaries 
under a restorative programme. 
The Role of Chiefs 
 The discussion of the role of chiefs in the postcolonial State is pertinent 
because the on–going land reform has been encrypted in a variegated ‘customary’ 
context. In one shade, chiefs in the postcolonial State have resisted the reform 
because, as they deem it, it endeavours to erode their power as custodians of land at 
custom.
100
 At another level, the postcolonial State advocates the involvement of chiefs 
in land administration. The chiefs’ position assumes an innate comprehension of their 
power relationship in relation to land. The postcolonial State assumes an allocative 
role of the chiefs where the power relationship in relation to land is a conferment and 
not a natural entitlement. 
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 The position of chiefs becomes challenging when one seeks to establish the 
source of their authority and their legitimacy.
101
 Under colonial and postcolonial State 
power respectively, the chief has been the subject of strategic deployment within the 
State apparatus. The colonial State often tolerated subservient incumbents to inculcate 
domination. Deviant chiefs could be suspended or outright banished. The practice has 
been perpetuated under the postcolonial State and is often buttressed by law.
 102
  
While it is acknowledged that a majority of chiefs assumed their incumbency through 
lineage,
103
 it remains to be resolved the extent to which the status of chiefs that is 
derived from colonial or postcolonial State construction can claim custody over land 
on the basis of ‘custom’.104 
 The call by the chiefs in Malawi that they are the custodians of land at 
‘custom’ and that the land reform must not erode their custodianship only seeks to 
reinforce the relevance of their institution as a unit of patronage.
105
 Building on the 
related arguments in Chapter 4, this is the case for two reasons: chiefs fulfilled a 
strategic role under colonialism which was precisely to guarantee colonial 
domination. The institution was a social construction that sustained a particular power 
relationship.
106
 The nature of the social construction and its role has been perpetuated 
under postcolonial Malawi.
107
 The social construction is concretized by the fact that 
the resource base of chiefs is ill–provided for or non–existent.108 In this respect, chiefs 
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rely heavily on the postcolonial State machinery for their survival and in the process 
render themselves pliable to the whims of the State’s patronage. 
The second reason why chiefs are a unit of patronage directly relates to the 
land question in the country. Peters and Kambewa have observed that while the Land 
Policy has reposed considerable trust in chiefs, their legitimacy is suspect since chiefs 
have been at the centre of land alienation through sales to the Achikumbe. In this 
respect, the suggestion that chiefs advance the interests of their ‘subjects’ – who 
partly include the land deprived in the ‘community’ – is tenuous.109 
In light of the foregoing, the call of chiefs as custodians of land at custom 
merely serves to perpetuate their relevance as a unit of patronage in their relationship 
with the postcolonial State. Further, the call also serves to inculcate the power 
relationship between them and the land deprived; a relationship that is invariably in 
favour of the chiefs. 
Eni Malo and Obwera: The ‘Internecine’ Conflict of the Land Deprived 
The discussion here primarily stems from the events in the wake of the 
redistribution of Makandi Estate in Thyolo, southern Malawi, and the preliminary 
findings from the resettled communities under the Community Based Rural Land 
Development Project.
110
 The Makandi Estate was established in the 1920s and was 
owned by Lonrho Agribusiness Limited. The area of the Estate is part of the land that 
was part of the land expropriation by white missionaries and entrepreneurs in southern 
Malawi just prior to the declaration of British colonialism.
111
 The black population 
that worked on the Estate comprised Anguru migrants from Mozambique. A key 
informant confirmed the point: 
The chieftaincy [...] was established in 1930 when our forefathers migrated to the area from 
Mozambique. The Estate found us. Previously, the Estate used to cultivate cotton, tea, coffee 
and beans. Things changed. Recently they were just growing tea and coffee. Villagers used to 
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work on the Estate until the Government bought the Estate and redistributed the land to 
obwera.
112
 
In 2002, the postcolonial State purchased the estate from Lonrho Agribusiness 
Limited for redistribution to the land deprived living in its periphery. In total, 1,400 
hectares were to be distributed to 498 beneficiaries; an average of 2.8 hectares per 
beneficiary.  
In the run up to the redistribution of the land under the Makandi Estate, the 
postcolonial State urged the land deprived in the periphery of the estate to identify 
those households that were in dire need of land for their dignified livelihood.
113
 The 
redistribution exercise immediately degenerated into conflict between the land 
deprived in the periphery of the estate – the so–called eni malo114 – and the land 
deprived from elsewhere that benefited under the exercise – the so–called obwera. 
The conflict arises because out of a population of approximately 2,000 of the 
community in the periphery of the estate only twenty people benefited from the 
redistribution.; representing a paltry 1 per cent of the ‘targeted’ community of the land 
deprived in the periphery of the estate.
115
 
In the wake of the redistribution, violence and general acrimony ensued where 
eni malo invaded the redistributed pieces of land and vandalized property belonging 
to obwera. Eni malo felt cheated under the land redistribution exercise as they could 
not conceive any discernible difference between their statuses as a land deprived 
constituency from that of obwera. The ‘ring leaders’ of the land occupation were 
arrested, charged with encroachment contrary to section 36 of the Land Act, 
prosecuted and convicted. They were sentenced to pay a fine of 5,000 Malawi 
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Kwacha or, in default, nine months imprisonment. One of the defendants served the 
term of imprisonment; the rest paid the fine.
 116
  One of the defendants states: 
We did not elect leaders. There was fluid ‘leadership’ based on one’s ‘bravery’ and the 
willingness to ‘occupy’ Makandi. A formal committee would have been counter–productive 
as the police would have just targeted the leaders. We occupied the Estate for a week. The 
police came to forcibly remove us; those of us who resisted were arrested. We were initially 
held at Luchenza Police Station. Our fellow villagers threatened violence to ‘rescue’ those of 
us who had been arrested. We were then moved to Thyolo Police Station; then to Thyolo 
Prison. The villagers petitioned our Member of Parliament, the Minister of Lands and the 
Ombudsman to secure our release. Delegations from the village were sponsored by donations 
from within the village. Five of us were tried at the magistrate’s court in Limbe. The arrests 
were meant to ‘intimidate’ us.  The rest of the villagers were afraid to ‘occupy’ Makandi after 
our arrest.
117
 
The relationship between eni malo and obwera is less than cordial for two 
primary reasons: The existing power structure among eni malo feels undermined as 
obwera created their own power structure and does not recognise the authority and 
legitimacy of the structure of eni malo. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, the Estate 
provided a source of livelihood to eni malo in the form of wage labour. The sale and 
subsequent redistribution of the land comprising the Estate has meant a loss of 
livelihood on the part of eni malo.
118
  
Further, the conflicts between eni malo and obwera under the Makandi 
scenario have been replicated in the receiving districts under the Project.
119
 First, the 
‘socio–cultural integration’ of obwera – from a predominantly Christian background – 
into the community in the receiving districts – which is predominantly Moslem – has 
had its problems.
120
 The problems have had their toll on the lifestyle of obwera.
121
 A 
key informant states: 
There is less cooperation in Mangochi [a receiving district under the Project] because 
Muluzi campaigned there saying the obwera from Thyolo [a sending district under the 
Project] are bent on destroying UDF [an opposition political party] in favour of Mutharika 
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and DPP [a ruling political party]. Our attempts to negotiate with the people of Mangochi 
have always failed at the ‘last minute’ all the time because of the politics.122 
There have been ‘myths’ perpetrated by the chiefs in the receiving districts that 
obwera are vampires and Satanists.
123
 The chiefs propagate the ‘myths’ as they 
perceive their authority is under threat since obwera resettle in the receiving districts 
under trusts.
124
 Finally, the friction between obwera and eni malo is aggravated by the 
dynamics of neopatrimonial nature of the postcolonial State as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Party politics in the postcolonial State is ethnic–based and the receiving districts are 
considered the stronghold of one of the opposition parties while the sending districts 
are considered the stronghold of the party in power.
125
 Hence an influx of obwera in 
the receiving districts undermines the opposition’s political power base.126   
The interests among the constituency of the land deprived are nuanced and 
marked by dissensus. Eni malo agitate for a superior claim to land under the 
postcolonial State’s land redistribution programme on the basis of history, context and 
culture. To the extent that the alleged basis is tenuous, it amounts to a strategic 
manoeuvre on the part of eni malo to access a scarce resource; namely, land. 
II PRESERVATORY CALCULATED CONFORMITY 
The notion of preservatory calculated conformity is the converse of predatory 
calculated conformity. Preservatory calculated conformity refers to the conformity 
that is a ‘coping mechanism’ used by the ‘dominated’ to ensure that any disadvantage 
is minimized as far as possible within the reality of their social setting. Under the on–
going land reform, the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the 
Achikumbe, and the land deprived, in various ways, ameliorate the effect of the 
capture and overbearance at the various levels of the various relationships. This 
process of amelioration is reflected in the relationship between the Bretton Woods 
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Institutions and the postcolonial State; the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe; the 
Achikumbe and the land deprived; and in the intra–‘community’ dynamics of the land 
deprived. At the macro level, the nature of the preservatory calculated conformity is 
shown through an analysis of the relationship of the postcolonial State and the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. At the micro level, it is shown through the relationships at four 
tiers: the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe, the Achikumbe and the land deprived, 
and the intra–‘community’ dynamics with a focus on the chiefs and their relationship 
with the ‘community’. 
A The Macro Level Analysis of Preservatory Calculated Conformity 
The nature of the development and implementation of the macroeconomic 
framework creates a picture that portrays the agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
as robust and sacrosanct. How can the discussion then begin to suggest that even in 
this seemingly fortified context, the postcolonial State minimizes any disadvantage to 
itself? The discussion seeks to demonstrate the postcolonial State’s strategy for 
preservatory calculated conformity through the land law reform initiative that has 
followed the Land Policy. The initiative of the postcolonial State here has involved 
the Malawi Law Commission and the Executive. The focus is on circumstances 
surrounding the (non–)enactment of the Land (Amendment) Bill, 2006.  
Part of the discussion in Chapter 5 covered the role of the Law Commission in 
translating the Land Policy into law. In that discussion, it was concluded that the 
Commission’s work buttresses market–based land reform models. For the purposes 
here, it must also be pointed out that the involvement of the Law Commission arose 
following pressure from the postcolonial State’s development partners who demanded 
that the translation of the Land Policy into law shall adhere to the Constitution 
particularly the obligation placed on the postcolonial State and all natural and legal 
persons to respect existing property rights.
127
  
The property clauses of the Constitution have been discussed in Chapter 4. 
The requirement (to respect existing property rights) highlights the liberal nature of 
the property clauses of the Constitution based as they are on abstraction and 
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decontextualization. It was pointed out in Chapter 5 that the Law Commission 
finalized its work in March, 2006. To date, the Report of the Law Commission has 
been presented to neither Cabinet nor Parliament as required by law. This means that 
the Report is technically a draft one. This state of affairs casts doubt on the 
commitment of the postcolonial State to finalize the land reform; at least from a legal 
formalization perspective.  
The developments around a Government Bill – the Land (Amendment) Bill, 
2006
128
 – need stressing: Under the Constitution, the Executive is responsible for 
initiating policies and legislation and implementing ‘all laws which embody the 
express wishes of the people of Malawi and which promote the principles of [the] 
Constitution.’129 Further to the public trust and the social trust under section 12 of the 
Constitution, the postcolonial State in general is required to ‘actively promote the 
welfare and development of the people of Malawi by progressively adopting and 
implementing policies and legislation’ to achieve specified goals which include the 
improvement of the quality of rural life.
130
  
In 2006, the Executive developed the Land (Amendment) Bill for presentation 
and possible enactment by the Legislature. While the Bill was introduced in the 
Legislature, it was not debated and was subsequently cancelled.
131
 The sequence of 
events at the material time is that upon presentation of the Bill in the Legislature, 
Malawi qualified for the HIPC Initiative. Rob Jenkins and Maxton Tsoka point out 
that the presentation of a new land bill to the Legislature was one of the 
conditionalities for Malawi achieving the completion point under the HIPC 
Initiative.
132
  
Notwithstanding the cancellation of the Bill, it must be noted that the 
Memorandum accompanying the Land (Amendment) Bill states in part that new land 
laws developed by the Commission are ready and are meant to address problems 
created under the existing land law regime. It is suggested here that the objective of 
the postcolonial State in developing the Land (Amendment) Bill, 2006 was to meet 
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the qualification criteria for the HIPC Initiative Completion Point. As that has been 
achieved, it is possible to infer that the postcolonial State is not keen on finalizing the 
legal formalization of the implementation of the Land Policy. This emerges in a 
scenario where the nation–wide scaling up of the Community Based Rural Land 
Development Project remains elusive.
133
 
B The Micro Level Analysis of Preservatory Calculated Conformity 
1 The Postcolonial State and the Achikumbe 
 Under the Project, the postcolonial State has received zero offers for purchase 
of land from the estate sector in the sending districts of Mulanje and Thyolo. What 
have been on the table from the estate sector are technically invitations to treat 
whereby the Achikumbe in the sector outlined conditions under which they were to 
‘offer’ their land to the land deprived. More critically, the Achikumbe demanded that 
the post–land redistribution owners were to continue growing plantation crops, 
particularly tea. Second, the Achikumbe, as previous owners of the land, would have 
the first option to buy the tea.
134
 The conditions are the quid pro quo for any land 
alienation on the part of the Achikumbe. The conditions here are interesting because it 
is evident that the Achikumbe do not want to disturb the global commodity chain by 
the mere fact that they have ceded some of their arable land. The objective in global 
commodity chain analysis is to establish ‘how local, regional and global institutions, 
policies and other factors’ affect each stage in the chain.135 In the agricultural sector, 
this requires the demonstration of the coordination or management of ‘the entire 
upstream commodity chain, from sourcing of raw materials and sub–components to 
delivery of the final product.’136 The convenient end is a particular type of product for 
a ‘niche’ market which demands a pre–configured producer to deliver on the set 
‘standard’ of production. Hence, in the Malawian scenario, the Achikumbe continue to 
hold on to their landholding on the basis of the efficiency argument. The 
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responsibilization here is such that the Achikumbe retain ownership to maintain a 
certain level of production at the local level of the commodity chain rather than 
relinquish ownership to a perceived inefficient producer – the land deprived – who 
may negatively affect the chain. 
 In the case of ‘offers’ from the Achikumbe in the receiving districts under the 
Project, it has been observed that land is unavailable for redistribution because the 
Achikumbe have held out for a very high price or that in relation to one estate, the 
owner(s) could not agree on the appropriate sale price.
137
 In cases where a sale has 
been finalized, the quality of the land has been very poor for viable agricultural 
productivity.
138
 The observation on poor quality land is not peculiar to Malawi. Moyo 
and Yeros make a similar observation in respect of land reform in Zimbabwe.
139
 
Further, the national political shenanigans between the political party in power and 
the opposition have resulted in less and less ‘offers’ from the Achikumbe in the 
receiving districts under the Project; the receiving districts being an opposition 
political power base.
140
  
2 The Postcolonial State and the Land Deprived 
 There is evidence of counter–conduct by the land deprived both from the 
sending districts and receiving districts under the Project.
141
 In the case of the land 
deprived from the sending districts, the counter–conduct has included not 
participating in the Project; registering as prospective beneficiaries in different names 
to maximize their benefit through the receipt of multiple resettlement grants; 
receiving resettlement grants and not relocating to the sending districts under the 
Project; and returning to the place of origin in the sending district after a brief period 
of relocation to the receiving districts.  
 The counter–conduct by the land deprived raises the issue of legitimacy. The 
land deprived consider that the postcolonial State is ‘forcing’ them to re–locate away 
from their ‘ancestral homes’. The postcolonial State (together with the Achikumbe in 
the sending districts) has not provided arable land to the land deprived. The 
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postcolonial State’s position is that the lack of offers from the Achikumbe in the 
sending districts amounts to a fait accompli and leaves it with no alternative but to re–
locate the land deprived to the receiving districts. Hence while the postcolonial State 
adjudge these acts ‘fraudulent’; the land deprived take their actions as justified, and 
depending on ‘whom one asks’, their acts are legal and legitimate.142 
 The eni malo in the receiving districts have occupied the land given to the 
obwera from the sending districts on the basis that the latter have acquired ‘good 
land’. Even though the eni malo in the receiving districts under the Project are 
technically ‘encroachers’ under the Project, they have had to be assimilated into the 
Project. Often this assimilation has been through their inclusion in the beneficiary 
groups comprising the obwera.
143
 The nature of the harmony between the two groups 
is unclear.
144
 A key informant from the Project management team states: 
In Machinga [a receiving district under the Project] eni malo were very hostile and violent 
towards obwera. They invaded the plots of the obwera. Even though we did not normally 
incorporate ‘encroachers’ under the Project, we had to include the eni malo in Machinga 
because the violence would have jeopardized the Project.
145
 
Notably, the approach taken under the Project to deal with land ‘occupation’ is 
markedly different from the one that was used in dealing with the aftermath of land 
redistribution under the Makandi Estate. The approach under the Project tilts towards 
more reconciliation as opposed to the bullish use of prosecution under the Makandi 
scenario.  
3 The Achikumbe and the Land Deprived 
 In the context of predatory calculated conformity, I suggest that the 
community–targeted initiatives by the Achikumbe seek to maintain a supply of cheap 
wage labour and ultimately sustain the global commodity chain. The nature of 
participation in the initiatives by the land deprived reveals the nature of the 
preservatory calculated conformity on their part. The reception of the community–
targeted initiatives has been at best lukewarm. The land deprived insist on a land 
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reform based on a land restitution model  on the basis of history, context and culture 
which purportedly gives them a superior land claim to the land now in the estate 
sector.
146
 A key informant states: 
We wanted Government to give us the land from the estates because this land is from our 
forefathers. We do not want to leave here. This is our home. All our relations are here.
147
 
And in relation to community–targeted initiatives: 
We just work as labourers to earn some money for our livelihood. We do not grow our own 
tea.
148
 
The following sums up the attitude of the Achikumbe: 
How do we marry economic value and use value? The market guarantees welfare. Better   
income through provision of labour means that the communities can afford a dignified 
livelihood. That way, we will be partners in progress.
149 
4 The Intra–‘Community’ Dynamics 
 The main focus here is to explore the relationship of chiefs and the 
‘community’; invariably the land deprived. Under predatory calculated conformity, it 
has been argued chiefs are a self–interested institution who appropriate ‘culture’, 
‘custom’ or ‘tradition’ to sustain their relevance as a unit of patronage. Indeed there 
are allegations against chiefs from the sending districts under the Project who demand 
cash kickbacks for ‘facilitating’ the relocation of beneficiary groups to the receiving 
districts.
150
 A key informant from the Project states: 
There is one case of corruption involving a beneficiary group that relocated to Machinga [a 
receiving district under the Project]. A chief demanded payment from the members of the 
group for ‘facilitating’ the land resettlement. The Project received a letter dated 7 December, 
2007 from Anti–Corruption Bureau on the alleged corruption. We forwarded the letter to the 
Ministry of Lands.
151 
In the case of the land deprived as a constituency, there are diametrically 
opposed interests of eni malo and obwera that centre on the notion of ‘culture’, 
‘custom’ or ‘tradition’. In the case of the eni malo and obwera, the suggestion of a 
superior claim by the eni malo over the obwera not only manipulates ‘culture’ but 
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also denies the validity of freedom of movement and residence enshrined under the 
Constitution.
152
  
The attitude of eni malo has been thus: 
We resisted going to Mangochi or Machinga [the receiving districts under the Project] because 
our home is here [meaning Thyolo; a sending district under the Project]. May be those people 
from elsewhere should have been moved to Machinga not us because we were born here.
153
 
 
The eni malo are adamant even though the picture of land availability is very grim: 
 
[The] village has got many people and land pressure is acute. There is no land even for a 
toilet.
154
  
 
Hence, these positions based on history, context and culture are counter–conduct in 
the mould of Scott’s Brechtian struggles. 
III THE NATURE OF THE MULTIVERSE 
The relationship among the key constituencies belies a perfect delineation of 
the ‘dominant’ and the ‘dominated’. The relationship reveals a multiverse of parochial 
interests and a multiplicity of conformities.  
The relationship between the postcolonial State and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions demonstrates the following: In the context of predatory calculated 
conformity, the various frameworks in the postcolonial State’s macro economy 
confirm Kelmanian compliance.
155
 The two major macroeconomic frameworks that 
have been developed in the country post–1994 and the Land Policy show compliance 
with the frameworks that have emerged from the Bretton Woods Institutions.
156
 The 
touted country ‘participation’ that enveloped the development of the frameworks at 
the local, Malawian space amounts to legitimation. The processes were heavily 
‘agency–sponsored’ and only reinforced the power of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
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and by extension the country’s development partners.157 The Kelmanian compliance 
underlines the process of normation. 
 From a preservatory calculated conformity perspective, the relationship of the 
postcolonial State and the Bretton Woods Institutions reveals a degree of false 
compliance on the part of the former.
158
 This is the case because the translation of the 
Land Policy into law has largely remained rhetorical. The Law Commission’s 
recommendations technically remain in draft form. The Land (Amendment) Bill, 2006 
was an audacious ploy by the postcolonial State to reach the HIPC Completion Point. 
Hence, the false compliance amounts to the Foucauldian counter–conduct as opposed 
to dissidence. 
The dual identity of the key players in the political hierarchy of the 
postcolonial State and the Achikumbe results in a somewhat ambivalent nature of the 
relationship of the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe. The key players that occupy 
critical roles in the formal State apparatus are from the constituency of the 
Achikumbe. Hence, while the pre–1994 rhetoric on land reform by the advocates of 
multipartyism seemingly favoured land reform based on a land restitution model, once 
they assumed sovereign power, there has been a gradualist approach towards the land 
restitution model. In fact, the rhetoric has since changed in favour of a land 
redistribution model based on willing seller/willing buyer approach. In instances 
where land has been purchased under the Project for redistribution to the land 
deprived, there have been cases where the post–land redistribution process has fallen 
prey to cronyism. The duality of the identity of the key political players in the 
postcolonial State’s apparatus and the Achikumbe has resulted in an ‘impasse’ that 
inculcates lop–sided land relations in disfavour of the land deprived. However, a rider 
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is in order: the relationship of the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe demonstrates 
two things. At one level, it shows the limitations of the postcolonial State to digress 
from market–based land reform models. Second, it also shows the precarious, albeit 
self serving, nature of the relationship of the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe in 
the context of the macro economy of the country. 
 Further, the nature of the relationship between the postcolonial State and the 
land deprived has been marked by legitimation, meaning–making, and elaborate and 
nuanced forms of false compliance. The postcolonial State has legitimized the Project 
under its ChiNyanja description as kudzigulira malo. This amounts to a disingenuous 
way of implementing land reform under the land redistribution model based on a 
willing seller/willing buyer approach. The juridicalization of ‘land occupation’ as the 
crime of ‘encroachment’ delineates the scope of beneficiaries under the Project 
among the land deprived. Those who ‘occupy’ land will not benefit under the Project; 
they are classified as encroachers and criminal in their behaviour. 
 On their part, the land deprived have resorted to elaborate processes of false 
compliance; preservatory calculated conformity. These instances of counter–conduct 
have included households collecting the resettlement grants under the Community 
Based Rural Land Development Project for a new life in the receiving districts when 
in truth they remain rooted in their villages in the sending districts; the ‘culture’ 
argument – where ancestry roots is touted as a factor in seeking resettlement within 
the district of ‘origin’; and patronage – where the chiefs actually select cronies and 
not those truly land deprived to benefit under the Project.
159
  
 The relationship of the Achikumbe and the land deprived pits the efficiency 
argument (for instance) against the ‘egalitarian’ argument in land reform discourse. In 
this respect, the Achikumbe have engaged in social capital initiatives that entrench 
land relations and sustain the global commodity chain. Again, the land deprived 
engage in Kelmanian compliance while simultaneously agitating for land reform 
based on a land restitution model. This is evident from the insistence on a superior 
claim to land based on ancestry. 
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 The relationship of the postcolonial State and the land deprived, and the 
Achikumbe and the land deprived reveal more clearly the hegemonic 
responsibilization that is underway in land reform in the country. The land 
distribution model based on a willing seller/willing buyer approach, in my view, 
entrenches the land question in the country. Under the model, the focus is on 
production. The efficiency argument prevails. In this way, historical land owners are 
maintained as producers while the land deprived are responsibilized as labourers and 
inchoate producers under contractual devices such as the Community Based Rural 
Land Development Project. 
Finally, the intra–‘community’ dynamics among the land deprived leading to 
the eni malo and obwera divide shows that history, context and ‘culture’ have become 
the vessel of patronage. Chiefs are not neutral and devoid of self interest. The 
insistence on history, context and ‘culture’ reinforces, as it has been argued in 
Chapters 2 and 4, the requirement for a new comprehension of the ‘customary’ space 
in land reform. 
In general terms, the nature of the multiverse is such that at the macro level 
(both in the context of predatory or preservatory calculated conformity), the market 
has become the ‘totem’. In any event, market as value underpins development 
discourse. At the micro level (again both in the context of predatory or preservatory 
calculated conformity), history, context and ‘culture’ have an instrumental dimension 
that serves two purposes: they inculcate the relevance of chiefs in agrarian politics. 
Second, they buttress the argument of the land deprived in their preference for a land 
restitution model.  
IV FINAL WORD 
 The picture that emerges at this point is as follows: The multiverse of the 
parochial interests of the key constituencies is difficult to reconcile and triangulate. 
This difficulty poses enormous challenges for the resolution of the land question in 
the country. The land question at this juncture is such that almost 80 per cent of the 
human population of Malawi eke a living from less than 0.5 hectares per household 
out of the estimated 5.3 million hectares of available arable land. This represents 
10.48 million people living off less than 0.5 hectares. 
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At the heart of the multiverse at the macro level are the competing interests of 
the efficiency versus the ‘egalitarian’ argument in land reform discourse. On the other 
hand, at the micro level, the nuances revolve around de–abstraction – in the case of 
the postcolonial State and the Achikumbe, and the Achikumbe and the land deprived.  
Further, at this level there is also the ‘capture’ of ‘culture’ where history and context 
are manipulated by chiefs against their ‘subjects’, and in the relationship between eni 
malo and obwera – where eni malo claim superior legitimacy over the obwera.  
All in all, the responses to the land question have merely served as the 
technologies of normalization. The land question in the country remains intact. In 
Chapter 7, the focus will be on proposals for the resolution of the land question. It is 
suggested that resolution of the land question requires a more holistic approach in 
ways that advocate a more egalitarian land distribution in recognition of land as a 
means of production; and the integration of other non–agricultural economic bases for 
sources of dignified living of the land deprived. In Chapter 7, the discussion focuses 
on the four pillars of people–generated responsibilization. The pillars set the 
parameters of a responsibilized State in the quest to resolve the land question.  
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Chapter 7 
 
People–Generated Responsibilization: Towards a Responsibilized State 
 
First, a recapitulation: the conception of hegemonic responsibilization under 
the thesis is that it is ‘State’–generated; that it is top–down; that it engages in the 
construction and re–construction – the responsibilization – of the individual as an 
‘entrepreneur’; that the individual must be atomistic; that the individual fits into a 
particular role in the grand scheme of a political economy. In the context of the land 
question in Malawi, the discussion has so far sought to demonstrate that the nature of 
hegemonic responsibilization has not focused on the market for its own sake. It has 
not merely focussed on the buying and selling. It has focused on production. In this 
regard, the Foucauldian phenomenon of scarcity underpins economic policy on the 
basis of the abundance of ‘produce’ and cheap labour in order to maximize dividends 
from exports.  
  Chapter 6 demonstrates that there is a multiverse of parochial interests and a 
multiplicity of conformities. In general terms, it has been concluded that under a 
framework of hegemonic responsibilization, the Foucauldian phenomenon of scarcity 
continues to sustain a breed of the producer and another of the labourer. It was also 
observed in the Chapter that under the terms of reference of the Community Based 
Rural Land Development Project, occupiers of land (referred to as encroachers) would 
not be beneficiaries. In effect, the postcolonial State would not be rewarding criminal 
behaviour. However, the eni malo in the receiving districts under the Project have 
been assimilated under the Project after they had occupied land given to the obwera. 
This transition to assimilation will be used to illustrate the nature of people 
sovereignty that underpins people–generated responsibilization.  
Counter–conduct has a bearing on the nature of people–generated 
responsibilization. It is admitted that in Malawi counter–conduct through land 
occupation in struggles involving the land question has not happened at the same 
scale as, for example, in other land struggles in Brazil, Mexico or the Philippines.
1
 
Counter–conduct in Malawi has been, as Scott would put it, largely Brechtian and has 
involved ‘every day weapons’ that are largely summed up here as false compliance. In 
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any event, Scott has argued that often, open defiance to ‘authority’ is suicidal. 
However, the transition to assimilation into a State response to a land question that 
has been forced through land occupation in the receiving districts under the Project is 
a ‘small’ but significant development for analytical purposes.  
In this Chapter, I make the case for a responsibilized State under people–
generated responsibilization as a strategy for the resolution of the land question in 
Malawi. It has been noted in the Introduction and Chapter 1 that people–generated 
responsibilization is based on people sovereignty; that to the extent that people–
generated responsibilization may be described in terms of constituent power, it has 
constitutional basis under section 12 of the Constitution; and that the public trust and 
the social trust under section 12 of the Constitution are its embodiment. In this 
framework, people–generated responsibilization is complementary to the conception 
of the right to property as a social relation. Recall that in Chapter 2 the conception of 
the right to property as a social relation seeks to de–bunk the universality of the 
liberal basis of a ‘right’ let alone a right to property. The right to property as a social 
relation brings out the social construction underway in a society in the delineation of 
the relationship of a person to a dephysicalized ‘thing’. 
People–generated responsibilization is an intervention based on de–
abstraction. The proposal for a responsibilized State seeks to emphasize that the terms 
of ‘governing’ that a ‘governor’ may exercise in a polity are set by the people 
themselves as a sovereign. The submission for people–generated responsibilization 
leading to the emergence of a responsibilized State has four key pillars: The first is 
gnosis and the ‘drama of citizenship’.2 The second is the constitutional basis of the 
responsibilization under the public trust and the social trust. The gnosis and the public 
trust and social trust form the core of people–generated responsibilization. This core 
is complemented by two other pillars. The third pillar entails a reconfiguration of the 
land reform based on the beneficial interest in land. The beneficial interest in land 
builds on possession as a root of property. Under the fourth pillar, I argue that a land 
reform that meaningfully confronts the land question in the country must locate law in 
the political economy.  
                                                 
2
 See J Holston & A Appadurai ‘Cities and Citizenship’ in J Holston (ed.) Cities and Citizenship 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1999) 1–20 cited in F Miraftab & S Wills 
‘Insurgency and Spaces of Active Citizenship: The Story of Western Cape Anti–eviction Campaign in 
South Africa’ (2005) 25 Journal of Planning Education and Research 200. 
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Gnosis is the cognitive foundation of counter–conduct. The idea of the public 
trust and the social trust is based on a Negrian interpretation of constituent power. 
Under the third pillar it is important to point out that at the normative level, law is 
subjective. Hence its application in land reform is not always inclusive, democratic 
and fair. Land reform in Malawi has proceeded on the back of hegemonic 
responsibilization where a particular conception of the ‘customary’ space has been 
critical in advancing the dominance of market–based land reform models. The 
beneficial interest in land is a proposition for the re–configuration of the norms of 
land reform. This reconfiguration has a political economy justification. Finally, the 
location of law in the political economy provides an opportunity for a more holistic 
triangulation of the various agrarian policy interventions and helps ascertain the 
precise role for law in the resolution of the land question in Malawi.  
In sum, the responsibilized State under people–generated responsibilization 
entails that the land question in Malawi can be resolved through a holistic, bottom–up 
approach to law, policy and the political economy. This approach recognizes that law 
is only a constitutive component of governing. Law need not be the panacea to the 
land question. Section I outlines the idea of gnosis and the drama of citizenship. 
Section II covers the public trust and the social trust under the Constitution. Section 
III propounds the beneficial interest in land. In section IV, the discussion focuses on 
law in the political economy. 
I GNOSIS AND THE DRAMA OF CITIZENSHIP 
 In Chapter 1, it has been asserted that the idea of gnosis derives from VY 
Mudimbe’s conception of African knowledge. Mudimbe argues in The Invention of 
Africa that the etymological roots of gnosis suggests that it means seeking to know, 
inquiry, methods of knowing, investigation, and even acquaintance with someone. He 
asserts that it has a sociohistorical origin; that it has an epistemological context; and 
that it allows the notion of conditions of possibility to flourish.
3
 I reiterate that gnosis 
is the cognitive basis of counter–conduct because it need not be institutionally 
located; it is innate to the human as a social being. Hence, as a repository of 
constituent power, the people as a sovereign, are the primordial arbiter of ‘knowing’; 
who can govern, what is to govern, or what or who is governed; and the methods of 
                                                 
3
 See VY Mudimbe, Introduction, note 32, ix–xii.  
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the knowing to govern. The aspiration here in the invocation of Mudimbe’s gnosis is 
to argue for ‘possibility’; for a change of mindset. 
 Manthia Diawara has reconciled Mudimbe and Foucault in the context of 
discourse.
4
 He has argued that Foucault’s ‘archaeological approach’ is ‘doubly 
enabling’ because it has made it possible to ‘think against the grain’ and it has made 
‘proposals of alternative discursive formations.’5  In relation to Mudimbe, Diawara 
further observes: 
Mudimbe uses Foucault’s method to unmask and unmake the Western ratio that dominates the 
human sciences and, under the guise of universalism, duplicates Western man in Africa. On 
the other hand, Mudimbe creates a postcolonial and postimperialist discourse that posits a new 
regime of truth and a new social appropriation of speech, thereby raising the question of 
individual subjugation in postcolonial discourse.
6
 
 
Diawara goes on to argue that both Foucault and Mudimbe de–bunk discourse by 
recognizing its three key ‘rules’. First, it sets external rules. Diawara states: 
These [rules] include the construction of forbidden speech that bans certain words from 
certain statements; the designation of madness that opposes reason to insanity; and a regime of 
truth that determines the desire to know and practices a principle of discrimination[.]
7
 
 
Second, discourse creates an ‘internal system’. Here Diawara argues: 
  
This internal system is aimed at classifying, ordering, and distributing discursive materials so 
as to prevent the emergence of the contingent, of the Other in all its nakedness. This internal 
system of discursive subjugation involves the concept of authorship, which serves to rarify the 
quantity of statements that can be made; the construction of the organization of disciplines as 
a delimiting force; and a notion of commentary that organizes discursive statements according 
to temporal and spatial hierarchies.
8
 
 
Finally, discourse, according to Foucault and Mudimbe, ‘gridlocks’ the rules of 
‘entry’. Again, Diawara states: 
[I]t posit[s] the conditions of possibility for putting discourse into play through the 
subjugation to rules of the individuals involved in discursive deployment. The object, 
however, is neither to neutralize the return of that which was repressed nor to conjure out the 
risk of it appearing in discursive practices, but to make sure that ‘no one will enter the 
discursive space unless certain prerequisites are satisfied and one is qualified to do so.’9  
  
These observations may be transposed to a governmentality context in so far as 
‘conduct’ or ‘rule–making’ under discourse is concerned with the ‘irruption’ of 
                                                 
4
 See M Diawara ‘Reading Africa Through Foucault: V. Y. Mudimbe’s Reaffirmation of the Subject’ 
(1990) 55 October 79. 
5
 See M Diawara, note 4, 80. 
6
 See M Diawara, above. 
7
 See M Diawara, note 4, 80. 
8
 See M Diawara, above. 
9
 See M Diawara, note 4, 80 [internal citation omitted]. 
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‘discontinuity’ or ‘disorder’.10 Indeed, in the context of Foucauldian counter–conduct, 
Graham Burchell has noted that it may be ‘ascetic’; that is, the self rejects prescription 
on the self; it may be ‘collective’ or ‘communal’, where it involves a communal 
opposition to ‘doctrine; or it may be ‘mystic’, where it points to possibility of a 
different ‘truth’ system.11 
 Against this setting, it is argued that the counter–conduct of the land deprived 
that has been highlighted in Chapter 6 has nuanced and intertwined economic, 
political and social undertones. It has been observed that while the counter–conduct of 
the land deprived has been varied, the focus here is on the land occupation that has led 
to the transition of assimilation into the postcolonial State programme of land 
redistribution under the willing seller/willing buyer approach which is being 
implemented under the Community Based Rural Land Development Project. The 
occupation demonstrated a ‘knowing’ that land is important for a dignified living. The 
unwillingness to relocate reveals a calculative conception of ‘culture’ where it is used 
to justify non–compliance with the State’s programme. Third, since the land deprived 
are the ‘ultra poor’, in the absence of viable alternatives that promise dignified living 
away from the land as a resource, the gnosis of their counter–conduct is that the 
‘good’ land given to the obwera is crucial to their dignified living. As the events after 
the Makandi land redistribution exercise have shown, mere illegalization of their 
counter–conduct as ‘encroachment’ does not resolve the underlying problem of access 
to available to arable that epitomizes the land question. It merely displaces the 
problem; in this case, access to arable land. 
 However, gnosis can flourish in an environment akin to what has been 
described as the drama of citizenship.
12
 The drama of citizenship is ‘active’, 
‘engaged’ and ‘grounded in civil society’.13 It is concerned with a gamut of issues 
about civil, political, social and economic rights.
14
 It is also decidedly ‘non–
formalized’ and permeates ‘the high courts of justice’, ‘the ministerial corridors of 
government institutions’, ‘the streets of the city’, ‘the squatter camps of hope and 
despair’, and ‘the everyday life spaces of [the] [excluded]’.15 The drama of citizenship 
                                                 
10
 See M Diawara, note 4, 81. 
11
 See G Burchell, Chapter 1, note 80. 
12
 See J Holston & A Appadurai, note 2. 
13
 See F Miraftab & S Wills, note 2, 201. 
14
 See F Miraftab & S Wills, above. 
15
 See F Miraftab & S Wills, note 2, 201–202.  
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is the opposite of ‘statist citizenship’ where the citizen defers the legitimacy of State 
and ‘juridical’ government to the ‘governors’.16  
It is duly noted that land struggles in Malawi are not at the same scale as, for 
example, those in Brazil, Mexico or the Philippines. This should not suggest the 
absence of dramatic struggles against social injustice in the country. There have been 
protests against exploitative land relations under the thangata system;
17
 protests 
against colonial rule;
18
 and in the early 1990s, there were protests against the 
dictatorial rule of the Banda Administration which led to the adoption of multiparty 
politics in 1993.
19
 It is suggested that these protests were galvanized by a coterie of 
predominantly Missionary–educated African males during the colonial period; and an 
urban–based, elite–led alliance of businessmen and intellectuals during the Banda 
Administration. Both struggles incorporated the land deprived.
20
 In Chapter 4, it was 
pointed out that despite the rhetoric of the pre–June, 1993 referendum for land reform 
based on a land restitution model, this call has gradually dissipated under the Muluzi 
and Mutharika Administrations.  Historically, the land question in the country has 
been an appendage of a broader political agenda. Once the political transfer of power 
to an emergent ruling class has been achieved, the land question has been pushed to 
the margins. The focus on the land question alone (which is critical to the land 
deprived) does not coalesce with the political aims of the ‘ruling class’ that include 
the Achikumbe.  
It may be asserted that land occupation in Malawi has been sporadic and has 
occurred under what may be termed inchoate rural movements.
21
 However, as the 
discussion in Chapter 4 demonstrates, it is useful for analysis to focus on the 
Brechtian struggles of the land deprived. Besides the complication that arises from 
looking at the land deprived as a unified entity, Chapter 4 has shown that there are a 
number of nuanced devices that the land deprived deploy in advancing their interests. 
This counter–conduct of the land deprived in the country suggests the emergence of 
                                                 
16
 See F Miraftab & S Wills, note 2. 
17
 See JAK Kandawire ‘Thangata in Pre–Colonial and Colonial Systems of Land Tenure in Southern 
Malawi with Special Reference to Chingale’ (1977) 47(2) Africa: Journal of the International African 
Institute 185. 
18
 See for example RK Tangri ‘The Rise of Nationalism in Colonial Africa: The Case of Colonial 
Malawi’ (1968) 10 (2) Comparative Studies in Society and History 142. 
19
 See for example KM Phiri & K Ross (eds.), Chapter 4, note 61; and FE Kanyongolo, Introduction, 
note 11, 121. 
20
 See RK Tangri, note 18; and FE Kanyongolo, Chapter 4, 120. 
21
 See FE Kanyongolo, note 19. In any event, it must be noted that ‘docility’ is a feature of Foucauldian 
biopower under a framework of governmentality: See M Foucault, Chapter 1, note 56. 
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gnosis that has engendered a ‘critical mind’ amongst the ‘governed’. In turn, the 
transition to assimilation under the Project presents a ‘possibility’ in re–negotiating 
the resolution of the land question in the country. The counter–conduct is critical 
because due to the largely rural nature of the land question, mainstream civil society 
groups and the ruling elite tends to acquiesce in maintaining the status quo of the land 
question.
22
 Manji, in the context of Tanzania and Uganda, also notes the significance 
of the tactics of rural women movements in advancing their case for access to arable 
land outside the realm of formal law and institutions.
23
 
II THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE RESPONSIBILIZED STATE: 
THE PUBLIC TRUST AND THE SOCIAL TRUST UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
 
 In Chapter 4, it has been noted that Malawi adopted a largely liberal 
democratic constitution in 1994. The Constitution provides for, among other things, 
constitutional supremacy; an entrenched Bill of Rights; equal and universal suffrage; 
fundamental principles which state, among other things, that all legal and political 
authority of the State derives from the people of Malawi; and creates the public trust 
and the social trust. More precisely, section 12 of the Constitution provides for the 
public trust and the social trust which form part of the basis for legal and political 
authority in Malawi. It states: 
 This Constitution is founded upon the following underlying principles–  
 
(i) All legal and political authority of the State derives from the people of 
Malawi and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution solely to 
serve and protect their interests. 
(ii) All persons responsible for the exercise of powers of State do so on trust and 
shall only exercise such power to the extent of their lawful authority and in 
accordance with their responsibilities to the people of Malawi. 
(iii) The authority to exercise power of State is conditional upon the sustained 
trust of the people of Malawi and that trust can only be maintained through 
open, accountable and transparent Government and informed democratic 
choice. 
(iv) The inherent dignity and worth of each human being requires that the State 
and all persons shall recognize and protect fundamental human rights and 
afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups 
and minorities whether or not they are entitled to vote. 
                                                 
22
 See FE Kanyongolo, above. Kanyongolo suggests that there are civil society groups that question the 
status quo of land relations in the country. However, these groups, if anything, are sporadic and 
spontaneous gatherings of a people agitating for access to arable land: See for example the occupation 
of the Makandi Estate discussed in Chapter 4. They are not movements in the sense of having a 
permanent existence and a hierarchy. Hence, I prefer to refer to such incidences as inchoate rural 
movements. 
23
 See A Manji, Introduction, note 4, 99–121.  
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(v) As all persons have equal status before the law, the only justifiable 
limitations to lawful rights are those necessary to ensure peaceful human 
interaction in an open and democratic society. 
(vi) All institutions and persons shall observe and uphold the Constitution and 
the rule of law and no institution or person shall stand above the law. 
 
Section 12 emphasizes some nine principles on exercise of State authority. 
These principles are: The people are the root of legal and political authority of the 
State; second, the exercise of the legal and political authority of the State is delineated 
by the Constitution itself; third, the exercise of the legal and political authority of the 
State shall be for protection of the interests of the people; fourth, persons exercising 
the powers of the State do so on trust; fifth, persons exercising powers of the State do 
so as fiduciaries since they are under a duty to do so lawfully and in line with their 
responsibilities to the people; sixth, the maintenance of the trust for the exercise of the 
powers of the State depends on an open, accountable and transparent Government, 
and informed democratic choice; seventh, the recognition and protection of human 
rights of persons in the country is derived from the inherent dignity and worth of 
every person; eighth, all persons are equal before the law; and finally, the Constitution 
has universal application to all persons and institutions and every person and 
institution shall comply with it. 
The notion of the public trust and the social trust need elaborating. First, it is 
necessary to clarify the notion of ‘trust’ itself: It has been argued that trust, together 
with reciprocity, solidarity and cooperation are the ‘habits of the heart’ of social 
behaviour.
24
 While it has been difficult to underpin the notion of ‘trust’ in definitive 
terms, ‘trust’ has been described as an ‘encapsulated interest’. Kenneth Newton states: 
Trust involves risk, it is true [...] but it also helps to convert the Hobbesian state of nature from 
something that is nasty, brutish, and short, into something that is more pleasant, more 
efficient, and altogether more peaceful. Social life without trust would be more intolerable 
and, most likely, quite impossible.
25
 
 
Turning to the public trust and the social trust: The public trust in public law 
has constituted a ‘mixture of ideas’ which have ‘floated freely’ in constitutional 
theory. However, central to the notion of the public trust is the idea that the ‘right to 
govern’ must be exercised for the benefit of the civic public.26 Hence, as a practical 
                                                 
24
 See K Newton ‘Social Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society and Democracy’ (2001) 22(2) 
International Political Science Review 201, 202 [internal citations omitted]. 
25
  See K Newton, above, 202 [internal citations omitted]. 
26
 See generally JL Sax ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention’ (1969–70) 68 Michigan Law Review 471.  For a discussion of the conception of the ‘civic 
public’: See PP Ekeh, Chapter 4, note 55. 
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matter, the choices of the ‘governors’ must conform to the wishes of the ‘governed’.27 
The social trust, on the other hand, is rooted in social capital theory. It forms the basis 
of an individual’s participation in a social system.28 While scholars such as Newton 
make a distinction between social trust and political trust on the basis of social capital 
and political capital respectively,
29
 in the context of constitutional theory, I suggest 
that the distinction is blurred since the exercise of the State, ‘juridical’ power has, one 
way or the other, implications for the relations of the civic public in a social system. 
In respect of the public trust under the section 12 of the Constitution, its nature 
lies in at least two attributes: the existence of the trust is publicly constituted under the 
Constitution itself; and the sustenance of the trust is dependent on an open, 
accountable and transparent Government. The nature of the social trust, on the other 
hand, lies in the fact that the exercise of the fiduciary duty that the Constitution has 
reposed in persons exercising the powers of the State shall be in accordance with the 
responsibilities of those fiduciaries towards the people as specified by the 
Constitution itself. Indeed, Kamchedzera and Banda have argued that the nature of the 
social trust also lies in the use of terms such as ‘trust’, ‘open’, ‘accountable’, 
‘transparent’; and I would add ‘informed, democratic choice’. All these descriptors 
point to the nature of governing in the country.
30
 
The public trust and the social trust mark a conceptual shift from social 
contract to a constitution–based fiduciary relationship between the ‘governed’ and the 
‘governors’. Under social contract, the emphasis is on the conduct of ‘citizens’ – the 
‘governed’ – while under a constitution–based fiduciary relationship, the focus is on 
the conduct of the ‘rulers’ – the ‘governors’. The constitution–based fiduciary 
relationship is underpinned by the Lockean ‘right to revolution’ where a ‘sovereign’ 
that betrays the trust of ‘men’ must be ‘overthrown’.31 In this respect, under the public 
trust and the social trust under the Constitution, the consent of the people as the 
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 See JL Sax, above, 483. 
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 See K Newton, note 24. 
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 See K Newton, above. 
30
 See G Kamchedzera & CU Banda, The right to development, the quality of rural life, and the 
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‘governed’ is not deferred. In this way, the exercise of the State authority is always 
subject to the terms of governing set by the people.
32
 
To the extent that the people are the root of legal and political authority under 
section 12 of the Constitution, the public trust and social trust can also be considered 
in terms of constituent power and constituted power. In constitutional theory, 
commentators have argued that political authority derives from the people who are the 
repository of constituent power. Negri contends that constituent power is an 
expression of the popular will; it is the power of the ‘multitude’. Hence, democracy is 
appurtenant to the concept and practice of constituent power. He contends that 
constituent power is in constant conflict with constituted power, which is the fixed 
power of formal constitutions. Constituent power, in Negri’s thesis, would lie neither 
with the legislature nor the judiciary as, according to him; the propensity ‘to revolt’ 
lies with the people themselves.
33
 
It has been suggested that those whose authority is necessary for constitution–
making – the ‘governed’ as the repository of constituent power – cannot do so without 
surrendering that authority to ‘institutional’ sites – the ‘governors’ as the holders of 
constituted power. This apparently epitomizes the paradox of constitutionalism.
34
 The 
paradox resonates with the point Antonio Gramsci makes on the deference of the 
‘governed’ in the context of ‘spontaneous’ consent.35 However, it is contended here 
that in light of the nature of the public trust and the social trust under the Constitution 
neither the deference nor the paradox has a basis in Malawi’s constitutional order at 
least at the normative level. It is clear under the Constitution that the public trust and 
the social trust maintains a constitution–based fiduciary relationship between the 
‘governed’ and the ‘governors’ such that, at the normative level, the terms of 
governing will have been set down by the ‘governed’ as the repository of constituent 
power. 
In practice, the position is more nuanced. In light of the nature of the 
neopatrimonial State that has been discussed in Chapter 4, it is possible to conclude 
that the deference or paradox exists at the level of constitutional practice in Malawi. 
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The deference or paradox, in my view, arises out of practice as opposed to norm. 
Since the deference or paradox arises out of practice, the extent to which the land 
deprived may express gnosis is crucial in the resolution of the land question in the 
country. The normative framework of the public trust and the social trust under the 
Constitution forms the benchmark for the responsibilized State in land reform in 
Malawi. Beyond this benchmark, in sections III and IV, I outline the nature of the 
beneficial interest in land, and the re–location of law in the political economy as the 
complementary attributes of people–generated responsibilization. 
 
III RE–CONFIGURATION OF LAND REFORM: THE BENEFICIAL 
INTEREST IN LAND 
 
In Chapter 2 it has been argued that approaching conception of the 
‘customary’ space under the right to property as a social relation framework reveals 
the (social) construction of the space under hegemonic responsibilization. The 
construction of the ‘customary’ space, in my view, has resulted in a number of 
problems in resolving the land question. These problems include: an ill–conceived 
conception of a category of land known as ‘customary land’ under the 1967 Reforms; 
the continued focus on the efficiency argument in land reform discourse; the ill–
conceived conception of the ‘customary’ estate under the Land Policy; the 
problematic role of chiefs in the ownership of the so–called ‘customary’ land in the 
‘customary’ space; and the lack of distinction of attributes of property in terms of 
nominal title, control, benefit, and management. These four attributes of property 
have implications for the conception of land ownership and the direction that the land 
reform may take in the country. 
In Chapters 2 and 4, it has been demonstrated that the legal title to the so–
called ‘customary’ land under the Land Act vests in the President under a political 
trust.
36
 The people of Malawi – as described under the Act – merely have a right to 
use or occupancy. They do not have an enforceable right at law. Even though the 
Land Act states that the President holds the ‘customary’ land as a trustee of the people 
of Malawi, it has been concluded that the comprehensive powers that the postcolonial 
State has over the ‘customary’ land obliterates any notion of a fiduciary relationship 
by operation of a trust. If anything, the people of Malawi use or occupy the so–called 
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‘customary’ land under an interest similar to a tenancy at will.37 In this framework, 
the so–called category of land called ‘customary’ land is in fact part of public land 
under the Land Act. 
On the basis of this ‘special’ tenancy, I have argued in Chapters 2 and 4 that it 
creates a beneficial interest in the land in favour of the people of Malawi on the basis 
of their use or occupancy of the so–called ‘customary’ land. It has then been 
concluded, in that context, that it is useful for analysis to construe a constitution–
based fiduciary relationship under section 12 of the Constitution. Hence, under the 
land reform in the country, the responsibilized State must guarantee access to 
available arable land as the minimum core for dignified living on the part of the land 
deprived. This is the context of the conception of the beneficial interest in land: 
A The Beneficial Interest in Land 
There is a legal basis of a beneficial interest in land. In light of the conception 
of the ‘customary’ space, it is pertinent to ‘disentangle’ the (various) rights, if at all, in 
this space. In this respect, Jean–Philippe Colin is a good starting point in this 
‘disentanglement’.38 He suggests three traits of the ‘right’ to ‘property’: The first trait 
relates to the right of use. He has said: ‘ the rights related to the use of the land’, that 
is, ‘use right stricto sensu (which can be exclusive or not), right to appropriate the 
return from the land, right to bring long–term improvements such as planting 
perennial crops, fencing, draining off’. The second trait relates to the right to alienate. 
This is the right to transfer the preceding rights, temporarily or permanently, through 
market (land lease through fixed or share contracts, land sale, pledging, mortgaging) 
or non–market (loan, gift, bequeath, inheritance) devices. Finally, the third trait relates 
to what he calls ‘administration rights’. He has said the administration rights, that is 
the rights to define others’ rights by controlling land use and transfer – who can do 
what with which parcel of land – and therefore who is excluded.’39 Colin concedes 
that the nature of the ‘rights’ must not be reified as they are not strong and 
unambiguous.
40
 In the final analysis, the ‘disentanglement’ brings us back to (initial) 
conception of the ‘customary’ as a space and as a distinct type of ‘tenure’. It is 
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possible to conclude from Colin’s analysis or ‘disentanglement’ that  the so–called 
‘customary’ tenure is imbricated in the colonial construction of the nature of the 
‘customary’; and that, in any event, the much lauded communitarian ethos (when 
taken at face value as to its legitimacy) is stratified. 
The beneficial interest in land builds upon the nature of the ‘tenancy at will’ 
that is located in public land under the categories of land under the Land Act.  This 
development must always be considered in the context of the right to property as a 
social relationship. It has been observed in Chapter 2 that property has an inherent 
power relationship. This is the political economy basis of the beneficial interest. The 
interest arises out of two underlying notions of property as a social relation: property 
as a ‘socially derived privilege of use’ and property as a type of trust or stewardship to 
the civic public.
41
 In respect of property conceived as a privilege of use, Gray and 
Gray state: 
‘Property’ in land can therefore be conceptualized as those publicly endorsed forms of user 
which the state allows individuals to enjoy and which can be varied or withdrawn at the sole 
discretion of, and on terms dictated by, the state. ‘Property’ is no more than a highly qualified, 
ultimately defeasible privilege for the citizen. On this view, property incorporates a notion not 
of right but of restraint, reflecting a state–directed responsibility to contribute towards the 
optimal exploitation of all land resources for communal benefit. ‘Property’ no longer 
articulates the arrogance of entitlement, but expresses the instead commonality of obligation, 
‘property’ consisting simply of allocations of land–based utility coordinated towards a defined 
common good.
42
 
 
Indeed, it has been held that the right to property must be counterweighted with its 
social function and the State must proactively ensure that the public interest 
prevails.
43
 The second notion of property as stewardship emanates from 
environmental welfare theory.
44
 In relation to the second notion, Gray and Gray 
observe: 
If all ‘property’ in land is held subject to a wide range of publicly conditioned constraints, it 
follows that the deeper constraints of ‘property’ is not absolute or oppositional in nature. It is, 
instead, delimited by a pervasive sense of community–directed obligation and is rooted in a 
contextual network of mutual restraint and social accommodation mediated by the agencies of 
the state. 
 
[...] 
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‘Property’ becomes not a summation of individualized power over scarce resources, but an 
allocative mechanism for promoting the efficient or ecologically prudent utilization of such 
resources.
45
 
 
The notion of property as a social relation based on the privilege of use and 
stewardship respectively resonates with the public trust and the social trust under the 
Constitution.  
 Possession as the root to title in land is the core grounding of the beneficial 
interest in land. Possession has been described as ‘the ultimate basis of “title” to an 
“estate” in land.’46 The nature of ‘possession’ here is nuanced.47 It presupposes a 
number of factors: first, there must be a connection of control by a person over the 
land.
48
 Second, there must be more than the idea of mere physical occupancy. A 
person must have the intention to exclusively possess – the animus possidendi – 
which is underlined by the person’s perception that they are entitled to defend and 
exert permanence of their right to property in the land.
49
 Statutory devices have 
developed a third and fourth element of possession. These elements are that the 
possession must not be disturbed
50
 and there must be no superior title to the one 
claimed by a possessor.
51
 
 It has been argued in Chapter 2 that the so–called ‘customary’ land in Malawi 
is in actual fact public land if the full effect of the Land Act is taken into account. 
Hence, the possession that accrues to the land deprived as tenants at will is inferior to 
the ‘title’ of the postcolonial State in respect of the public land. In light of the 
obligation of the governors under the public trust and the social trust under the 
Constitution, the postcolonial State has a constitutional duty to ensure the greater 
public good by guaranteeing that the land deprived fulfil their aspiration for 
possession of parcels of land suitable for dignified living. This, as I have also argued 
before, requires a responsibilization of the State based on constituent power. In this 
train of thought, I echo CB Macpherson’s words that the ‘idea of property’ must be 
                                                 
45
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broadened to include ‘a right to a kind of society or set of power relations which will 
enable the individual to live a fully human life.’52 He states: 
Property will [...] have to include not only a right to a share in political power as instrumental 
in determining the kind of society, but a right to that kind of society which is instrumental to a 
full and free life.
53
 
 
It may be recalled that the constituency of the land deprived has access to less than 
0.5 hectares of arable land and such miniscule parcels of land cannot support dignified 
living. 
 It needs mentioning that under English land law and trusts law, the beneficial 
interest in land is ‘engrafted’ to a legal title under a pre–existing trust; regardless of 
whether the trust is express or implied.
54
 There is an underlying ‘conscientious 
obligation’ in the nature of the beneficial interest in land under English land law and 
trusts law that takes precedence over a ‘strict legal right.’55 It has been said however 
that establishing a beneficial interest in land is not an exercise where a court sits 
‘under a palm tree’ in order to ‘exercise a general discretion’ that is ‘fair’.56 The 
process is structured and laboured and seeks to establish the intention to set a 
beneficial interest.
57
  
 In relation to the land question in Malawi, it is imperative that the land 
deprived as ‘tenants at will’ under public land are effectively recognized as having 
beneficial interest in land. It is argued here that while the legal title of the postcolonial 
State to public land lies in its eminent domain as the sovereign, the existence of a trust 
arises from section 12 of the Constitution on the basis of a political economy 
justification. Hence, in the context of dignified living, the beneficial interest may also 
be justified under human rights law. Here, the general argument is that the link 
between human rights and human dignity is in recognition at international law of the 
‘inherent worth’ of every human being.58 This is the root of human–being–ness.59 
However, Kamchedzera and Banda argue that while human dignity cannot be lost, 
dignified living can. They argue that ‘certain conditions’ must be existent in a 
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political economy which make living dignified and conducive.
60
 In this sense, 
dignified living is not universal in reality; even though it is a universal aspiration. 
They also cite a 1997 study which used material and non–material indicators to 
measure a people’s well–being. They note that in that study, lack of land was one 
example of non–dignified living that the participants highlighted.61 The human rights 
context of dignified living resonates with David Bilchitz’s minimum core approach to 
the potential of economic, social and cultural rights in addressing impoverishment and 
inequality.
62
 
B Securing the Beneficial Interest in Land 
 If in the words of Macpherson, access to land is a hallmark for a full human 
life, I propose that in terms of the public trust and the social trust under the 
Constitution, the postcolonial State has a duty to provide the beneficial interest in land 
of the land deprived both a legal and non–legal framework of support. The two 
frameworks must be complementary and not mutually exclusive. In terms of a 
proposal of a legal framework, the polity may consider the following: The beneficial 
interest in land may be recognized as private interests in favour of the land deprived 
on the basis of the fact that the postcolonial State has title to the public land. 
Presently, there is no basis for a direct recognition of the beneficial interest as private 
interests. This then raises the presumption of alienability that is pervasive under 
English land law and trusts law. In view of the economic reality of the land deprived 
as described in the Introduction, the presumption of alienability immediately raises 
the issue of the threat of foreclosure and distress sales which would in turn 
(potentially) leave the land deprived (once again) exposed to destitution. In light of 
the threat of foreclosure and distress sales, other non–legal strategies may have to be 
considered. 
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IV LAW IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The recognition of the beneficial interest in land raises its own set of 
challenges since it is brought within direct ambit of law. The point has been repeated 
throughout the thesis: It is perilous to privilege law in land reform; especially the 
tendency to translate land reform into an exclusively land law reform project. This is 
not to suggest that law does not have a role in land reform at all. However, undue 
privilege of law in land reform amounts to the continuation of the notion of the 
objectivity of law. The objectivity of law is a myth. Law does not always support 
objective goals. The subjectivity of law is writ large and in the context of the land 
question in the postcolony the position is not different from other contexts. This is 
particularly the case when close attention is given to legal rules and principles at the 
expense of equally important social and political contexts. Brink et al.
63
 have argued 
that the subjectivity stems from the fact that the right to property as a social relation is 
inherently a political process and the ascertainment of the rights in land is not always 
inclusive, democratic and fair. A one–dimensional imposition of law as a tool for 
ascertainment ignores the underlying power relations at play. Once law is analyzed in 
its political economy, it affords an opportunity to examine the role of law in 
entrenching a (capitalist) economy, defining or reproducing social relations, and its 
potential for radical social transformation.
64
 In this vein, I argue that once we 
acknowledge a nuanced understanding of the ‘customary’ space and the related 
problems that surround the institutions of chiefs, it becomes pertinent to understand 
the beneficial interest in land in light of the role of law in the political economy as the 
country seeks to resolve the land question.  
Following the different strands of the nature of the ‘customary’ space that 
have been discussed in Chapter 2, the debates that ensue in the resolution of the land 
question in Malawi must address the utility of land in three broad areas: the first area 
is concerned with the efficiency argument; that is, whether there must be more 
available arable land to sustain an estate sector or ‘smallholder’ farming, or indeed 
both, in advancing the agricultural productivity of the country. The second area relates 
to policy synergy; that is, the extent to which the various policy frameworks that 
inform the economy of the country may be harmonized in the context of the land 
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question. This should explore the extent to which the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy and the Land Policy can be harmonized. Finally, the third area 
relates to the egalitarian argument about fairness in the resolution of the land question. 
Here the focus is the appropriation of ‘history’ and ‘culture’ on account of path 
dependence which in the end undermines the resolution of land question in the 
country. 
A ‘Efficiency’: Estate Sector versus Smallholders  
 
 The central thrust under the efficiency argument is that small farm sizes are 
economically inefficient as they do not optimally utilize land, labour and capital for 
high farm productivity. It must be noted that the efficiency argument has been 
pervasive in the land reform discourse in the country as the discussions in the 
preceding Chapters demonstrate.  
In the context of the land question in Malawi, the efficiency argument is 
weakened when other ‘market’ factors are taken into account. Chirwa has pointed out, 
in the context of an analysis of the Community Based Rural Land Development 
Project, that a complementary agricultural input programme to households led to 
greater food security.
65
 He however concluded that sustainability of a food secure 
environment in ‘smallholder’ households would likely be undermined by the 
imperfect markets in transport, labour, credit and other financial sectors which often 
fail to meet the needs of the smallholders.
66
 
 The current rhetoric from the postcolonial State suggests that the agricultural 
sector must move towards more commercial agriculture.
67
It is not clear from the 
statements that have been made whether the increased commercialization of 
agriculture will mean that more initiatives will be introduced to support the estate 
sector only or the smallholders only or both. Conversely, it is not clear whether the 
increased commercialization will mean the introduction of mechanized agricultural 
practices in the smallholders since the practices in the sector are traditional and 
predominantly non–mechanized.  
 In sum, the efficiency argument that gets polarized between the support for the 
estate sector or smallholders is reductionist. What must be pursued in the country are 
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initiatives that boost agricultural productivity through, at least in the short to medium 
terms, the provision of State–sponsored complementary agricultural input 
programmes, and the perfection of the markets in the transport, labour, credit and 
other financial sectors by making them more smallholder–friendly.68 This framework 
would meaningfully complement initiatives towards the development of the beneficial 
interest in land. 
B Policy Synergy: The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
and the National Land Policy 
 
 In Chapters 5 and 6, it has been concluded that there is no synergy between the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy and the Land Policy. I have made the 
point that while the Land Policy is meant to be the driving force behind reform in the 
agrarian and other attendant sectors in the country, I pointed out that as long as the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy is the ‘overarching blueprint’ of 
development in the country, all sectoral policies must conform to the Strategy as the 
main white paper of the postcolonial State. As things stand, the lack of synergy 
between the Strategy and the Policy undermines the resolution of the land question. 
This is an area where the notion of gnosis and people sovereignty under the public 
trust and the social trust may be pursued to ensure that the ‘governors’ in the country 
re–visit the purposes of establishing the two policy frameworks and, with a sense of 
urgency, harmonize them.  
As the two frameworks currently stand, the land deprived are unlikely to 
benefit under the land reform in the country. In this respect, the contradiction and 
confusion between the two frameworks serves as ‘tools’ for ‘economic conquest’ 
whereby the state of impoverishment is indeed ‘an integral part of the discourse of 
wealth.’69  
C ‘Fairness’ 
 
 Brink et al. have observed that the ‘fair’ use and ownership of land changes 
with time.
70
 The logic of colonial capitalism created a ‘rural apartheid’ which in the 
regional context entrenched the land question in Southern Africa.
71
 Unmediated land 
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relations that are perceived as ‘unfair’ lead to political and economic instability in a 
country.
72
 They have stressed that ‘restoring a more equitable distribution of land will 
greatly contribute to more social cohesion, which will foster more inclusive 
institutions and policies, and hence better long–term development.73 
V THE RESPONSIBILIZED STATE: A RESTATEMENT 
 In light of the discussion of the four pillars of people–generated 
responsibilization, the call for a responsibilized State emerges in the following 
context: Under hegemonic responsibilization that has marked land relations in the 
country, availability of arable land has been consistently lop–sided in favour of large 
estate agriculture. Agricultural policy has been skewed towards increased land 
alienation to expand the estate sector. This, in effect, has meant dwindling land sizes 
or greater pressure for access to arable land on the part of the land deprived. The 
responsibilization has been possible through legal and policy devices that have 
perpetuated land alienation; unsustainable commodity pricing in the smallholders’ 
produce markets; exploitative labour policies; and policy responses developed by the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (particularly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) that have merely localized market–based land reform models.  
 Hence, the proposition of gnosis and the drama of citizenship as a key mindset 
for land reform in the country places a critical responsibility on the citizen (in settling 
the terms of ‘governing’) to re–interpret the strategies for the resolution of the land 
question in the country. The re–interpretation that is being proposed must be from the 
‘reality’ of the land deprived. Further, under this re–interpretation, it has been asserted 
that the public trust and the social trust under the Constitution confer constitutional 
responsibility upon the ‘governors’ in their exercise of the right to ‘govern’ to ensure 
that the aspiration for dignified living is realized. The public trust and the social trust 
are rooted in people sovereignty. The constitutional basis of the public trust and the 
social trust leads to the proposition of the beneficial interest in land. Finally, the re–
location of law in the political economy provides the basis for a more holistic 
approach to the resolution of the land question in the country. 
 In sum, the nature of the responsibilized State under a framework of analysis 
based on people–generated responsibilization for purposes of the resolution of the 
land question emerges from the triangulation of its four pillars. This should allow a 
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right to access as opposed to the perpetuation of the right to exclude under hegemonic 
responsibilization; given that the latter is underpinned by market as value.
74
 On this 
basis, the possibility of government action as recognized under the Mabo discourse 
and the Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case provides an opportunity to ameliorate the 
issues that arise under market–based land reform models as discussed in Chapter 3; 
namely, the preference of the land owners, the absence of post–land distribution 
support mechanisms, and insufficient programme financing. 
VI FINAL WORD 
 The framework of a responsibilized State for purposes of enhancing the 
resolution of the land question in Malawi presupposes assertion and proaction. The 
responsibilized State only becomes a reality if there is a combination of assertion and 
proaction on the part of the citizen as the repository of constituent power. The 
transition of assimilation through the Brechtian struggles of the land deprived that 
have been discussed in Chapter 6 are significant interventions in shaping the manner 
of the responses to the land question.  
However, such counter–conduct must be complemented by the informed 
intervention and participation in the development of (macroeconomic) policy for the 
country. The nature of the intervention and participation during the development of 
policy is where the battle of ideas must be most fierce. So far, narrow, sector–specific 
policy intervention; strict advancement of the efficiency argument; one–dimensional, 
legal positivist approaches; and the lack of meaningful triangulation of all the critical 
elements of the political economy – all these, have undermined resolution of the land 
question in the country. People–generated responsibilization proffers a holistic, 
people–based approach to the land question, where for example, a fair land 
redistribution model may be re–visited. Second, there is an urgent need in the country 
to explore ways of relieving pressure off land as the only viable resource for dignified 
living. This can be through policy interventions that may lead to the development of 
non–agriculture–based economic enterprise for the erstwhile land deprived. 
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Conclusion 
 
[The] village has got many people and land pressure is acute. There is no land even for a toilet.
1
 
    
 
I REITERATIONS 
 
The participant’s lamentation shows that the land question is not merely about 
pieces of arable land as factors of production. It is about the dignity inherent in a 
human being and the attendant aspiration for dignified living. The postcolonial State 
recognizes this fundamental condition of livelihood. The Malawi Law Commission in 
making recommendations for the registration of ‘customary’ estates notes that 0.5 
hectares would be adequate for farm structures which constitute a dwelling house, 
animal houses, granaries, a latrine and any other structure that may be required by the 
household.
2
  
The socio–economic profile makes the dirge louder: As at 2007 and in a 
country of some 13.1 million people, as much as 10.48 million people in Malawi have 
access to less than 0.5 hectares of arable land; that the national average per capita of 
cultivated land area stands at less than 0.22 hectares; that as much as 40 per cent of 
the human population is impoverished; that 15 per cent of the population is ‘ultra 
poor’; and that the agricultural sector accounts for 85 per cent of total employment in 
the country.
3
 The story of the land question in Malawi is one of impoverishment; it is 
one of exclusion at the expense of inclusion. It is a story about scarcity that leads to 
less than dignified living. 
Amidst this bleak socio–economic reality, a number of law and policy 
interventions have been invoked and re–invoked to supposedly foster ‘development’ 
in the country. These interventions lead to the automatic translation of land reform 
into land law reform under the so–called new wave of land reform. In Malawi, the 
latest ‘policy’ interventions ‘coalesce’ under the Land Policy adopted in 2002.  The 
Policy is touted as a key component for a vibrant agro–based economy and 
simultaneously as the blueprint for the resolution of the land question in the country. 
Hence, this thesis has sought to examine whether the Land Policy and its attendant 
framework can or cannot resolve the land question. 
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It has been noted that the nature of the land question at the continent–level in 
Africa or at the national space is mired in confusion and dissensus. For analytical 
purposes, the land question in Malawi has four dimensions: the nature of colonial 
capitalism; the nature of the neopatrimonial State; the normative issue of the 
conception of the ‘customary’ space; and finally, the interests of the key 
constituencies under land reform in the country; namely, the postcolonial State, the 
Bretton Woods Institutions, the Achikumbe, and the land deprived. 
Three issues have been the points of focus: Conception of the right to property 
in land and its implication for land reform; the precise nature of the land question; and 
the competing interests of the key constituencies and their implication for the 
resolution of the land question. The thesis is based on the Foucauldian idea of 
governmentality and a framework for analysis based on the idea of responsibilization. 
This approach enables an examination of situations and processes that can or cannot 
enhance the resolution of the land question. This means that in examining the land 
question, the thesis goes beyond law. Hence, under governmentality, law is only one 
of the norms; one in a range of multiform tactics.
4
 Responsibilization then relates to 
the process where a norm, as a tool of governance, becomes practice.
5
 
Under a genealogical account of the land question, a number of conclusions 
have been made: First, the confusion and dissensus that traverses the nature of the 
African land question has undermined the establishment of a clearly defined purpose 
and direction of land reform and is replicated in the context of the nature of national 
land questions. Second, the complication of the African land question is exacerbated 
by the multiplicity of interests of various constituencies competing for the control of 
access to available arable land. Related to this, it has been argued that history and 
context are critical for the examination of the land question in African postcolonial 
economies such as Malawi. In this respect, the following commonalities have been 
found useful for analysis: the nature of colonial capitalism, law and policy of the 
emergent postcolonial State, and economic globalization.  
Third, the following four dimensions constitute the land question in Malawi 
for analytical purposes: The first dimension relates to the nature of colonial 
capitalism. The second dimension relates to the neopatrimonial nature of the 
postcolonial State. The third dimension relates to the normative issue of the 
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conception of the ‘customary’ space. Finally, the fourth dimension relates to the 
competing interests of the key constituencies.  
In relation to the first dimension, the historicized and contextualized narrative 
of colonial capitalism has shown that the liberal conception of the right to property in 
land served a particular ‘convenient end’; namely, the legalization and legitimation of 
land alienation for the entrenchment of white economic enterprise through the 
development of a plantation agriculture sector. I have argued that the conception of 
the right to property as a social relation may lead to the prominence of the beneficial 
interest in land in favour of the land deprived. 
Under the second dimension it has been demonstrated that the neopatrimonial 
State is based on the big bwana syndrome. The terms of governing have been rooted 
in patronage under the three Administrations; namely, the Banda, Muluzi and 
Mutharika Administrations. This stems from Ekeh’s notion of primordial public 
whereby the political legitimacy of a ‘regime’ is based on ethnicity or social class. 
The land question has continued to be determined by the preference for a plantation 
agriculture sector. Traditionally, the responsibilization entailed the ‘positive shaping’ 
of the land deprived as labourers. However, under the new wave of land reform, the 
land deprived are also responsibilized as inchoate producers under contract–based 
schemes such as the Community Based Rural Land Development Project as a 
technique of discipline.
6
  
The third dimension has been discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. The central 
argument is that the conception of the ‘customary’ space is a product of colonial 
construction that served the ‘convenient end’ of inculcating plantation agriculture in 
the colony and postcolony. Further, it has been argued that the ‘customary’ space 
must be problemmatized under the land reform in Malawi. Following from the Mabo 
discourse and the Malawi courts’ decision in Press Trust (Supreme Court) Case, 
government action can legitimize the counter–conduct of the land deprived. 
The conclusion from the discussion of the fourth dimension is that the 
multiverse of the interests of the postcolonial State, the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
the Achikumbe, and the land deprived is difficult to reconcile and poses significant 
challenges for the resolution of the land question. The nature of the multiverse has 
been discussed at the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, market as value 
                                                 
6
 See M Foucault, note 4; and P Fitzpatrick, Introduction, note 4, 151. 
  226 
underpins land reform in the country. A network comprising  Bretton Woods 
Institutions (particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), 
‘Northern’ agents in policy development, and ‘model missionaries’ has meant that the 
postcolonial State has had to implement market–based land reform models in 
response to the land question. At the micro level, history, context and ‘culture’ have 
often been appropriated to serve patronage or entrench local political hierarchies in 
agrarian politics.  
Following the discussion of the four dimensions to the land question in 
Malawi, I suggest that the nature of conduct and counter–conduct of the key 
constituencies respectively means that it is possible to explore people–generated 
responsibilization under the country’s largely liberal democratic constitutional order. 
This requires informed intervention and participation by the land deprived in the 
development of (macroeconomic) policy for the country leading to greater policy 
synergy. So far, narrow, sector–specific policy intervention; strict economistic 
advancement of the efficiency argument; one–dimensional, legal positivist 
approaches; and the lack of meaningful triangulation of all the critical elements of the 
political economy – all these, have undermined the resolution of the land question in 
the country.  
II THE WIDER ANGLE 
Beyond the preceding reiterations, I would like to make some general 
observations regarding the wider context of the thesis: 
A Less Government, More Governance 
 Governance is the epitome of hegemonic responsibilization. It has been noted 
that under governance, the coercive authority of the State is a sufficient but 
unnecessary tenet to ‘governing’. Indeed, governance entails the development of 
guidelines, principles, codes of conduct and standards that are ‘produced’ by the 
State, inter–State agencies and other non–State players under what has been called a 
‘market of authorities’.7 Under a governmentality analysis, it can be said that what 
matters is who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed.
8
 
 It has been observed that the development of the various policy frameworks in 
Malawi under land reform or the wider macro–economy has not been adequately 
synchronized. It has been disjunctive particularly in relation to the land question. I 
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suggest that this disjunction is not an oversight; it is calculative. In any event, 
Foucault has noted under the phenomenon of scarcity that in relation to land, 
government intervention focuses on production. Further, ‘uncertainty’ is a feature of 
biopower. The nature of the macroeconomic frameworks in Malawi do not adequately 
support the land deprived. Such that even though there is a parallel process of land 
redistribution under the willing seller/willing buyer approach, and the implementation 
of macroeconomic reform under poverty reduction strategies such as the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy, in my view, the lack of policy synergy in the 
country will unlikely resolve the underlying issues relating to structural 
impoverishment. In any case, it has been noted in Chapter 5 that land redistribution is 
not a viable long–term solution to the land question. At an average land size of 1 
hectare (present figures reveal landholding sizes of less than 0.22 hectares) and with 
an annual population growth of 3.2 per cent, there would be no arable land to 
redistribute in the country by 2018. There is an urgent need to develop triangulated 
policy interventions that explore the development of other non–agricultural economic 
activity given that at present the country’s economy is heavily agro–based with the 
agricultural sector accounting for 85 per cent of the total work force. 
B The Right to ‘govern’ and the Problem of Abstraction 
 I would like to raise the issue of ‘abstraction’ in ‘governing’ generally, and let 
alone in relation to political economies such as Malawi. There is need to examine 
whether the degree of specificity in relation to a public institution that bears a 
particular duty correlates to effectiveness in delivery of a duty or effectiveness of a 
remedy under a process of redress. For example, section 13 of the Constitution 
provides that the State shall ‘promote the welfare and the development of the people 
of Malawi’ and shall progressively adopt and implement policies and legislation to 
achieve some fifteen national goals.
9
 The goals are varied and the question arises 
whether a specific description of a public institution responsible for each national goal 
augurs well for the attainment of the particular goal. 
 A possible quick response is that the right to ‘govern’ must adhere to the 
tenets of the public trust and the social trust under section 12 of the Constitution. To 
the extent that there are challenges in the enforcement of the obligations of the 
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‘governors’ in the postcolonial State, I suggest that the consent that is inherent under 
the public trust and the social trust also carries with it a corresponding ‘fiduciary risk’. 
This risk arises when the ‘governors’ fail to deliver their obligation under the liberal 
constitutional order. Indeed in the context of the land question, the ‘governors’ 
present a fiduciary risk since for self–interest or otherwise, some 10.48 million people 
in Malawi have access to less than 0.5 hectares of arable land and in the process are 
prone to a less dignified livelihood. 
C Notions of ‘Possibility’ 
 If conduct underpins hegemonic responsibilization, it is suggested that 
counter–conduct must underpin people–generated responsibilization. The following 
recounts a nascent but significant development in the country: In October, 2009, a 
local daily newspaper ran an online story entitled ‘Public service charter to restore 
people as bwanas’. It was reported that a local human rights non–governmental 
organization is implementing a programme through a local government authority in 
the country whereby public officers sign a ‘Public Service Charter’ committing them 
to ‘improve public service delivery’. An official from the organization argued that the 
rationale behind the programme is that through the charters, the ‘ordinary people’ will 
be ‘restored as the real masters since public officers are currently the ones who are 
looked at as masters by the public’. The charter spells out the duty of a public officer, 
the process of complaints and redress.
10
 The public charter, as a device of 
accountability and transparency, must be extended to all levels of public service in the 
country. Admittedly, the initiative has not been fully established. However, it 
represents the mindset that would mirror the idea of gnosis and the drama of 
citizenship. This demands a proactive, engaged citizen as opposed to a statist citizen. 
Suffice it to say that it is reported in the same article however that the postcolonial 
State has developed its own programme where it seeks to introduce ‘a national public 
service charter programme’ in all public offices in the country.11 It is not clear 
whether this State programme will go beyond mere civil servants to include the 
holders of political public offices such as the President, Cabinet ministers or members 
of Parliament. 
 
                                                 
10
 See ‘Public service charter to restore people as bwanas’, available at 
http://www.bnltimes.com//content/view/217/28/ [visited on 14 October, 2009]. 
11
See note 10. 
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III THE THESIS: A PRÉCIS 
The thesis is a comprehensive law and policy analysis of land reform in 
Malawi. The broad contextual parameters of the thesis in relation to the land question 
are twofold: the linkage between (global) development discourse and land reform in 
Malawi; and the discursive continuity of colonial and postcolonial law and policy, and 
the attendant outcomes of the hegemonic responsibilization. Against this background, 
the thesis is restated thus: the land question in Malawi can be resolved through the 
emergence of a responsibilized State under people–generated responsibilization. 
People–generated responsibilization is a holistic, bottom–up approach to tackling 
asymmetrical access to, and ownership of, land in the country. This, it is suggested, 
must entail proactive, people–based action for a triangulated approach to land reform 
involving law, macroeconomic frameworks like poverty reduction strategies, and the 
adherence to the terms of governing under the Constitution.  
People–generated responsibilization has been discussed in detail in Chapter 7 
and comprises four pillars: gnosis and the drama of citizenship, the public trust and 
the social trust under the Constitution, the beneficial interest in land, and the re–
location of law in the political economy. This means that the responsibilized State 
must desist from an automatic translation of land reform into land law reform. I end 
with the words of Mwalimu – Teacher – Julius Kambarage Nyerere: 
If real development is to take place, the people have to be involved.
12
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Available at http://africanhistory.about.com/od/biography/a/qts-Nyerere01.htm [visited on 15 
December, 2009]; the quote is taken from Nyerere’s book Uhuru na Maendeleo [Freedom and 
Development] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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